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Full text of "International law topics and discussions : 1914"

. ■ ".GE 

I AW 






NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TOPICS AND 
DISCUSSIONS 



1914 



*. 






WASHINGTON 
1915 



PREFACE. 



The discussions of the international law topics of 1914 
at the Naval War College were conducted by George 
Grafton Wilson, LL. D., professor of international law 
at Harvard University, who also drew up the notes which 
are published in the present volume. 

The topics before the conferences were for the most 
part suggested by questions raised in connection with the 
proposed Third Hague Conference. Some of the con- 
crete questions were sent to the War College with re- 
quests that consideration be given thereto. As in former 
years the War College is anxious to receive such ques- 
tions as seem to officers to demand consideration. The 
recent changes in the plans of work at the War College 
have made necessary some modifications in the method 
of treatment of the subjects in the conferences. It has 
seemed best, however, that the printed volume should in 
the main correspond to the earlier volumes. 

Attention is called to the appendix, containing pro- 
posed manual of laws of maritime warfare voted by the 
Institute of International Law at its session at Oxford 
in 1913. 

Austin M. Knight, 

Rear Admiral, United States Navy, 

President Naval War College, 
August 1, 1914. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Topic I. — Classification of public vessels 9 

Conclusion 9 

Classification of public vessels 9 

Treatment of public vessels 9 

Notes: 

Introduction 10 

Classification 10 

Vessels used in war 10 

Attempts at definition 11 

Neutrality proclamations 15 

Regulations as to visits 16 

Resume" 17 

Consideration in 1899 18 

Classification, Hospital ships 20 

Cartel ships 20 

Vessels engaged in scientific work 21 

Philanthropic and religious work 21 

Vessels engaged in exploration 22 

Vessels in scientific, philanthropic, exploration 

service 22 

Lighthouses, general 23 

Opinion of Ferguson 23 

Policy in Far East 23 

China 24 

Cuban lights, 1898 24 

Lighthouse, Cape San Juan 25 

Maintenance of lights 27 

Lighthouse vessels 27 

Jurisdiction for revenue purposes 28 

Revenue service of the United States 28 

Revenue and naval service 29 

Treatment of vessels, ships of war 29 

Hospital ships 31 

Institute of International Law, 1913 31 

Cartel ships 31 

Vessels engaged in scientific, philanthropic, re- 
ligious work or in exploration 31 

Lighthouse vessels 33 

Revenue vessels 33 

Other vessels 34 

Conclusions — 

Classification of public vessels 34 

Treatment of public vessels 34 

5 



6 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Topic II. — Regulations relating to foreign ships of war in waters 

under the jurisdiction of the United States 35 

General 35 

In time of peace 35 

When United States is at war 36 

Notes: 

General 37 

Entrance of ships of war in time of peace 37 

German regulation 38 

French regulation 39 

Restrictions as to ports in United States 39 

Regulation as to entrance in time of peace 40 

Number of ships of war 40 

Foreign regulations as to number 40 

Regulation proposed 41 

Length of sojourn 41 

Foreign regulations as to sojourn 42 

Regulation proposed 42 

Departure on notification 42 

Foreign regulations in regard to departure 43 

Regulation proposed . 44 

Anchorage 44 

Foreign regulations as to anchorage 44 

Regulation proposed 44 

Port regulations 44 

Quarantine 45 

Netherlands regulation 46 

French regulations 46 

Foreign port regulations 46 

Regulation proposed 46 

Taking of soundings, use of submarines, air craft, target 

or similar practice 46 

Foreign regulations as to soundings, use of submarines, 

air craft, etc - 47 

Regulation proposed 48 

Carrying of arms 48 

Regulation proposed 48 

Disregard of regulations 48 

Regulation proposed 48 

Exemptions for public officials 49 

Regulation proposed 49 

Vis major 49 

Regulation proposed 49 

Use of canals 49 

Panama Canal 50 

Suez Canal 50 

Project of interparliamentary union 50 

Regulation proposed 51 

Vessels in waters of United States in time of war 51 

Entrance of foreign vessels in time of war 51 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 7 

Topic II. — Regulations relating to foreign ships of war in waters 
under the jurisdiction of the United States — Continued. 

Notes — Continued. Page. 

French regulations in 1913 52 

Decret 52 

Regulations proposed 55 

Conditions of entrance during day 55 

Regulation proposed 55 

Entrance during night, fog or storm 56 

Regulation proposed 56 

Entrance under permission 56 

Regulation proposed : 56 

Entrance without permission 56 

Regulation proposed 57 

General, Foreign regulations as to time of war 57 

Decree of the Queen of the Netherlands 57 

Decree of the King of Italy 60 

Temporary regulations, Russia 63 

Conclusions 66 

General 66 

In time of peace 66 

When United States is at war 67 

Topic III . — Bombardment by naval forces 68 

Conclusion 69 

Notes: 

Admiral Aube on bombardment in 1882 70 

Prof. Holland's opinion in 1888 72 

The Hague Conference of 1899 73 

General discussion at The Hague, 1907 74 

Propositions at Second Hague Conference, 1907 74 

What constitutes defense 75 

British opinion on bombardment because of mines 77 

Vote on article 1, paragraph 2 78 

Ratification of convention 78 

Opinion of Dupuis 79 

Institute of International Law, 1913 79 

Resume 83 

Bombardment of materiel of war 84 

Report at Hague Conference 85 

Doctrines of military necessity 87 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907 89 

Bombardment in Turco-Italian War, 1911-12 91 

Bombardment on plea of military necessity 92 

Institute of International Law, 1896 93 

Comparison of rules for land and sea 93 

Bombardment for provisions, Hague Conference, 1907. . 93 

Bombardment for supplies 95 

General character of requisitions 95 

Conclusion 96 

Institute of International Law, 1913 96 

Conclusion 98 



8 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Topic IV. — Submarine mines 100 

Conclusion 100 

Notes: 

Mines in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 101 

Propositions at The Hague in 1907 102 

Premiere question 104 

Seconde question 105 

Troisi^me question 105 

Quatri6me question 106 

Preamble of The Hague Convention 106 

Tentative character of the convention 106 

Types of mines 106 

Controlled anchored mines 107 

Anchored contact mines 107 

British instructions, 1907 108 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907 108 

Opinion of Dupuis Ill 

Conclusion Ill 

Unanchored mines Ill 

Attitude of United States at The Hague, 1907 113 

Precautions as to unanchored mines 114 

Conclusion 116 

General statement as to area 116 

Propositions as to area, The Hague, 1907 118 

Circumstances determining use of mines 120 

Use of mines for intercepting commerce 121 

Naval War College discussion, 1913 121 

Institute of International Law, 1910-1913 122 

Discussion as to area, The Hague, 1907 123 

Conclusion 128 

Removal of mines 128 

Precautions as to anchored mines 128 

Conclusion 132 

Use of mines by neutrals 132 

Conclusion 134 

Provision for exemption from r*ules as to mines 134 

Conclusion 136 

Use of torpedoes 136 

Conclusion 137 

General 137 

Conclusion 138 

Appendix: 

Les lois de la guerre maritime dans les rapports entre bellig- 
erents, 1913 139 

Index 161 



INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS, WITH CON- 
CLUSIONS AND NOTES. 



Topic I. 

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

How should public vessels be classified having regard 
to their relations to and possible usefulness for warlike 
operations ? 

CONCLUSION. 

Even though there have been propositions to include 
other vessels under the classes granted exemptions, con- 
sidering the present tendencies of international opinion 
and practice the following general classification seems to 
be approved for public vessels : 

Classification of public vessels. 

1. Vessels of war; all vessels under public control for 
military or hostile purposes. 1 

2. Hospital ships under X Hague convention for the 
adaptation to maritime war of the principles of the 
Geneva convention. 

3. Cartel ships. 

4. Vessels engaged exclusively in scientific or philan- 
thropic work or in exploration. 

5. Other vessels. 

Treatment of public vessels. 

1. Vessels of class 1 may, according to the rules of 
war, be captured or destroyed. 

2. Vessels of class 2 are exempt from capture when 
conforming to X Hague convention. 

3. Vessels of class 3 are exempt from capture when 
conforming strictly to the terms of the cartel agreement. 

4. Vessels of class 4 are exempt from capture when 
their status has been made known by notification and 
when innocently employed. 

5. Other vessels are liable to capture. 

1 Usually a public armed vessel under command of a duly commissioned oflficerand 
having a crew under naval discipline. 

9 



10 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

NOTES. 

Introduction. — The changes in methods and means of 
maritime warfare have been more rapid than the changes 
in the laws regulating the conduct of maritime war. The 
rules generally cited were drawn up for the conduct of 
war at a period when wooden ships were used and when 
ships were propelled by sails. The elements of time and 
space then bore a relation to military operations very dif- 
ferent from that of to-day. The attempt to extend the 
old rules to modern conditions has in many cases shown 
these rules inapplicable. 

Classifications. — There has also arisen in consequence 
of changed conditions, a demand for new rules in order 
that States may not suffer undue hardships. In early 
times all ships of the enemy were liable to U^e treatment 
regardless of the fact as to whether they were public or 
private. Now there is not merely a difference in the 
treatment of the public and private ships of the enemy, 
but also in the treatment of different classes of public 
ships. 

Vessels used in war. — In a sense all vessels for hostile 
use may be called vessels of war, but the term should be 
more clearly defined. The introduction of steam as a 
motive power has increased the importance of coal and 
coaling stations, and colliers have become more important. 
The same may be said in regard to other forms of fuel 
and fuel ships. 

The change in material of ship construction has made 
repair ships essential. Docking facilities, dry docks, etc., 
have assumed a new importance. Ports which might be 
suitable as bases for fleets of wooden ships of war may be 
entirely unsuited for modern battleships. 

The highly specialized service of some ships of war 
requires that supplies and other forms of aid be always 
close at hand and supply ships and other auxiliary ships 
have been enrolled in the maritime service. 

The transportation of the military and naval forces is 
often by special troop ships. 

Vessels serving in the various capacities mentioned 
above may be regarded as so closely related to the naval 



ATTEMPTS AT DEFINITION. 11 

service as to be analogous to vessels of war if not actually 
within that category. 

Attempts at definition. — There have been many attempts 
at definition of vessels of war in order to distinguish a ship 
which is liable to the extreme consequences of war from 
a vessel which may receive a somewhat less severe treat- 
ment. The need of clear definition has been particularly 
evident because of the questions arising in regard to con- 
version or transformation of vessels of other classes into 
vessels of war. Naturally if there are to be rules for con- 
version there must be a clear conception of the class into 
which conversion is to be made. The question of defini- 
tion arose at The Hague in 1907 together with the 
question of conversion. 

At this time Great Britain proposed that vessels of war 
should be divided into two categories. 

A. Vaisseaux de combat. 

B. Vaisseaux auxiliaires. 

A. Sera compris dans le terme "vaisseau de combat:" Tout navire 
battant un pavilion reconnu, arme aux frais de 1'Etat pour attaquer 
Tennemi et dont les officiers et 1' equipage sont dument autorises a cet 
effet par le Gouvernement dont ils dependent. II ne sera pas licite 
au navire de revetir ce caractere sauf avant son depart d'un port 
national ni de s'en devetir sauf apres §tre rentre dans un port national. 

B. Sera compris dans le terme " vaisseau auxiliaire:" Tout navire 
marchand, soit belligerant soit neutre, qui sera employe au transport 
de marins, de munitions de guerre, combustibles, vivres, eau ou toute 
autre espece de munitions navales, ou qui sera destine a l'execution 
de reparations ou charge du port de depeches ou de la transmission 
d'information si le dit navire est oblige de se conformer aux ordres de 
marche a lui communique, soit directment soit indirectment, par la 
flotte belligerante. Sera de meme compris dans la definition tout 
navire employe au transport de troupes militaires." (Deuxieme Con- 
ference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 862.) 

These definitions received somewhat full treatment 
and explanation from Lord Reay, who, speaking of the 
term "vaisseau de guerre/' said: 

II me semble qu'il serait opportun d'ajouter quelques mots d' ex- 
plication en appelant votre attention sur les conditions de la guerre 
maritime de nos jours qui sont, vous en conviendrez, tres differentes 
de celles qui existaient du temps de Suffren, de Nelson ou de Paul 
Jones. 

Autrefois, Messieurs, le vent etait 1' element indispensable sans 
lequel une flotte etait paralysee dans ses mouvements; aujourd'hui 



12 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

c'est le charbon qui joue le role principal et sans lui une escadre 
moderne ne peut pas naviguer et se trouve dans l'lmpossibilite" 
d'^chapper a la poursuite de l'ennemi. II est done indispensable aux 
vaisseaux de guerre de faire du charbon et d'organiser a ces fins un 
service de vaisseaux charbonniers qui, le cas £ch£ant, accompagne- 
raient la flotte. On ne saurait con tester que ces vaisseaux charbon- 
niers font partie integrante d'une flotte bellig£rante et que l'ennemi 
s'efforcera tou jours de s'en emparer, quel que soit leur pavilion. En 
effet, supposons qu'une escadre belligerante rencontre des vaisseaux 
charges de charbon a destination de l'ennemi, croyez-vous qu'elle 
h£sitera a les saisir comme faisant partie de l'escadre ennemie? Pour 
ma part, je ne le crois pas. 

Des vaisseaux neutres faisant ce service de ravitaillement rendent a 
l'un des belligerants une assistance hostile que l'adversaire ne saurait 
reconnaitre comme licite et s'exposent de ce fait a toutes les con- 
sequences qui d£coulent de l'£tat de belligerant. Toute fourniture 
de combustibles, de vivres ou de munitions faite par un navire neutre 
accompagnant ou escortant une escadre belligerante, constitue de sa 
part une infraction a la regie generale qui interdit a un neutre de porter 
directement secours a un belligerant. 11 ne s'agit plus, dans l'espece, 
d'une simple entreprise commerciale, mais d'un acte d'ingerence dans 
les operations de la guerre. 

Les navires qui font ce service de revitaillement, ou qui sont charges 
d'executer des reparations ou de porter des depeches, sont directement 
sounds aux ordres des autorites competentes du belligerant. lis sont 
incorpor^s dans ses forces mari times, qu'ils soient armes ou non, qu'ils 
naviguent en conserve avec les flottes du belligerant ou qu'ils attendent 
les ordres de marche ou l'arrivee des navires de guerre, soit en mer, soit 
dans un port. 

Leur caractere belligerant est done incontestable puisqu'ils prennent 
une part active aux operations de guerre. 

Les armateurs qui mettraient leurs navires ainsi a la disposition d'un 
des belligerants les exposent de ce fait a tous les risques et perils en- 
courus par les navires de guerre du belligerant auquel ils pretent leur 
assistance hostile. Reconnaitre la legitimite de leurs actes aurait pour 
effet de prolonger la guerre et d'etendre le theatre des hostilites. Nous 
croyons, Messieurs, que le resultat de l'adoption de notre proposition 
serait au contraire d'accorder une protection plus large aux neutres et 
de limiter les forces belligerantes aux forces nationales qui seules, a 
notre avis, devraient se trouver en presence les unes des autres. 

II est bien entendu que la regie ne s'appliquerait qu'aux navires se 
trouvant dans les conditions precipes et qui rendraient les services 
d£ja £numeres. II ne saurait y avoir aucun doute dans notre esprit 
sur le caractere hostile des services rendus dans ces conditions. 

Selon ces conditions, les navires devont etre places sous les ordres 
directs ou indirects d'un Gouvernement belligerant ou d'un comman- 
dant d'une escadre belligerante; ils devront de temps en temps etre 
incorpores dans une escadre belligerante ou la rejoindre selon les 
circonstances; ils devront etre employes au transport de marins ou de 



ATTEMPTS AT DEFINITION. 13 

soldats, de munitions de guerre, de charbon, de provisions ou d'articles 
d'approvisionnement maritime, ou charges d'executer des reparations 
ou de transmettre des depeches ou des informations a l'escadre dont ils 
dependent. 

Dans ces conditions ils seront considered comrae pretant une assis- 
tance hostile a Tennemi. (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome 
III, p. 847.) 

Admiral Roell, of the Netherlands delegation, raised 
the question whether it was intended to give to these 
"vaisseaux auxiliaires" all the rights of vessels of war- 
He referred to the right of capture of enemy and of 
neutral ships, the right of visit and search, and sojourn 
in neutral ports. 

The American delegate, Gen. Porter, suggested that 
apparently the purpose was to give the belligerents the 
same summary jurisdiction over them that they would 
exercise over regularly commissioned ships of war — i. e., 
they might be seized or destroyed without reference to a 
prize court before or after the act. He also held that a 
vessel engaged in unneutral service would under the 
existing principles of international law be brought 
before a court for adjudication, but under the classi- 
fication and definition proposed by Great Britain would 
be subject to treatment such as the will of an enemy 
commander might dictate. 

The Russian delegate thought that the term "vais- 
seaux auxiliaires" included all private ships, even though 
neutral, which were employed in the transportation of 
fuel, provisions, water, etc., for the belligerent fleet. 

The question of definition of the term "vaisseau de 
guerre" was, after discussion, referred to a committee, 
of which Admiral C. S. Sperry, United States Navy, was 
a member, for special consideration and more precise 
definition. This committee reported through M. Froma- 
geot: 

La proposition britannique, telle qu'elle a ete presentee, comprend 
dans son preambule, comme vous l'avez vu, sous une meme expression 
"vaisseaux de guerre" deux categories: les vaisseaux de combat et 
les vaisseaux auxiliaires. 

S. Exc. Lord Reay a, tout d'abord, declare retirer ce preambule. 

II en requite qu'il ne s'agit plus actuellement de presenter, comme 
une categorie de navires de guerre, les navires vises par la proposition 
britannique sous le nom de navires auxiliaires. 



14 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

La proposition se trouve done actuellement a comprendre deux dis- 
positions nettement distinctes: 

1°. Une disposition relative a la definition du navire de combat, 
e'est-a-dire aux carac teres que doit presenter le navire de guerre pour 
jouir de cette qualite au point de vue du droit des gens. 

A cet £gard, et en r^ponse a une observation du Comte Tornielli, 
1'honorable Delegue britannique a tres nettement declare que rien 
n'6tait plus loin de la pensee de son Gouvernement que de proposer 
un texte pouvant faire songer a un retablissement deguise de l'ancien 
droit de course. 

Aussi bien, ce premier paragraphe n'avait pas a etre examine par le 
Comite. La discussion en parait naturellement devoir etre rattach^e 
a la discussion des propositions presentees sur le meme sujet, par les 
autres Delegations. 

2°. Une disposition apportant une definition de ce que la Delegation 
britannique propose d'appeler "vaisseaux auxiliaires." 

Sur ce point, S. Exc. Lord Reay a explique le point de vue de sa 
Delegation, qui est d'assimiler aux na vires militai res d' une force navale, 
quant au traitement auquel ils sont exposes, les navires de commerce, 
soit employes au service de cette flotte pour un usage quelconque, soit 
places sous ses ordres, soit servant a des transports de troupes, dans 
tous les cas, pretant ainsi a la flotte une assistance evidemment hostile. 

Pour preciser la portee de la proposition, les membres du Comite ont 
tour a tour explique les consequences qu'elle leur paraissait entrainer. 

Le caractere hostile reconnu aux navires transporteurs de munitions, 
combustibles, vivres, etc., a-t-on fait remarquer, ne serait autre chose 
que la consecration de la notion de contrebande — ce qui parait en 
contradiction avec la proposition, faite d'autre part par la Grande- 
Bretagne, d'abolir cette notion. La contrebande destinee a une force 
navale se trouverait ainsi rester saisissable — et, comme on va le voir, 
dans des conditions plus rigoureuses qu'autrefois — tandis que le meme 
transport, destine a un port de l'ennemi, serait licite. 

D'autre part, dans l'etat actual du droit, le navire de commerce 
accompagnant une flotte est simplement expose au traitement de droit 
commun, e'est-a-dire, la capture et la necessity d'une decision de vali- 
dation par une cour de prise. 

L'assujettissement du meme navire au traitement des navires mili- 
taires de cette flotte autoriserait non-seulement la capture sans aucune 
formalite judiciaire de prise," mais encore l'emploi de tous moyens de 
destruction en usage entre forces militaires. 

De cet echange d' observations et des explications fournies par S. 
Exc. Lord Reay, il resulte que le sens et la portee de la proposition 
britannique peuvent se caracteriser comme il suit: 

II ne s'agit pas ici a proprement parler ni de contrebande, ni de 
navires de commerce transform es en navires de guerre, e'est-a-dire 
mobilises. Ce n'est pas le commerce avec le belligerant qui est vise, 
e'est le fait pour un navire d'etre au service de ce belligerant, a quelque 
titre d'ailleurs que ce soit, comme navire-magasin, comme navire- 



NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATIONS. 15 

atelier, comme reserve de vivres, de combustibles ou de munitions; 
peut-etre meme le navire sera sur lest, accompagnant la floite en vue 
de telle ou telle eventualite. 

Ces na vires, au cours de leur service au profit du belligerant, seraient, 
d'apres la proposition britannique, soumis au traitement eventuel des 
navires militaires de ce belligerant, avec toutes les consequences de 
fait et de droit qui en resultent. 

Une fois leur service termine, ils se retrouveraient sous 1' empire du 
droit commun. 

L'expression de "navire auxiliaire " souvent employee pour designer 
des navires mobilisables ou mobilises, et destines a exercer les droits 
de belligerants, pourrait preter ici a confusion. Cette confusion, 
comme on le voit, doit etre evitee. 

Convient-il, ainsi que l'a fait remarquer notre President, M. de 
Martens, de reconnaitre cette nouvelle classe de navires, se placant en 
quelque sorte entre le navire militaire belligerant et le navire priv6? 

Y a-t-il lieu de leur imposer le traitement propose? 

Faut-il distinguer entre le cas du navire voyageant de conserve avec 
la flotte, — le cas du navire voyageant isolement aux ordres de ladite 
flotte, — le cas du navire transporteur de troupes? 

Le Comite d'examen n'avait pas a se prononcer a cet egard. II s' est 
efforce, comme il en etait charge, de preciser la question; il vous 
appartiendra de la resoudre. (Ibid., p. 863.) 

Further discussion led to the withdrawal of the British 
definition of "vaisseau auxiliaire/' and the question so 
far as relates to unneutral service was considered at the 
International Naval Conference, 1908-9, and the con- 
clusions embodied in the Declaration of London, 1909. 

Neutrality 'proclamations. — The proclamations of neu- 
trality have shown that neutrals intended to include 
other ships than those which might be called men-of-war 
in the regulations provided such ships were under bellig- 
erent control. These provisions vary somewhat accord- 
ing to the conditions, but, in general, cover vessels con- 
trolled by belligerents for hostile purposes. 

In 1898, at the time of the Spanish- American War, the 
Brazilian regulations, which were reaffirmed for the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904, stated: 

VIII. No ship with the flag of one of the belligerents, employed 
in the war, or destined for the same, may be provisioned, equipped, 
or armed in the ports of the Republic, the furnishing of victuals and 
naval stores which it may absolutely need and the things indispensa- 
ble to the continuation of its voyage not being included in this pro- 
hibition. (Proclamations and Decrees, p. 14.) 



16 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

Denmark, in 1898, provided that— 

Vessels of war of either belligerent or transport boats belonging to 
their fleets will be permitted to enter the ports and territorial waters 
of the islands, but to remain there only during twenty-four hours, 
except in case they find themselves in distress caused either by bad 
weather, lack of provisions, accident, or other cause. (Ibid., p. 23.) 

The Italian royal decree, of June 16, 1905, embodied 
the same prohibitions in article 12 for " Foreign ships of 
war and merchantmen armed for cruising." 

In 1898, also an imperial ordinance of Japan, No. 
LXXXVII, extended the same rules to " men-of-war and 
such other ships used for warlike purposes" as may "hap- 
pen to be in the territorial waters of the Empire." 

Regulations as to visits. — Several States have issued 
regulations in regard to the entrance of vessels into their 
ports. Not all of the regulations give any definition as 
to the scope of the regulations. Among the statements 
made may be mentioned that of France, which uses the 
word which has been translated as " man-of-war." Arti- 
cle I, of the French Regulations of May 21, 1913, is as 
follows : 

The term "man-of-war" shall be considered as applying not only 
to all the ships designated as such in the recognized sense of this 
word, but likewise to auxiliary ships of all sorts. (Visits of men-of- 
war to foreign ports, p. 14.) 

The German Regulations of August 18, 1911, in the first 
article use the term "warships and other vessels of war of 
foreign powers." In Article VII " ships and vessels of 
foreign navies" are mentioned. In the German Regula- 
tions of May 14, 1913, Article I, the phraseology is "war 
vessels (war ships and war craft) of foreign powers." 

The regulations relating to the Dutch protectorates 
refer to vessels of war as' in the regulations relating to 
Curacao of April 2, 1912, which say: 

Article I. This resolution includes among men-of-war and vessels 
equalized therewith all vessels — 

First. Which carry the outward marks of men-of-war of their nation- 
ality (flag and command flag or split command pennant); 

Second. Whose commander is in the service of the State and is 
charged with the command by the competent authority; and 

Third. Whose crew is subjected to military laws. 



RESUME. 17 

The regulations of the Dutch East Indies of Octo- 
ber 16, 1905, state: 

Article I. In these regulations the term "foreign warships" is to be 
understood to mean — 

I. All warships of nations on friendly terms with the Netherlands. 

II. All ships having on board armed troops of nations on friendly 
terms with the Netherlands. 

Great Britain, in December, 1912, announced, for the 
purpose of regulations for the United Kingdom, that — 

The term "ship of war" is to be understood as including all ships 
designated as such in the accepted sense of the term, and also auxil- 
iary vessels of all descriptions. 

There seems to be a growing tendency to use a brief 
general term to cover all vessels under public control for 
purposes of war. This becomes particularly necessary 
when regulations are to be made in accordance with the 
Hague conventions for regulating the number of ships 
which may be in a neutral port. Such a general defini- 
tion is also convenient in order to avoid misunderstand- 
ings in the time of peace. As privateering is, in gen- 
eral, discountenanced, vessels under public control are 
now regarded as the only legitimate vessels for hostile use. 

Resume. — While the term " fighting ship" or "battle- 
ship" may perhaps be reserved for such vessels as are 
actually equipped for engaging in battle, there is reason 
for a general term which will cover the range of vessels 
used for hostile purposes in time of war. It may be 
difficult to predict whether the issue of a naval campaign 
will depend more upon the battleship or upon supply 
ship and collier. Each may be essential. Each is 
designed for use in war, and several ships may be neces- 
sary to constitute a fighting unit. It is not easy to 
maintain such distinctions under modern conditions as 
were possible earlier, when each ship might be a self- 
sufficient fighting unit. The fact that one ship has the 
guns, another supplies, and another coal, does not neces- 
sarily determine the respective usefulness of each for war 
purposes. Transport ships designed to carry troops from 
one region to another are likewise for purposes of war. 
Many other auxiliary vessels are now necessary, such as 
dispatch boats, repair ships, etc. 

71396—15 2 



18 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

There are, however, certain vessels with a fleet which 
are not there for war purposes, such as hospital ships. 
It is the mission of these to mitigate the evils of war. 
They care for the shipwrecked and wounded of both 
parties, and their purpose is not hostile. 

The object of the service of the battleship, the supply 
ship, the collier, the dispatch boat, etc., is hostile. The 
object of the service of the hospital ship is not hostile. 
The first may be broadly classed as vessels of war, and 
as such are distinct from hospital ships. Therefore the 
term "vessels of war" applies to all vessels under pub- 
lic control for hostile purposes. 

Consideration in 1899. — At the First Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899, the subject of classification of vessels 
devoted to the care of the sick, wounded, and ship- 
wrecked received consideration. The president of the 
committee having the matter in charge, speaking of 
vessels in general which might render hospital service, 
mentioned — ■ 

1. batiments-hopitaux militaires; 

2. batiments de commerce; 

3. batiments bospitaliers, equipes aux frais de societes de secours; 

4. embarcations. (Conference Internationale de la Paix, Troisieme 
Partie, p. 62.) 

Of this proposition Capt. Siegel, of the German delega- 
tion, said: 

M. Siegel dit qu'en soumettant les embarcations a cette decision, 
on a eu en vue de faciliter au commandement superieur le controle des 
na vires admis sur le champ de bataille. 

Cependant cette question souleve des difficult^. 

Les navires dont il s'agit peuvent etre de deux sortes: 

1°. les batiments hospitaliers equipes aux frais de soci^tes de secours, 
reconnus et commissionnes par leurs Gouvernements; 

2°. les batiments de commerce, de plaisance, de peche, etc., qui ee 
trouvent fortuitement sur le champ de bataille. 

M. Siegel est d'avis que les premiers peuvent etre assimiles aux 
navires de l'Etat et que les forcer a arborer un pavilion etranger serait 
un acte incompatible avec la souverainete de l'Etat de qui ils relevent, 
un acte qui pourrait etre consid^re comme peu amical pour la Puissance 
non favoris^e et qui constituerait peut-etre meme une violation de la 
stricte neutralite au benefice de Tun des belligerants. 

Si Ton accorde aux batiments de commerce la liberte" de porter, s'ils le 
jugent a propos, un pavilion stranger avec le pavilion de leur pays, il 



CONSIDERATION IN 1899. 19 

reste toujours le fait d'un acte peu amical qui augmenterait probable- 
ment les risques de l'entreprise. 

M. Siegel ajoute qu'il lui paraitrait utile, dans ces conditions, de 
laisser aux batiments hospitaliers le droit de porter, avec le pavilion 
blanc a croix rouge, exclusivement leur pavilion national en y ajoutant, 
ei cela etait juge* necessaire, une marque distinctive qui serait a deter- 
miner. (Ibid., p. 63.) 

Not merely did the conference of 1899 consider that 
hospital ships should be easily recognizable, but that 
their character should be made known in advance, as was 
shown in the report of the committee: 

La Commission propose done de soustraire a la prise les batiments 
construits ou amenages par les Etats sp6cialement et uniquement en 
vue de porter secours aux blesses, malades et naufrages. Chaque Etat 
construira ou amenagera comme il l'entendra les batiments affectes a 
son service hospitalier; on ne saurait lui imposer aucun type determine. 
L'idee essentielle est que les batiments auront un caractere exclusive- 
ment hospitalier, par suite ne pourront rien porter qui ne soit pas des- 
tine aux blesses ou malades et a ceux qui les soignent, qui puisse etre 
utilise pour des actes hostiles. 

Chaque belligerant doit connaitre les batiments de son adversaire 
auxquels des immunites particulieres sont accordees; il sera done 
necessaire que les noms de ces batiments aient ete officiellement com- 
muniques. A. quel moment cette communication devra-t-elle avoir 
6te faite? Au moment meme de Pouverture des hostilites, les bellig6- 
rants doivent naturellement se notifier les noms de leurs batiments- 
hdpitaux. Mais il serait excessif de n'accepter que les notifications 
faites a ce moment. Un belligerant peut avoir ete surpris par la guerre, 
il n'avait pas d'avance construit ou amenage des batiments-h.6pi.taux; 
ou bien la guerre prend de grandes proportions et les batiments-hdpi- 
taux existants sont juges insuffisants. Ne serait-il pas cruel d'interdire 
aux belligerants la faculte de developper leur service hospitalier suivant 
les necessites de la guerre, par consequent d'amenager de nouveaux 
batiments? C'est ce qui a ete admis. Une notification pourra done 
etre faite au cours meme des hostilites; elle devra seulement pr£c£der 
l'emploi du navire pour son nouveau service. 

La notification des noms des batiments-hopitaux militaires int^resse 
tout d'abord les belligerants; elle peut interesser aussi les neutres, 
puisque, ainsi qu'il va etre explique, une condition particuliere est 
faite a ces batiments dans les ports neutres. II est done a desirer que 
les belligerants portent les noms de ces batiments a la connaissance des 
etats neutres, quand ce ne serait que par une insertion dans leur journal 
ou recueil officiel. (Ibid., p. 14.) 

The Second Hague Conference, 1907, did not make any 
change in the classification adopted at the first confer- 
ence, though it did define somewhat more strictly the 
conditions under which exemptions would be granted. 



20 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

Classification, hospital ships. — Hospital ships form a 
distinct class owing to the functions which they have to 
perform. As hospital ships to whatever nationality 
belonging are performing a public service, they become 
for the time entitled to special exemptions and are under 
special regulations. 

As was determined by the Hague Convention of 1899, 
these ships may be of three classes — (1) military hospital 
ships belonging to the belligerent States, (2) hospital ships 
equipped wholly or in part by private individuals by 
societies of the belligerent State, (3) hospital ships 
equipped wholly or in part by private individuals or by 
societies of a neutral State. The societies above men- 
tioned must be officially recognized relief societies. 

As these hospital ships are under the control and sub- 
ject to the orders of the belligerent commander, they may 
be classed as public vessels. 

The method of control and degree of responsibility to 
the commander of the naval forces may be determined 
by the domestic law of a State, but as regards the conduct 
of hospital ships such as enumerated above the respon- 
sibility to the opposing belligerent is of the nature of a 
public responsibility. 

Hospital ships seem from the above and from other 
reasons properly within the category of public ships, but 
not within the category of vessels of war. 

Cartel ships. — It may be necessary that even in time 
of war some relations may be had between belligerents. 
It may be for the advantage of both belligerents that 
these relations be maintained. During the hostilities it 
may be necessary that certain communications between 
the belligerents be continued or that prisoners be ex- 
changed, particularly since in modern times the conduct 
and treatment of prisoners have been so carefully regu- 
lated. Certain vessels are usually set apart to carry on 
this exchange. If the exchange is for the advantage of 
both parties these vessels should be given full freedom to 
carry on their work. At the same time, as there would 
be exceptional opportunities for dishonorable persons 
to take advantage of their position to the injury of one 
or the other of the belligerents, the full freedom for the 



VESSELS IN SCIENTIFIC WORK. 21 

performance of the specific work would be closely limited 
to the specific work. 

The class of vessels commonly called cartel ships and 
authorized to pass between the belligerents under strict 
regulations will probably continue to be recognized as 
special class. 

Vessels engaged in scientific work. — It has been cus- 
tomary for many years to grant special privileges to ves- 
sels engaging in scientific work which from its nature 
would benefit mankind. Notice of the departure of such 
expeditions has often been transmitted to foreign States 
in order that the vessels might not be interrupted. So 
long as the vessels are strictly employed in 'their scien- 
tific work, the immunity has been readily conceded. 
Sometimes a voyage is undertaken into a remote region 
better to observe an eclipse. The results of such ob- 
servations may be of great general value and any inter- 
ference with the work may be an injury to the State 
which interferes and bring no military advantage. The 
same may be said of expeditions to map the sea currents 
and other like undertakings. 

There may be scientific work which from its nature 
closely resembles work which may be undertaken for 
military purposes. The taking of certain soundings or 
making of certain surveys in time of war may be doubt- 
ful in character and must be clearly shown to have no re- 
lation to the war in order that it may not be stopped or 
even be penalized. A vessel equipped for scientific work 
may be specially suited to serve hostile purposes, and for 
that reason must, if given exemption, be particularly 
careful to avoid suspicion. 

Not merely should such vessels be careful to avoid sus- 
picion, but at the present time it seems a reasonable re- 
quirement that the status of such vessels be made known 
in advance and that they be properly designated in order 
that they may not be put to inconvenience and in order 
that the belligerents may identify such vessels at sight 
and without difficulty. 

Philanthropic and religious work. — There are now many 
vessels engaged in various forms of philanthropic and 
religious work. Usually these vessels, like hospital ships, 



22 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

assist those in need regardless of nationality or attitude 
toward the war. Vessels engaged in philanthropic and 
religious work would ordinarily be equipped with radio- 
telegraphic apparatus and their personnel would be es- 
specially familiar with the region in which they might be 
found. The personnel of such vessels would ordinarily 
not be under responsible State control. The possibility 
that information of a military character might be given 
to a belligerent by such a vessel would always be present. 
Indeed some of the personnel might regard such action as 
a patriotic duty. At the same time, such service as 
these vessels would habitually render might be even more 
needed in time of war than in time of peace. It would, 
for example, be as needful that such service as Dr. Gren- 
fell has rendered to the Newfoundland fishermen should 
continue in war as in peace, because the fishermen are by 
international law and by convention exempt from cap- 
ture and entitled to carry on their ordinary pursuits in 
an innocent fashion. The general principle followed in 
these cases seems to be that persons and property having 
no relation to the war should, so far as possible, be exempt 
from the consequences of war. While private rather 
than public vessels usually engage in such philanthropic 
and religious service, it seems reasonable that such ves- 
sels should be properly designated and that their status 
should be duly established. 

Vessels engaged in exploration. — As the extent of unex- 
plored earth surface decreases, the importance of such 
vessels naturally becomes less. Such vessels are, how- 
ever, sometimes met. The service which they render is 
in a general way of value to all mankind. It is a service 
which, if innocently carried on, does not imply any par- 
ticipation in the war. Public ships are sometimes en- 
gaged in this service and officers of the Navy are fre- 
quently found best qualified to direct such work. Such 
vessels, if belonging to the State, should be notified to the 
foreign States and designated in a manner which will 
make them easily distinguishable. 

Vessels in scientific, philanthropic, exploration service. — 
It is evident that vessels exclusively engaged in scien- 
tific and philanthropic work or in exploration would, in 



LIGHTHOUSES. 23 

general, be entirely unrelated to the war. Their work, 
while not necessarily like that of the hospital ships, would 
in a broad way be for the good of all and would not have 
any belligerent character. These vessels may, therefore, 
form a distinct class because of their aloofness from the 
war. 

Lighthouses, general. — In time of peace lighthouses 
are maintained for the benefit of shipping in general 
without distinction as to nationality. In some instances, 
particularly in earlier times, the shipping coming within 
the jurisdiction of a State might be taxed for the upkeep 
of the lighthouses, and the payment of light dues was not 
unusual. This practice has now for the most part been 
discontinued, though these dues may be covered in the 
tonnage dues. 

Opinion oj Ferguson. — Ferguson, who had been the 
Netherlands minister to China, writing in 1883, said of 
lighthouses, etc. : 

Lighthouses, pilot boats, telegraph vessels, and all vessels belonging 
to institutions which are established exclusively for the convenience, 
security, and public safety of navigation, and for the general benefit of 
all nationalities, are entitled to international protection also during 
war, as long as interference with them is not absolutely necessary in 
connection with stringent measures of war. 

Regarding mail boats (paquebot poste, post-dampfer) we have noted 
above, in paragraphs 109 and 122, that the privileges which they enjoy 
result from international postal conventions or special treaties. 

Lighthouse tenders are exempt from capture. If the belligerent 
has not actually occupied the lighthouse, the regular supply by the 
lighthouse tender must be allowed to go on in the usual way for the 
benefit of navigation at large. When the belligeient cuts off the supply 
of a lighthouse situated on a blockaded coast or on outside islands or 
shoals, by capturing the means of ccmmunication, he is bound to con- 
tinue the maintenance of the light and its supply by his own means 
by reason of the general international utility attached to the objects 
thus occupied or captured by him. (Manual of Int. Law, Vol. II, 
sec. 213.) 

Policy in Far East. — The opinion of Ferguson favoring 
exemption of lighthouse tenders is in accord with the 
opinion natural in the Far East, because the lighthouse 
service was in a degree under international control and 
particularly protected by treaties and conventional 
agreements. 



24 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

The Japanese prize law of 1894 extended exemption 
from capture not merely to hospital ships, but also to 
boats belonging to lighthouses. 

The regulations governing captures at sea, issued in 
1904 by Japan, also exempted " lighthouse vessels and 
tenders." (Art. XXXV.) 

China. — Many States have treaties with China giving 
to their consular representatives a certain participation 
in the locating of lighthouses, etc., which puts the service 
in China on a basis somewhat different from that in other 
States. The treaty of 1858 with the United States is 
similar to others. Article XVI of this treaty provides 
that "the collectors of customs at the open ports shall 
consult with the consuls about the erection of beacons 
or lighthouses and where buoys and lightships should 
be placed." 

Article XXVI implies that it will be necessary for China 
to maintain a lighthouse service even during war in order 
that the vessels of the United States may " pursue their 
commerce in freedom and security:" 

Article XXVI. — Relations of peace and amity between the United 
States and China being established by this treaty, and the vessels of 
the United States being admitted to trade freely to and from the ports 
of China open to foreign commerce, it is further agreed that, in case 
at any time hereafter China should be at war with any foreign nation 
whatever, and should for that cause exclude such nation from entering 
her ports, still the vessels of the United States shall not the less continue 
to pursue their commerce in freedom and security, and to transport 
goods to and from the ports of the belligerent powers, full respect being 
paid to the neutrality of the flag of the United States, provided that 
the said flag shall not protect vessels engaged in the transportation of 
officers or soldiers in the enemy's service, nor shall said flag be fraudu- 
ently used to enable the enemy's ships, with their cargoes, to enter 
the ports of China; but all such vessels so offending shall be subject 
to forfeiture and confiscation to the Chinese Government. 

Cuban lights, 1898. — In the Spanish-American War in 
1898 the lights were not regarded as inviolable, and light- 
ships were liable to the consequences of war. 

U. S. S. Eagle, 

At Sea, May 12, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that the Eagle reached the lightship 
off Diego Perez Island at 7 a. m. of the 11th instant, and at once com- 
menced a search for the submarine cable connecting Batabano with 



LIGHTHOUSES IN 189 8. 25 

Cienfuegos. A boat was sent to the lightship and the keeper's services 
secured to aid in the search. 

Six lines were carefully run at varying depths between the lightship 
and the point of the shoal to the eastward, now marked by a wreck, the 
bottom being visible most of the time. This vessel and two of her 
boats performed this duty, but without a satisfactory result. The 
strong wind and rough sea, the pilot's assurance that no holding ground 
could be found for an anchorage, the evident fact that the chart was 
extremely unreliable, and the positive statement of the lightship 
keeper that no one had overhauled the cable in that vicinity for over 
three years determined me to abandon the search at 4 p. m. as fruitless, 
it being more than probable that the cable was buried deep in the sand 
of the reefs. 

In accordance with your order, the lightship was then set fire and 
was burning fiercely when this vessel left. Her keeper expressing a 
desire to go to Cienfuegos, took him on board this vessel with his personal 
effects and his own small boat, and will drop him off Cienfuegos when 
you so direct. 

This action on my part was principally due to the fact that the sea 
was too rough for him to get ashore unaided. He states that he is a 
Cuban and has not received his salary from the Government for the 
last seven months. 

We reached Piedras Cay at sunset. Sent an armed crew on shore 
and destroyed the lighting apparatus and what pertained thereto. 
Two men were in charge of the light and with them a small boy. 
These we found in a starving condition, in consequence of which it 
became necessary to bring them on board for removal from the island. 
They had been eight months without pay, three weeks without any 
communication with the outside, and five days without food. 
Very respectfully, 

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND, 

Lieutenant, United States Navy , Commanding. 
Commander B. H. McCalla, 

United States Navy, Commanding Division. 

[Naval Operations of War with Spain, 1898, pp. 198-199.] 

Lighthouse, Cape San Juan. — Early in August, 1898, 
the Puritan and Amphritrite took the lighthouse at Cape 
San Juan. An attempt to recover the lighthouse was 
later made by the Spaniards, as is shown in the following 
report : 

U. S. S. Cincinnati, Second Rate, 
St! Thomas, Danish West Indies, September 2, 189S. 

Sir: As part of the record of this ship for the month of August I have 
the honor to submit the following report of the attack by the Spanish 
forces on the lighthouses at Cape San Juan on August 8: 

On August 7 I was ordered by Capt. Frederick Rodgers, commanding 
U. S. S. Puritan, to proceed to maintain the blockade of the port of 



26 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

San Juan, P. R., which had been left open by the withdrawal of the 
U. S. S. New Orleans. 

I proceeded immediately and, as directed, stopped at Cape San Juan 
to take coal from the U. S. S. Hannibal. There I found the U. S. S. 
Amphritrite and Leyden, and Capt. Barclay had a party of seamen on 
shore holding the lighthouse. Under the protection of the party were 
about 70 Porto Rican refugees, most of whom were women and 
children. The town of Fajardo had been occupied by our naval forces, 
but upon their withdrawal it was raided by some Spanish troops, and 
it was feared they would make an attack on the lighthouse. 

Just before dark of the 8th of August reports came in that a large 
force, said to be several hundred strong, was advancing to retake the 
lighthouse, and, notwithstanding the urgent necessity of reestablishing 
the blockade, I deemed that the circumstances warranted my remain- 
ing to assist in the defense of the place, especially as a night attack was 
threatened and the Cincinnati was the only ship present with search- 
lights in working order. 

At about midnight firing was begun on shore and the three ships, 
under the glare of the Cincinnati s searchlights, immediately began to 
shell the woods and slope of the hill on which the lighthouse stands. 
This, together with the fire on shore, soon drove back the attacking 
party. 

* * * * * 

Very respectfully, 

C. M. Chester, 

Captain, United States, Navy, Commanding 

and Senior Officer Present. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department. 

[Appendix to Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, p. 651.] 

There was an evident intent to prepare the lighthouse 
for defense in time of war: 

U. S. S. Amphitrite, Second Rate, 
Off Cape San Juan, P.P., August 10, 1898. 

* * * * * 
Military defense. — The lighthouse is a brick structure ICO by 40 feet, 

inside measurement, with walls 2 feet thick, evidently built for mili- 
tary defense. There is little woodwork about except the doors and 
windows. These are furnished with heavy shutters, instead of frames 
for glass, and have ordinary slat blinds outside of them. The shutters 
when closed are secured with iron diagonal braces. The floor is marble 
tile, the roof beams and girders iron, and the roof floor brick. There 
is only one lofty story and no cellar. The front is commanded by a 
slightly raised central portico, with loopholes in the parapet. Oppo- 
site the portico the lighthouse tower abuts against the rear wall, and a 
circular gallery just under the light is loopholed. The light tower is 
about twice as high from the ground as the roof, and can only be entered 



LIGHTHOUSE VESSELS. 27 

from the ground floor or the roof. Two-foot brick parapet walls, about 
2\ feet high, subdivide]; the roof. The window sills are 5 or 6 feet 
above the ground. 

The light is 265 feet above the sea on the summit of a steep hill, 
which commands the four lower hills and the distant land approaches 
across a low neck half a mile south. The four lower hills are near to the 
northward and westward, and the five make up a small promontory 
on which it is difficult to land boats on account of the shallow water 
over coral reefs. The land drops away from the lighthouse immediately 
and on all sides. Fifty feet from the building is a barbed-wire fence. 
Around this and from 50 to 200 yards from it is another barbed-wire 
fence and a low hedge. Beyond all is rugged hillside, covered densely 
with high brush and creepers and traversed by rough paths, except 
west, where there is a pasture commanded by the lighthouse. The 
lighthouse inclosures are cleared except of a few low bushes and cactus 
hedges. 

* * * * * 

I am, very respectfully, 

Charles N. Atwater, 

Lieutenant, United States Navy. 
Capt. Charles J. Barclay, 

Commanding U. S. S. Amphitrite. 

[Appendix to Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, p. 653.] 

Maintenance of lights. — If lighthouse tenders and other 
boats in the service of lighthouses are to be exempt from 
capture in time of war, the service should be maintained 
in an impartial manner and with the intent of giving the 
same security to navigators as in the time of peace. The 
extinction of a light or the change of color or character 
of a light may lead to disaster for vessels depending upon 
its constancy. The changing of a light may be an easy 
ruse for confusing the enemy though it would doubtless 
affect the private shipping rather than the public vessels 
of war. Neutral vessels both public and private might 
be misled. 

The legitimacy of the extinction of lights in light- 
houses in time of war seems to have been recognized for 
many years, and court decisions, particularly in regard 
to maritime insurance, have been rendered accordingly. 
(Ionides v. Universal Marine Ins. Co., 14 Common Bench 
Reports, N. S., p. 259.) 

Lighthouse vessels. — Lighthouse vessels of different 
kinds have sometimes been placed in a distinct class in 
the time of war. This seems to have been because of 



28 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

exceptional circumstances in the Far East. Lighthouses 
have sometimes been captured and destroyed in war, 
and lighthouse tenders have sometimes been used for 
hostile purposes. Lighthouse vessels might under cer- 
tain circumstances be used for transmitting messages 
or other hostile service. They are closely related to the 
lighthouse service, which is established and maintained 
to aid navigation. It is doubtful whether a belligerent 
would desire to guarantee to maintain aids to navigation 
which would perhaps particularly serve his opponent 
because his own ships would presumably be less depend- 
ent upon these aids, owing to greater familiarity with the 
waters. The establishing of a special class of vessels 
entitled to special treatment, because in the lighthouse 
service, seems to depend upon the establishment of a 
conventional agreement upon the treatment of light- 
houses in the time of war. As exemption is at present 
exceptional, and as it does not seem possible to make a 
special agreement as to vessels in the lighthouse service, 
it does not seem expedient to make of such vessels a 
special class. 

Jurisdiction for revenue purposes. — There have been 
wide claims of jurisdiction set up to enforce revenue 
laws and to prevent smuggling. Twelve miles has been 
a common limit set up by Great Britain and by the 
United States. (U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 2760.) The claims 
of other States have usually been less extreme. 

Revenue service of the United States. — The revenue- 
cutter service of the United States was organized early. 
In 1790, under the direction of the Treasury Department, 
this service formed the main naval force, and after the 
Navy Department was established the Revenue-Cutter 
Service remained under the Treasury Department, 
though cooperating with the Navy. The officers are 
commissioned by the President, and by law hold rank 
with officers of the Army and Navy, the captain com- 
mandant ranking with the colonel in the Army and with 
the captain in the Navy. 

Revenue cutters were frequently ordered to undertake 
captures or given commissions. Sir William Scott, in 



REVENUE AND NAVAL SERVICE. 29 

1809, speaking of private vessels and ships of war, and 
then mentioning revenue vessels, said: 

But these vessels, employed in the service of the revenue, are a class 
of ships of an anomalous kind, partaking in some degree of both charac- 
ters — they belong to the Government and are maintained at the public 
expense — but it is not for the purpose of making captures from the 
enemy. On the other hand, they have commissions of war, but these 
are private commissions, which impose no peculiar duties upon them; 
they are not bound to attack and pursue the enemy more than other 
private ships of war. (The Bellona, Edwards, Admiralty Reports, 63). 

Revenue and naval service.- — The revenue service is gen- 
erally closely related to the naval service of a State. The 
object of the service is to prevent the unlawful entrance to 
a State of goods or persons. The laws relating to the pay- 
ment of duties may be thus enforced and the revenues of 
the State may be thus increased. The vessels engaged 
in this service are usually of such construction as to be 
easily available for use in war. 

The personnel of revenue vessels is sometimes directly 
enrolled in the navy of a State and usually available at 
short notice for this service. 

To grant exemption to vessels engaged in the revenue 
service would seem to be a gr^ant of exemption to a class 
of vessels already in the service of a State for the purpose 
of assuring the income from its trade. While granting 
this exemption an enemy might be using its forces to put 
an end to the trade itself. Such an exemption would 
seem, from the nature of conditions, illogical. The vessels 
of the revenue service at the present time, with trained 
observers and with skilled operators of radiotelegraph, 
might be of greatest aid in the military plans and in fur- 
nishing information. The relations of the revenue serv- 
ice seem in the highest degree such as to make it un- 
desirable that it should receive any exemption in time of 
war. The vessels belonging to this service would not be 
a class entitled to special consideration. 

Treatment of vessels, vessels of war. — As war is a relation 
of hostility of State to State, it is a relation which brings 
the units of the State into hostility one to another. This 
relation of hostility of the units varies in character ac- 
cording to the relation of the units to the war itself. It 



30 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

is now admitted that a coast fishing vessel innocently 
employed would have no relation to the war and accord- 
ingly should be generally exempt from capture. It is 
similarly admitted that a ship of war of an enemy is so 
closely identified with the war that it is subject to the 
most extreme treatment necessary for the end of the war, 
the aim of which is the restoration of peace with the least 
possible loss of life and property. This aim is much more 
humane than many of those sought in early wars, such as 
the complete reduction of the enemy. The modern aim of 
war, looking to peace with the least possible loss of life 
and property, avoids conduct which does not conduce to 
that end. Unnecessary or wanton destruction of life or 
property therefore would be regarded as in excess of the 
rights of legitimate warfare. Indeed it is regarded as an 
obligation to preserve so far as possible enemy lives and 
property which may have no relation to or effect upon 
the end of the war. Unnecessary destruction of life or 
property may make the return to peace more difficult 
and hence be contrary to the end sought. 

Such considerations as the above have led to the limit- 
ing of the extreme measures of war to the persons and in- 
struments particularly devoted to the war and to an at- 
tempt to treat other persons and things according to 
their relations to the hostilities. This may be illustrated 
by the treatment of mails and mail vessels which were 
formerly liable to capture, but with the change in the 
methods of transmission of news have become exempt in 
general practice and latter by convention. 

The principle that persons and things are liable to the 
consequences of war in accordance with their relations to 
the war seems to be generally accepted. 

Applying this principle to ships of war particularly de- 
signed to carry on hostilities against an enemy it would 
seem proper that the enemy, regarding always the laws of 
war, should be at liberty to take such measures as would 
reduce his opponent to submission, otherwise the very 
end for which the war is undertaken is defeated and the 
period of the war would naturally be lengthened. 



HOSPITAL AND CARTEL SHIPS. 31 

It may, therefore, be concluded that ships of war are 
subject to such treatment as is not contrary to the laws 
of war and as military necessity permits. 

Hospital ships. — The provisions in regard to the treat- 
ment of hospital ships are fully set forth in the conven- 
tion for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva 
convention to maritime warfare. 

Institute of International Law, 1913. — Article 47 of the 
Manuel des lois de la guerre maritime, sanctioned by 
the Institute of International Law in 1913, provided 
that — 

Boats engaged exclusively in the coast fishery and small boats en- 
gaged in local trade, including those engaged in pilot and lighthouse 
service, as well as the boats built to navigate principally on rivers, 
canals, and lakes, are exempt from seizure, as well as their fittings, sails, 
equipment and cargo. It is forbidden to take advantage of the inno- 
cent character of such boats to employ them for any warlike purpose 
while preserving their peaceful appearance. 

Cartel ships. — As cartel ships are commissioned for the 
performance of special services recognized as of mutual 
advantage to both belligerents these ships should be 
allowed to perform these services. The cartel, being an 
agreement between enemies, should be strictly interpreted 
and has always been thus interpreted. 

Cartel ships lose their exemption if they violate the 
terms of the cartel. They must confine their action 
within its provisions — i. e., the agreement for the ex- 
change of prisoners does not permit trade, the carriage of 
passengers or dispatches. Such ships are not to carry 
arms, though a cannon for firing signals may be allowed. 
The exemption ceases with the performance of the func- 
tion, but in the case of exchange of prisoners the direct 
voyage to the place of embarcation and the direct 
voyage home may be regarded as within the period of 
service. Such ships must also comply with any special 
obligations imposed upon them. These vessels may 
therefore be regarded as exempt only when conforming 
very strictly to the letter of the provisions of the cartel. 

Vessels engaged in scientific, philanthropic, religious 
work, or in exploration. — Among the earliest exemptions of 
vessels from capture by an enemy was the exemption 



32 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

extended to vessels engaged in exploration and discovery. 
It was considered as of advantage to all States that those 
navigators who were risking their lives and ships upon 
voyages of exploration should not be liable to capture in 
order that they might proceed freely. This exemption 
developed more particularly in the eighteenth century, 
when there was commonly joint agreement to exempt 
from interference certain vessels whose status had pre- 
viously been made known by notification. Often these 
vessels were granted safe-conducts by foreign States. 
With the decline of such undertakings this form of ex- 
emption has become less important, though occasionally 
met, and the reasons for exemption seem as valid now as 
formerly, and such vessels would now probably be classed 
with those engaged in scientific missions. 

As exploration and discovery was an early form of 
scientific mission upon which vessels ventured, the exemp- 
tion established for such undertakings was later extended 
to other analogous undertakings. Voyages for special 
scientific investigations were protected by general 
exemptions on the ground that the advance in scientific 
knowledge of the sea would be of benefit to all, and the 
exemption was accordingly made general. 

Until comparatively recent years vessels have not 
engaged in strictly philanthropic and religious missions. 
There was no doctrine of exemption. At the Second 
Hague Conference in 1907 the Italian delegate proposed 
the exemption of such vessels, and it was included as 
article 4 of the convention relative to certain restrictions 
on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war. 

Article 4. Vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic 
missions are likewise exempt from capture. 

While it is understood that this immunity is dependent 
upon innocent employment, as stated in regard to 
coast fishing vessels and small boats employed in the 
local trade, as specified in the preceding article, it might 
be advantageous in a subsequent draft of the convention 
to rearrange the clauses so that it should be entirely 
clear that this exemption is conditioned upon innocent 
conduct. There is also ample reason why such vessels 



LIGHTHOUSE VESSELS. 33 

should be previously made known by notification. 
This is not necessary in case of the coast fishing vessels 
the character of which is easily discernible from con- 
struction and other marks. It would, however, be 
essential in the case of certain vessels engaged in scien- 
tific or philanthropic work that there be distinctive 
marks, if possible, and safe-conducts or other evidence 
of a character which entitled to exemption. The Italian 
proposition contained a provision to that effect, to which 
there seems to have been no objection. (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 271.) 
These vessels should therefore be exempt from inter- 
ference so far as military necessities may permit. 

Lighthouse vessels. — As the lighthouse vessels are so 
closely related to the conduct of the hostilities, and as 
such vessels may at times be used and have been used for 
warlike purposes, these vessels should not be granted 
exemptions, except when innocently employed, by 
special agreement or by grace without obligation or 
liability. 

In case exemption is granted by conventional agree- 
ment, the means and method of effective control should 
be provided. As this has not thus far been provided, 
lighthouse vessels serving the lighthouses of the enemy 
should be regarded as enemy vessels and should be 
treated as vessels engaged in the public service of the 
enemy. The fact that such vessels are engaged in the 
lighthouse service need not be notified, but some exemp- 
tion may as occasion arises be granted unless there is 
reason to suspect that they are not innocently employed. 

Revenue vessels. — Vessels engaged in the revenue 
service being in most States closely related to the. naval 
control should not be granted any exemption unless 
under special and definite agreement. Under ordinary 
circumstances there would be no reason making necessary 
the notification of the names of such vessels. As the 
revenue service is usually strictly national and has as its 
purpose to enforce the collection of the national revenue 
and thus increase the national resources, there might 
seem to be a legitimate reason for the treatment of such 
71396—15- — 3* 



34 CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS. 

vessels as vessels clearly engaged in the enemy service 
and liable to the full consequences of war. 

Other vessels. — In addition to lighthouse and revenue 
vessels, there may be other vessels which are engaged 
in public or quasi-public service, which are easily con- 
vertible into vessels for use in war. Such vessels will, 
like lighthouse and revenue vessels, be liable to capture 
unless exempt by special agreement and conforming 
to the provisions of the agreement. Thus the exemption 
as to public vessels would be confined, except under 
special arrangement, to hospital and cartel ships, and to 
vessels engaged exclusively in scientific, philanthropic, 
and exploration service, and all others would be liable to 
capture. 

Conclusion. — -Even though there have been proposi- 
tions to include other vessels under the classes granted 
exemptions, considering the present tendencies of inter- 
national opinion and practice, the following general 
classification seems to be approved for public vessels: 

Classification of public vessels. 

1. Vessels of war, all vessels under public control for 
military or hostile purposes. 

2. Hospital ships under X Hague convention for the 
adaptation to maritime war of the principles of the 
Geneva convention. 

3. Cartel ships. 

4. Vessels engaged exclusively in scientific or philan- 
thropic work or in exploration. 

5. Other vessels. 

Treatment of public vessels. 

1 . Vessels of class 1 may, according to the rules of war, 
be captured or destroyed. 

2. Vessels of class 2 are exempt from capture when 
conforming to X Hague Convention. 

3. Vessels of class 3 are exempt from capture when 
conforming strictly to the terms of the cartel agreement. 

4. Vessels of class 4 are exempt from capture when 
their status has been made known by notification and 
when innocently employed. 

5. Other vessels are liable to capture. 



Topic II. 

REGULATIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR IN 
WATERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 

What should be the regulations relating to foreign 
vessels of war in time of peace and in time of war ? 

CONCLUSION. 

From discussion of the needs in time of peace and in 
time of war and from the principles embodied in regula- 
tions issued by other States the following regulations 
may be proposed for the United States: 

REGULATIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR IN 
WATERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 

General. 

1. The term u vessel of war" applies to all vessels 
under public control for hostile or military purposes. 

I. In time of "peace. 

2. In general, foreign vessels of war need no special 
authorization to enter American waters, but previous no- 
tice of intended arrival should be given through diplo- 
matic channels. Foreign vessels of war are, however, 
excluded from certain American waters. 

3. Not more than three foreign vessels of war of the 
same flag shall at the same time sojourn in any naval 
district without specific authorization. 

4. The sojourn of foreign vessels of war in American 
waters is limited to 15 days unless a longer period is 
specifically authorized. 

5. Foreign vessels of war must leave American waters 
within six hours if requested by the authorities, even if 
the limit of time of their sojourn has not expired. 

6. Foreign vessels of war are subject to regulation as 
to anchorage. 

35 



36 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

7. Foreign vessels of war must observe the regulations 
to which American war vessels are subject, except as to 
customs inspection. 

8. The taking of soundings, except as required for im- 
mediate safe navigation, the making of surveys, the use 
of submarine or air craft, target or similar practice, in 
American jurisdiction are prohibited, though any of 
these may be specifically authorized. 

9. Arms other than the dress arms of officers are not 
to be worn outside the foreign vessels of war except by 
special authorization. 

10. Disregard of any of the above regulations will be 
reported to the senior officer present of the foreign war 
vessels, and the vessel or vessels may be requested or 
may be required to leave American jurisdiction immedi- 
ately. 

11. The above regulations do not apply when a foreign 
vessel of war is carrying the sovereign or is upon a special 
diplomatic mission. The arrangements for the treat- 
ment of such vessels should be made through diplomatic 
channels. 

12. Vessels of war maybe granted special privileges in 
case of vis major. 

13. In general, the passage through canals is per- 
mitted only after notification by diplomatic channels and 
after permission is granted. 

77. When United States is at war. 

14. In time of war an}' foreign vessel, public or private, 
even with permission, enters American waters at its own 
risk. 

15. Desire to enter American waters between sunrise 
and sunset shall be made known by flying the national 
flag with the signal for pilot, but the vessel must remain 
outside of American waters till permission to enter is 
granted. 

16. Entrance to American waters during the night is 
prohibited. Desire to enter American waters between 
sunset and sunrise shall be made known by such signals 
as do not admit of mistake, but the vessel must remain 
outside American waters till permission to enter is 
granted. The same rule applies in fog or in storm. 

17. If permission is granted, the foreign vessels must 
strictly observe its provisions. 

18. Any vessel entering American waters without per- 
mission does so at its peril, and such force may be used 
against it as the American authorities deem necessary. 



TIME OF PEACE. 37 

NOTES. 

1. General. — The idea that the term "vessel of war" 
should apply to all vessels under public control for hos- 
tile or military purposes seems to meet with general ap- 
proval. There are many regulations accepted in practice 
among States determining the treatment of armed public 
vessels. It is also now generally admitted that these regu- 
lations extend to the vessels which are auxiliary to the 
Navy and under commissioned officers, and to transports 
and other vessels which may be used for hostile purposes. 
There are, as has been shown, many other public vessels 
whose purpose is not to carry on war and whose treat- 
ment will not be the same as that accorded to vessels of 
war. 

2. Entrance of vessels of war in time of "peace. — In ab- 
sence of any regulation to the contrary it has been gen- 
erally admitted that a vessel of war may freely enter the 
ports of the United States. This doctrine has also the 
sanction of the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in early cases. Wheaton says that — 

If there be no express prohibition, the ports of a friendly State are 
considered as open to the public armed and commissioned ships belong- 
ing to another nation with whom that State is at peace. (Int. Law, 
sec. 95.) 

Pradier-Fodere, mentioning that Ortolan follows 
Wheaton, says: 

Je ne comprends pas cette doctrine, car Ten tree des vaisseaux de 
guerre etrangers dans un port peut etre inoffensive la veille et devenir 
dangereuse le lendemain; la prohibition est de nature politique, et 
tout ce qui tient de la politique est subordonne" aux circonstances. 
(Droit International Public, vol. 5, sec. 2462.) 

Pradier-Fodere maintained on that account that a 
State should be free to determine whether a foreign vessel 
of war should be admitted and that a prior conventional 
agreement is not necessary to justify the exclusion of a 
foreign ship of war, but that a State may of its own voli- 
tion close a port. The closure of a port which has long 
been open should not be without reason, though the 
State within whose jurisdiction the port is, may deter- 



38 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

mine the adequacy of the motive. Notice of restrictions 
upon the entrance to a port should be given. 

Later opinion seems to support the view that a State 
may close or regulate the entrance to its ports, but that 
a port which has been freely open should not in general 
be closed without notice — in other words, that the 
prohibition of entrance is properly within the competence 
of the State but is not presumed. 

The development of vessels of war has seemed to change 
opinion somewhat. In earlier times when the presence 
of a few vessels of war would not unduly endanger any 
port reasonably defended there was no demand for re- 
striction. Sometimes it was thought advantageous to 
have ships of a possible enemy in port in order that they 
might the more easily be seized. At the present time 
the more powerful vessels of war if permitted without 
restriction to enter ports might constitute a formidable 
menace. For this and other reasons there has de- 
veloped in recent years the idea that the proposed 
entrance of a ship of war to a foreign port should if pos- 
sible be made known in advance. Possible embarrass- 
ments may be avoided by such procedure. A naval 
force belonging to the State having jurisdiction over the 
harbor may be drilling and may prefer that foreign 
observers should not be in the neighborhood. The prac- 
tice of giving advance notice of entrance to a foreign port 
has now become common and in some States is regarded 
as almost obligatory. The advantages of such a notice 
for both parties when entrance is with a legitimate 
object, are so many that it may justly be regarded as the 
best form and is tending to become general. 

The rule seems reasonable for the United States that 
foreign vessels of war need no special authorization to 
enter American waters, but previous notice of intended 
arrival should be given through the diplomatic channels. 

German regulation. — The German regulation provides 
that ships or vessels of war of foreign States do not 
need special authorization to enter German ports / 
whether or not fortified, or to enter the estuaries, rivers, 



AMERICAN RESTRICTIONS. 39 

or inland waters. It is, however, necessary that their 
visit should be announced in ample season through 
diplomatic channels. Without such notification ships 
and vessels of war of foreign States, except those carrying 
the head of a State or his accredited representative, or 
except those in distress, may not pass the outer line of 
fortifications. (Marine-verordnungs-blatt, 1910, no. 15.) 

French regulation. — The French regulations of May 21, 
1913, provide that the notification of a proposed visit, if 
circumstances permit, ought to be made through diplo- 
matic channels seven days in advance. Exceptions are 
made as in the case of the German rules and also for ships 
engaged in supervision of the fisheries under treaty pro- 
visions. 

Other States have made special rules to cover special 
waters. 

Restrictions as to 'ports in United States. — The policy of 
restriction upon the entrance to ports prevails likewise 
in the United States. This restriction has been made 
known to naval officers as follows: 

1503. (1) It has been ordered that the following-named harbors, 
Tortugas, Fla.; Great Harbor, Culebra; Guantanamo Naval Station, 
Cuba; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Guam; Subig Bay, Philippine Islands; 
Kiska, Aleutian Islands, are not, and that they shall not be made, 
subports of entry for foreign vessels of commerce, and that said harbors 
shall not be visited by any commercial or privately owned vessel of 
foreign registry; nor by any foreign national vessel, except by special 
authority of the United States Navy Department in each case. (Execu- 
tive Order, Sept. 23, 1912.) 

(2) Foreign Governments have been notified that permission must 
be obtained from the Secretary of the Navy through their respective 
diplomatic representatives at Washington before their men-of-war or 
other public vessels may enter the actual limits of a navy yard or naval 
station of the United States. 

(3) For the proper control, protection, and defense of the naval sta- 
tion, harbor, and entrance channel at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, 
the Secretary of the Navy is authorized, empowered, and directed to 
adopt and prescribe suitable rules and regulations governing the naviga- 
tion, movement, and anchorage of vessels of whatsoever character in 
the waters of Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, and in 
the entrance channel to said harbor, and to take all necessary measures 
for the proper enforcement of such rules and regulations. (U. S. Navy 
Regulations, 1913, No. 1503.) 



40 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Regulation as to entrance in time of peace. — The changes 
in recent years seem to indicate that a reasonable regula- 
tion might be drawn on the following lines: In general, 
foreign ships of war need no special authorization to enter 
American waters, but previous notice of intended arrival 
should be given through the diplomatic channels. Foreign 
ships of war are, however, excluded from certain Ameri- 
can waters. 

3. Number of vessels of war. — Until recent years little 
attention has been paid to the question of the number of 
vessels of war which might be admitted to a port in the 
time of peace. Perhaps limitations were first imposed 
because of fear on the part of the State having jurisdic- 
tion over the port lest its own safety might be imperiled 
if many foreign vessels of war were to be admitted at the 
same time. This was particularly true in case of certain 
small States. The idea gradually gained ground that it 
would be advantageous for all States to limit the number 
of foreign ships of war which might be at the same time in 
a port. It was implied that if some such regulation should 
not be made, the safety of a neighboring State might be 
put in jeopardy. This might happen through the as- 
sembling of a large fleet in neighboring ports just before a 
declaration of war and preparatory to a declaration of 
war. While each State might, in the absence of regula- 
tions, have an equal right to assemble ships, the situation 
of a port might make such a procedure advantageous to 
one of the States while conferring no advantage upon the 
other. The difference in speed and the increase in fight- 
ing capacity of vessels of war have made them such power- 
ful and effective instruments that States even in time of 
peace, are now much more concerned than formerly as to 
their conduct and nearness. This is seen in the rules 
already issued by States in regard to foreign vessels of war 
in territorial waters. 

Foreign regulations as to number. — The French regula- 
tions of May 21, 1913, provide that the number of vessels 
of war flying the same flag should not be more than three 
in a district, the western coast forming two districts, the 
southern coast one district with Corsica, and the African 
coast one district. 



LENGTH OF SOJOURN. 41 

The German regulations of July 26, 1910, also limit the 
number of foreign vessels of war flying the same flag to 
three, unless special permission has been obtained through 
diplomatic channels. 

The question has been raised as to whether the same 
regard should be paid to number without consideration of 
the character of the vessel of war. Some have proposed 
to regard three battleships as the number ordinarily ad- 
mitted, but to allow a larger number of torpedo boats or 
small vessels, pointing out that one battleship would 
ordinarily be accompanied by several smaller vessels. 
The complications which might arise in time of peace seem 
to be met by the provision that the admission of more than 
three vessels be only upon special permission and 
authorization. 

Regulation proposed. — To embody the right to limit the 
number while allowing freedom to the receiving State the 
following regulation may be proposed as consistent with 
the general trend : Not more than three foreign vessels of 
war of the same flag shall at the same time sojourn in any 
naval district without specific authorization. 

4. Length of sojourn. — In time of peace it is generally 
admitted that every courtesy should be extended to 
foreign vessels of war. At the same time, it might for 
many reasons be inexpedient to allow a foreign ship of 
war to remain indefinitely in territorial waters as a matter 
of right. The navy of the State having jurisdiction over 
the waters might wish to maneuver or to carry out plans 
which would be inexpedient in the presence of foreign 
naval observers. If no time limit is prescribed, a sug- 
gestion that the ship of war depart might be regarded as 
short of proper treatment. If a period is prescribed in 
advance, no offense could be taken and the sojourn 
beyond the period would be only after renewed permis- 
sion had been granted. 

A period which would be liberal for all purposes and give 
evidence of courteous and friendly disposition should be 
allowed in ports to which vessels of war are admitted. 
This period should not be unduly long that the receiving 
State may not be inconvenienced. A period of 15 days 
seems to be reasonable and liberal. 



42 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Foreign regulations as to sojourn. — The length of time 
which vessels of war may sojourn in foreign ports has 
received consideration because theoretically ships of war 
might remain indefinitely in time of peace unless there is 
a time specified. The harbor facilities may be insufficient 
to accommodate a large number of vessels for a long time 
or there may be other reasons for limiting the period of 
sojourn. Accordingly, to avoid misunderstanding it seems 
expedient that permission should be limited. The permit 
to enter sometimes contains the statement as to the length 
of sojourn allowed. France has enacted a rule prescrib- 
ing a fortnight unless a special extension is obtained. 
This period seems reasonable from all points of view and 
being specific, the foreign ship of war would be under 
obligation to obtain permission for a longer stay. 

Some States have prescribed longer or shorter periods 
according to geographical conditions. 

Regulation proposed. — In order that a reasonable time 
may be allowed ordinarily, and in order that there may be 
the possibility of longer stay if there be a special reason, 
regulations have been somewhat flexible. The following 
seems to meet the requirements generally approved: 

The sojourn of foreign vessels of war in American 
waters is limited to 15 days unless a longer period is 
specifically authorized. 

5. Departure on notification. — There may be reasons 
why vessels of war, which under ordinary circumstances 
would be permitted to remain 15 days, should depart 
without delay. 

I The necessity under which the receiving State may be 
through the possible approach of hostilities may be a 
sufficient cause. Even a somewhat remote prospect of 
war might make it necessary to prepare for war in a cer- 
tain port. This preparation might require immediate 
departure of foreign ships of war. A State should be 
free to request such departure without stating reasons, 
and the request should be heeded without delay. 

The conditions in a neighboring State may be such that 
the sojourn of certain vessels of war might be a threat to the 
peace or well-being of that State and might be construed 
as evidence of an unfriendly disposition. The State in 



DEPARTURE. 43 

whose waters the foreign ships of war may be must be free 
to judge under such conditions whether the ship of war 
should be requested to depart in order that its territory 
might not be used as a base preparatory for war. 

In general, as a State has jurisdiction over its territorial 
waters, it is entitled to exercise this jurisdiction in a rea- 
sonable manner. Provision should be made for request- 
ing the departure of foreign vessels of war whenever a 
State may deem it expedient, and this departure may be 
requested without statement of reason. 

If the circumstances are not exceptional, a ship of war 
could be ready for departure within six hours after re- 
quest. Accordingly, six hours might be a reasonable 
delay to mention in conveying the request. If longer 
time should be necessary, this could be specially consid- 
ered. 

Foreign regulations in regard to departure. — While cases 
of request to vessels of war to leave foreign ports have not 
been common, there seems to be a growing opinion that 
such requests may at times be necessary. Accordingly, 
certain States have made known that foreign ships of war 
within their ports might be requested to depart, and on 
request would be under obligation to leave. 

The Belgian decree of October 30, 1909, names six 
hours as the time within which foreign ships of war should 
depart when notified. 

France, in the regulations of May 21, 1913, also pre- 
scribes six hours as the period after notice, even though 
the time granted at admission may not have expired. 

The German regulations of July 26, 1910, provide for 
forcible expulsion in case a ship of war does not move on 
notification, though it is presumed that reasonable time 
would be allowed. 

The Italian law of August 20, 1909, provides that ves- 
sels shall betake themselves beyond range within 12 
hours. 

Other regulations seem to show that, considering the 
speed of modern vessels of war and the presumed pre- 
paredness of a ship of war in a foreign port, a six-hour 
allowance would not be too short. 



44 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Regulation proposed. — Foreign vessels of war must leave 
American waters within six hours if requested by the 
authorities, even if the limit of time of their sojourn has 
not expired. 

6. Anchorage. — As vessels of war are granted special 
privileges in foreign ports, there is reason for care in fol- 
lowing the port regulations, in order not to put the local 
authorities to any inconvenience. The place of anchor- 
age is usually determined by the local authorities and 
may be assigned for special reasons. A port may be 
mined, military or other operations may be in process 
which may make it desirable that foreign vessels of war 
be kept within certain areas. No complaint can be made, 
as the local authorities must be permitted to determine 
such matters. For similar reasons a vessel of war may be 
requested to change her anchorage to another designated 
place in a harbor. 

At the present time it has also become common for 
many States to refuse to vessels of war the privilege of 
anchoring in certain waters. This also is regarded as 
entirely within the competence of a State. 

Foreign regulations as to anchorage. — As many ports in 
foreign States are more extensively fortified and more 
continuously in a state of preparation for war than Ameri- 
can ports, the regulations in regard to the place of anchor- 
age of foreign ships of war are frequently very specific. 

The States having ports on the Baltic Sea have, in gen- 
eral, promulgated detailed regulations in regard to the 
method, time, and place of anchorage, sometimes provid- 
ing for the change of place of anchorage and the formali- 
ties in connection therewith. The other European States 
have, in some cases, equally detailed regulations, but all 
assume full right to regulate anchorage. 

Regulation proposed. — As reason and practice agree, the 
United States may properly make an announcement ac- 
cordingly: Foreign vessels of war are subject to the port 
regulations as to anchorage. 

7. Port regulations. — The regulations in regard to the 
use of a port are usually to some degree determined by 
local necessities. These necessities vary in different ports. 



QUARANTINE. 45 

Sometimes port regulations are or seem to be arbitrarily 
established and without particular reason. Whatever 
may be the basis of the ordinary regulations established 
for and extending to other foreign war vessels, the simi- 
lar vessels of the United States must give them respect. 
As such regulations must be respected by vessels of war of 
the United States in foreign waters, foreign vessels of war 
must respect the regulations of the United States estab- 
lished for the use of its ports. These regulations would 
particularly relate to such matters as quarantine, etc. 

Quarantine. — The positive obligation of the rules for 
observance of quarantine is emphasized by the regulations 
of the United States. 

3801. (1) Commanding officers of ships shall on entering a port, for- 
eign or domestic, comply strictly with all its quarantine regulations. 

(2) They shall, whether liable to quarantine or not, afford every 
facility to visiting health officers and give all the information the lat- 
ter may require. 

(3) Should doubt exist as to the regulations of the port, no commu- 
nication shall be held with the shore, with boats, or with other ships 
until a sufficient time has elapsed to allow of the visit of the health 
officer. 

3802. (1) Should a naval vessel arrive in port with a quarantinable 
disease on board, or should such disease break out while lying in port, 
the fact shall be at once reported to the commander in chief or senior 
officer present; the commanding officer shall hoist the quarantine flag 
and prevent all communication likely to spread the disease elsewhere 
until pratique is received. 

(2) In order to check the spread of such disease on board ship, he 
shall arrange with the authorities of the port for the care and treatment 
of patients on shore or on board a hulk. 

(3) If at sea in company with other ships and a quarantinable dis- 
ease exists or appears on board, he shall keep the quarantine flag flying 
as long as the disease lasts and shall do all in his power to prevent its 
dissemination. 

3803. (1) In boarding arriving vessels care shall be taken not to 
violate the rules of the port, and in case they are subject to quarantine 
the boarding officer shall, if possible, obtain the information required 
without going alongside. 

(2) Vessels at sea coming from a suspected port not having a clean 
bill of health or otherwise liable to quarantine shall not be boarded 
unless it be absolutely necessary, and the fact of such communication, 
when it occurs, shall be reported on arrival in port to the health officer. 

(3) No concealment shall be made of any circumstances that may 
subject a ship of the Navy to quarantine. (U. S. Navy Regulations, 
1913.) 



46 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Netherlands regulation. — The regulation of October 30, 
1909, of the Netherlands provides, in article 12, that ships 
of war of foreign States sojourning in Dutch jurisdiction, 
if they do not observe the rules prescribed, may be 
invited to depart, and, if it is necessary, may be com- 
pelled by force. 

French regulations. — The French decree of May 20, 
1913, article 10, provides: 

Dans un cas ou un batiment de guerre Stranger ne se conformerait 
pas aux regies edictees par le present decret, l'autorite maritime ou 
militaire locale attirera d'abord l'attention de l'officier commandant 
sur la contravention commise et l'invitera formellement a observer 
les reglements. Si cette demarche echoue, l'autorite qualifiee, preset 
maritime, commandant de la marine ou commandant d'armes, pourra 
inviter le batiment de guerre etranger a quitter immediatement le port 
ou les eaux territoriales. 

Foreign port regulations. — The port regulations of some 
foreign States are, as regards vessels of war, also very 
elaborate. Even the ceremonial to be observed for com- 
manding officers of different grades is prescribed in de- 
tail. Provisions are made for conformity to fiscal and 
sanitary regulations, in regard to landing of forces, the 
circulation of boats in port, funeral honors, etc. Cer- 
tain States reserve the right to send with a visiting ship 
of war one of their own naval officers in order to facili- 
tate the observance of the local regulations. Statements 
in regard to the ship of war itself are required in some 
ports. The rules in regard to pilotage vary greatly and 
change from time to time. 

Regulation proposed. — It is not possible to announce in 
advance what rules may be necessary. Vessels of war 
are, however, exempt from customs inspection. The fol- 
lowing rule seems to cover present practice: Foreign ves- 
sels of war must observe other port regulations to which 
American war vessels are subject, except as to customs 
inspection. 

8. Talcing of soundings, use of submarines, aircraft, 
target, or similar practice. — The taking of soundings was 
formerly regarded as a form of scientific investigation or 
exploration and was carried on with a considerable degree 
of freedom. At the present time, sounding within the 



SOUNDINGS, SUBMARINES, AIRCRAFT. 47 

maritime jurisdiction of a foreign State is regarded as in 
excess of the right of a vessel except that when necessary 
soundings required for the immediate safety of the ships 
may be made. 

As the movements of submarine vessels are or may be 
secret and may involve risk, the operations of such ves- 
sels in foreign waters is also in excess of right and should 
require special permission. 

The use of aircraft forming a part of the equipment of 
a ship of war while it may not be secret as in the case of a 
submarine may permit observations which a foreign 
State may prefer should not be made. This might be 
particularly true when in the neighborhood of fortifica- 
tions or mined areas. Accordingly, it seems proper that 
the use of aircraft over foreign ports and waters should 
require express permission and that in the United States 
such use should require special authorization. 

Target practice, torpedo practice, and similar exer- 
cises by foreign ships have long required special authoriza- 
tion. There has been general assent that such limitation 
is reasonable and the grounds are so many and so evident 
that discussion is not necessary. 

Foreign regulations as to soundings, use of submarines, 
aircraft, etc. — In recent years, with the introduction of 
new methods of warfare, regulations in regard to conduct 
of ships of war in foreign ports have become more specific. 
The taking of soundings and making of surveys is gener- 
ally prohibited unless definite authorization is granted. 
These regulations seem to be entirely proper, as a foreign 
ship of war can not claim rights other than those which 
would be implied in hospitable treatment. The use of 
submarine and of aircraft is held to involve risks to which 
a foreign port should not be liable. Target practice is 
generally prohibited, though in special cases permits 
have been granted for such practice on unsettled and 
remote coasts; even practice in the placing of mines is 
prohibited in the regulations of certain States. The 
discharge of torpedoes is also frequently prohibited. The 
use of foreign waters for any purpose which would render 
a ship of war directly more efficient for war purposes 



48 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

seems to be discouraged or prohibited with general assent 
of nations. 

Regulation proposed. — The taking of soundings, except 
as required for immediate safe navigation, the making of 
surveys, the use of submarine or aircraft, target or 
similar practice in American jurisdiction are prohibited, 
though any of these may be specifically authorized. 

9. Carrying of arms. — Many States prohibit the en- 
trance of foreign armed forces within their lard area. 
Armed foreign ships may be allowed within their ports, 
but the personnel of such ships are not permitted to go 
ashore under arms unless by special arrangement. 
Officers, however, may be required to go ashore in official 
capacity and as part of their official dress may wear the 
side arms recognized as appropriate. 

Regulation proposed. — Arms other than the dress arms 
of officers are not to be worn outside the foreign vessels of 
war except by special authorization. 

10. Disregard of regulations. — It may happen that reg- 
ulations may be disregarded intentionally or uninten- 
tionally. Subordinate officials may be careless or 
ignorant of the requirements of different ports. As 
action against a subordinate official might create mis- 
understanding or disturb the relations existing between 
States, it is considered less liable to create misunder- 
standing to report the facts to the commanding officer of 
the foreign force who is in fact officially responsible. As 
this officer has the authority to determine the action of 
his subordinates, it may be inferred that the act in 
regard to which there is some question if continued or 
repeated, is with the approval of the commanding officer. 
If there be a disposition to misuse the privileges of a 
port of the United States, a request to depart is a mild 
measure and if not heeded, there is a right to use such 
force as may be necessary to compel the vessel to depart. 

Regulation proposed. — It is advisable that definite action 
be taken if the rules established for the conduct of a foreign 
vessel of war be disregarded and the following rule con- 
forms to that usually accepted: Disregard of any of the 
above regulations will be reported to the senior officer of 



EXEMPTIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS. 49 

the foreign war vessels and the vessel or vessels may be 
requested or may be required to leave American jurisdic- 
tion immediately. 

11. Exemptions for public officials. — The general rule 
for exemption from local jurisdiction of sovereigns and 
those who represent the sovereign power extends to the 
vessels which bear them. It is the established custom to 
give the widest possible freedom from all local restraints 
to such vessels. In order that this may be done and in 
order that the proper marks of respect may be shown to 
the visiting officials, early notice should, when possible, 
be given through the diplomatic channels. 

Regulation proposed. — The above regulations do not 
apply when a foreign ship of war is carrying the sovereign 
or is upon a special diplomatic mission. The arrange- 
ments for the treatment of such vessels should be made 
through diplomatic channels. 

12. Vis major. — Even in harbors which are ordinarily 
closed foreign vessels of war may be admitted under 
exceptional and pressing circumstances. The rights of 
humanity will prevail over the restrictions based upon 
political or other grounds and a vessel of war if in distress 
because disabled, or in want of necessary supplies in order 
to keep the sea, should be admitted to repair or take on 
necessary supplies. The local port regulations may be 
suspended or be waived in cases where a foreign ship of 
war is in actual and immediate distress. 

Regulation proposed. — Vessels of war may be granted 
special privileges in case of vis major. 

13. Use of canals. — As a canal is usually constructed at 
the expense of some state or of its citizens, it is usually 
regarded as specially subject to regulation by such state 
or by the state through whose territory it may pass. 
The nature and object of canals may vary. Some may 
be primarily for military purposes; others may be pre- 
dominantly commercial or these purposes may be fairly 
balanced. Unless there are special treaty provisions, a 
canal would be considered as within the jurisdiction of 
the state through whose territory it passes and subject to 
its regulation. 

71396—15 4* 



50 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Certain canals are usually kept open for general 
commerce, as the Kiel and Corinth Canals, but may be 
closed at the will of the state within whose territories 
they are. Germany and Greece reserve the right to 
make whatever regulations may seem best in regard to 
the use of their canals. In absence of treaty provisions, 
a state undoubtedly may regulate or even prohibit the 
passage of vessels of war through a canal within its juris- 
diction, and in general, passage would be granted to 
vessels of war only after permission had been secured 
through diplomatic channels. 

Panama Canal. — The use of the Panama Canal is by 
treaty of November 18, 1901, under similar restrictions 
to those governing the use of the Suez Canal, though the 
United States has "the exclusive right of providing for 
the regulation and management of the canal." 

Suez Canal. — The regulations for the passage of the 
Suez Canal are detailed. The place of anchorage, the 
time of entrance, etc., may be prescribed. Equality of 
treatment is, however, assured to vessels passing through 
the canal. The convention of Constantinople of 1888, 
signed by nine powers, provided that the Suez Canal 
" shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time 
of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war without 
distinction of flag." Belligerent rights were not to be 
exercised in the waters of the canal. 

Project of interparliamentary union. — The commission 
of the interparliamentary union in 1913, desirous of 
devising rules which would apply to all interoceanic 
straits and canals, suggested the adoption of the follow- 
ing principles : 

(a) The express recognition of the right of free passage to vessels of 
commerce without distinction of flag in time of peace and war in all 
straits uniting two seas which are not inland seas and interoceanic 
canals proper. 

(b) The strict prohibition of blockade of these straits and canals. 

(c) The interdiction to place mines or torpedos completely obstruct- 
ing the passage of these straits and canals and the obligation of advising 
all ships of the placing of mines and torpedoes in the neighboring terri- 
torial waters. 

(d) The interdiction to put out, even in time of war, the lighthouses 
which delimit the passage of these straits and canals. 



TIME OF WAR. 51 

(e) The recognition in the treaties concerning straits and canals of 
the use of arbitration or other means, amicable or judicial, for the 
settlement of disputes relating to the application or the interpretation 
of these treaties. (XVIII Conference Interparlementaire, La Haye, 
1913, p. 40). 

Regulation proposed. — Considering that canals vary in 
nature and in status, a general regulation only may be 
proposed: In general, the passage through canals is per- 
mitted only after notification by diplomatic agent and 
after permission is granted. 

II. Vessels in Waters of United States in Time of 

War. 

14. Entrance oj joreign vessels in time oj war. — The en- 
trance to ports of a belligerent State or under belligerent 
control usually depends upon the flag of the vessel desiring 
to enter. Neutral vessels may be allowed to enter certain 
ports as in time of peace, while the entrance to others may 
be entirely closed. A neutral has no right to question 
the military necessity which may lead to the restriction 
upon the entrance to a port or the entire closing of the 
port. Since the Second Hague Conference of 1907 it is 
necessary in general that the neutral be notified in 
advance of the existence of war, and after such notifica- 
tion, the neutral is supposed to take precautions. The 
entrance, however, must be considered as under the laws 
of war. The vessel which is permitted to enter may pre- 
sume that no other risks than those ordinarily incurred 
in war are involved in entrance. 

Certain classes of vessels of the opposing belligerent 
may be allowed to enter under similar conditions. 

In ports that are fortified or where there are ships of 
war there is always a possibility of hostilities. In case 
of such hostilities, neutral vessels and vessels not related 
to the hostilities will be preserved so far as military 
necessities permit. Such vessels, if in the line of fire or 
within the field of action, may suffer from the hostilities, 
and from these risks no State can guaranty vessels 
within its waters even though the vessels had permission 
to enter these waters. 



52 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

French regulations in 1913. — The French decree of 
May 26, 1913, gives detailed regulations for which the 
minister of the marine gives reason: 

I. Rapport au President de la R£publique Francaise: 

Paris, le 26 max 1918. 

Monsieur le President: Les dispositions du decret du 19 juillet 
1909 fixent une zone d' interdiction d'une largeur uniforme de 3 milles, 
pour la protection du littoral francais en temps de guerre, et 6dictent 
des conditions d'acces identiques pour les bases d'operations de la 
flotte et pour les ports de commerce. II m'a paru necessaire, pour 
assurer dans de meilleures conditions la securite de nos grands ports de 
guerre, d'etendre a 6 milles la zone d' interdiction situ6e au large de 
leurs fronts de mer, la mettant ainsi en rapport avec la portee des arme- 
ments modernes; de differencier les conditions d'acces de ces ports, 
dont la defense est organisee, afin de leur permettre de remplir leur 
role de bases d'operations de la flotte, de celles relatives aux ports de 
commerce uniquement proteges dans le but de les preserver des insultes 
de l'ennemi; enfin d'apporter des precisions sur les formes sous 
lesquelles l'acces des ports francais devait etre demande et accorded 
J'ai l'honneur de soumettre a votre haute sanction le projet de d6cret 
ci-joint qui modifie, sur les points ^nonces, les dispositions du decret 
du 19 juillet 1909. 

Je vous prie d'agreer, Monsieur le President, l'hommage de mon 
profond respect. 

Le Ministre de la Marine: 

Pierre Baudin. 

(Revue G6nerale de Droit Int. Public, vol. 21, 1913; Documents, p. 
56; also Journal Officiel, 14 juin 1913, p. 5097; 18 juin, p. 5234.) 

II. Decret: 

Le President de la Republique francaise, vu le decret du 19 juillet 
1909, reglant, pour le temps de guerre, les conditions d'acces et de 
e^jour des navires autres que les batiments de guerre francais dans 
les mouillages et ports du littoral francais, sur le rapport de Ministre 
de la Marine, d^crete: 

Article 1. En temps de guerre, les conditions d'acces et de s£jour 
des navires autres que les batiments de guerre francais dans les mouilla- 
ges et ports du littoral francais et des pays de protectorat sont reglees 
par les dispositions precisees dans les articles suivants: 

Art. 2. Aucun navire de commerce francais, aucun navire etranger, 
de guerre ou de commerce, ne peut, sans s'exposer a etre detruit, 
s'approcher des cotes dans les eaux territoriales francaises ou des pays 
de protectorat a moins de 3 milles, avant d'y avoir ete autorise. Cette 
zone d 'interdiction est portee a 6 milles des cotes au large des bases 
d'operations de la flotte, entre les limites fixees ci-apres au titre de 
chacune d'elles: Cherbourg: du meridien du cap Levi au meridien 
de la pointe de Jardeheu; Brest: du parallele du phare du Four au 
parallele de la pointe du Raz; Toulon: du meridien du Bee de l'Aigle 



FRENCH DECREE, 1913. 53 

au meridien du cap Benat; Bizerte: du meridien du Raz Enghela au 
meridien du cap Zebib. 

Art. 3. Entre le lever et le coucher du soleil, tout navire vise" par 
le present decret doit porter son pavilion national et son numero du 
code international (s'il en possede un) des qu'il s'approche de la zone 
interdite. S'il desire y perietrer, il en fait la demande en hissant 
le pavilion de pilote, mais il se tient en dehors de cette zone jusqu'a 
ce que l'entree lui ait ete accordee par un semaphore, un poste de 
signaux ou un batiment d'arraisonnement. La reponse d'un sema- 
phore ou d'un poste de signaux est faite par les signes suivants du 
code international: Pavilion S: entree accordee; Flamme D: entree 
differee; Pavilion Q: entree interdite. Si la demande est accordee, 
le navire entre a vitesse reduite dans la zone interdite en conservant 
battant le pavilion d'appel de pilote. Si l'entree est differed, le 
navire manoeuvre pour laisser libre l'entree des passes, attend le 
batiment d'arraisonnement et se dirige vers lui a vitesse reduite quand 
il l'a apercu. Si l'entree est interdite, le navire doit renoncer a entrer 
et doit gagner un autre mouillage. Le batiment d'arraisonnement se 
distingue par trois boules hiss^es sur la meme drisse. 

Art. 4. Entre le coucher et le lever du soleil, tout navire vise" par 
le present decret doit porter son pavilion national et avoir ses feux de 
navigation allum^s des qu'il s'approche de la zone interdite. S'il 
desire y penetrer, il en fait la demande en brulant un ou plusieura 
feux de bengale, appuyes d'appels au sifflet ou a la sirene; mais il se 
tient en dehors de cette zone jusqu'a ce que l'autorisation d'y penetrer 
lui ait ete accorded par un batiment d'arraisonnement. Le navire, les 
feux de navigation clairs, attend ce batiment d'arraisonnement en 
brulant au besoin de nouveaux feux de bengale pour attirer son atten- 
tion et, s'il n'a pas ete semonce, peut se diriger sur lui a vitesse reduite 
quand il l'a apercu. Le batiment d'arraisonnement se distingue par 
trois feux rouges superposes. — Un feu coston rouge, brule d'un poste 
a terre, signifie que l'entree est interdite; le navire doit alors renoncer 
a entrer et doit gagner un autre mouillage. Entre le coucher et le 
lever du soleil, il est interdit, en principe, a tout navire vise* par le 
present decret de demander a penetrer dans les zones situ^es au large 
des bases d'operations de la flotte: Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon, Bizerte, 
d^finies a Particle 2; les seuls cas oil les capitaines puissent demander 
l'entree sont les suivants: Batiments autorises a le faire par gouver- 
neur, soit a leur depart, soit en cours de route; batiments en danger 
et dont l'impossibilite absolue d'attendre a la mer le lever du jour ou 
de gagner un autre mouillage. 

Art. 5. En cas de brume tout navire vise - par le present decret, 
desirant penetrer dans la zone interdite, hisse les memes signaux que 
par temps clair et fait des appels au sifflet ou a la sirene jusqu'a ce que 
l'autorisation d'y penetrer lui ait &t& accordee par un batiment d'arrai- 
sonnement. L'acces des bases d'operations de la flotte: Cherbourg, 
Brest, Toulon, Bizerte est interdit en cas de brume dans les mSmes 
conditions que celles specifiers a l'article 4. 



54 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

Art. 6. Tout navire vise" au present decret est tenu de deferer 
immediatement aux injonctions d'un batiment de guerre ou d'arrai- 
sonnement. d'un semaphore ou d'un poste de signaux, faites a la voix, 
par signaux du code international ou par coup de canon de semonce. 
Tout navire semonce par une batterie ou par un batiment de guerre 
doit, quelle que soit sa distance de terre, stopper immediatement en 
cassant son erre. Apres s'etre arrets tout navire semonc£ peut renou- 
veler sa demande d 'entree, mais il doit attendre sur place les ordres 
qui lui seront notifies. Si malgre' l'avertissement d 'un coup de semonce 
a blanc le navire ne s'arrete pas sur le champ, il sera tire, deux minutes 
apres, un coup de semonce a obus et, si apres un nouvel intervalle de 
deux minutes le navire n'a pas stoppe - et casse son erre, le feu sera 
ouvert effectivement contre lui. En cas d'urgence le coup de semonce 
a blanc peut etre supprime\ La nuit le coup de semonce a obus peut 
6galement §tre supprime - et tout navire qui perietre sans autorisation 
dans la zone interdite s'expose a, etre detruit sans avertissement prea- 
lable. 

Art. 7. Les batiments autorises a penetrer dans les rades et ports 
francais ou des pays de protectorat devront prendre le mouillage qui 
leur sera indique par l'autorite locale et se conformer strictement aux 
reglements de toute nature edictes par cette autorite. La duree de 
leur sejour restera subordonnee aux necessites d'ordre militaire et, 
lorsque les circonstances l'exigeront, il pourra leur etre prescrit de 
prendre le large ou de se retirer sur un point determine; cet ordre 
devra etre execute sans delai, un sursis pouvant toutefois etre accorde 
aux na vires qui se trouveraient dans l'impossibilite justifiee de s'y 
conformer immediatement. Aucun navire ne pourra appareiller, soit 
pour changer de mouillage, soit pour quitter la rade, sans en avoir 
recu la permission de l'autorite locale; la demande peut etre faite par 
signal: pavilion S. 

Art. 8. Dans les rades et ports militaires, entre le coucher et le 
lever du soleil, toute circulation des embarcations autres que celles 
appartenant aux batiments de guerre francais est absolument interdite. 
Du lever au coucher du soleil cette circulation n'est autorisee que 
pour les embarcations auxquelles les autorites maritimes auront d^'livre 
un permis de circulation special et le moyen de se faire reconnaitre. 
Les embarcations autorisees devront s'ecarter des navires de guerre si 
l'injonction leur en est faite et ne pourront, en aucun cas, les accoster 
sans en avoir recu la permission. La circulation de ces embarcations 
restera en outre soumise aux consignes locales relatives notamment a 
l'interdiction de penetrer dans certaines parties de la rade et d 'accoster 
en tout autre endroit que ceux expressement designes. Dans les 
ports de commerce, des mesures analogues seront prises par l'autorite 
locale pour imposer a la circulation des embarcations les restrictions 
jugees necessaires, tout en menageant les interets du commerce. 

Art. 9. Les visites des batiments de guerre neutres restent soumises, 
en ce qui concerne la notification ou l'autorisation prealables, aux 
prescriptions du decret du 21 mai 1913, les conditions d'acces et de 
sejour etant reglees par le present decret. 



ENTRANCE DURING DAY. 55 

Art. 10. Les mesures prevues par le present decret seront applicables 
des la mobilisation ou a la suite d'un avis special. 

Art. 11. Toute infraction au present decret, en dehors des risques 
de destruction auxquels elle expose, entralnera les mesures de repres- 
sion que comporteront les circonstances. 

Art. 12. Sont abrogees les dispositions contraires au present decret. 

Art. 13. Le ministre de la marine est charge" de 1' execution du 
present decret. 

R. PoiNCARE. 

Fait a Paris, le 26 mai 1913. 

Par le President de la R6publique: 

Le ministre de la marine, Pierre Baudin. 
(Revue Gen^rale de Droit International Public, vol. 20, 1913, Doc. 

p. 57.) 

Regulation proposed. — In view of such regulations as the 
above it would seem that a general regulation may be 
proposed as follows: In time of war any foreign vessel, 
public or private, even with permission, enters American 
waters at its own risk. 

15. Conditions of entrance during day. — The waters of a 
belligerent are frequently mined or otherwise protected 
against the entrance of the ships of an enemy. The use 
against belligerent vessels of the means of protection may 
endanger other vessels. If the means of protection is 
hidden, as in the case of mines, due care should be taken 
in order that innocent vessels may not suffer injury. As 
the use of false flags is not yet forbidden in naval war 
the belligerent may properly assure himself of the identity 
of any vessel approaching his jurisdiction. Entrance to 
the waters off an open undefended coast is ordinarily 
freely open unless there be strategic reasons for closing 
such waters. Reasonable regulations are necessary for 
the safety of the belligerent, and such reasonable regu- 
lations would certainly include a requirement of due 
notification by a vessel before it should be permitted to 
enter belligerent jurisdiction. The form of notification 
commonly required is the display of the national flag with 
the signal for a pilot. In order to avoid risk, a vessel 
should remain outside till permission to enter is granted. 

Regulation proposed. — Desire to enter American waters, 
when the United States is belligerent, between sunrise 
and sunset shall be made known by flying the national 
flag with the signal for pilot, but the vessel must remain 



56 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

outside of American jurisdiction till permission to enter 
is granted. 

16. Entrance during night, fog, or storm. — What has 
been said in regard to restrictions upon entrance by day 
is even more applicable in case of desire to enter bellig- 
erent jurisdiction during the night or in time of fog or 
storm. Proper signals should be displayed and the 
identity of the vessel should be established. 

Regulation proposed. — When the United States is a 
belligerent, entrance to American waters during the night 
is prohibited. Desire to enter American waters between 
sunset and sunrise shall be made known by such signals 
as do not admit of mistake, but the vessel must remain 
outside American jurisdiction till permission to enter is 
granted. The same rule applies in fog or in storm. 

17. Entrance under permission. — Permission to enter 
belligerent ports should, so far as consistent with military 
necessity, be granted. As entrance may be dangerous to 
the vessel entering, such precautions as are possible should 
be taken in order that the vessel may not be injured. 
The vessel may, by entrance, acquire knowledge of mili- 
tary conditions which should not be made public. In 
time of war the circumstances are usually such as would 
make necessary, both for the safety of the vessel and of the 
belligerent, that the conditions of entrance under which 
the permission to enter is granted shall be strictly 
observed. 

Regulation proposed. — If permission is granted to enter 
American waters when the United States is at war, the 
foreign vessels must strictly- observe its provisions. 

18. Entrance without permission. — In time of war a 
belligerent may, under present rules, take measures nec- 
essary to insure protection of its coasts by the means 
sanctioned by the law, as by mines, etc. 

Ordinarily, as in peace, so in war, neutral commerce 
with belligerents is subject only to the risk involved in 
the carriage of contraband, etc. This principle is, how- 
ever, conditioned upon military necessity which may 
make it essential that a belligerent really close all or a 
part of his ports or waters to the entrance of vessels. 



NETHERLANDS DECREE, 1909. 57 

Regulation 'proposed. — Any vessel entering American 
waters without permission when the United States is at 
war does so at its peril, and such force may be used 
against it as the American authorities deem necessary. 

General, Foreign regulations as to time of war. — There are 
controversies which may easily arise in modern times 
in consequence of the desire of foreign ships of war to 
enter or remain in ports in time of war. The greater 
number of ships of war is a simple reason why there may 
be more possibilities of misunderstanding. The greater 
speed may give rise to other complications. The inter- 
ests which take ships of war into foreign ports sometimes 
make definite and prior regulations advantageous if not 
essential. The full statement of the laws of three foreign 
States may show the course of the development toward 
regulation. 

Netherlands. — Decree of the Queen of the Netherlands fixing new 
rules in respect of the admission of warships of foreign powers to 
Netherland territorial waters. (The Loo, Oct. 30, 1909.) 

[Translation.] 

We, Wilhelmina, by the grace of God, Queen of the Netherlands, 
Princess of Orange-Nassau, etc.; 

On the joint proposal of our ministers of marine, of war, for foreign 
affairs, and of justice, of the 26th April, 1909, the 3d May, 1909, the 
18th May, 1909, and the 25th May, 1909; 

Having seen the royal decree of the 2d February, 1893, containing 
provisions respecting the admission of warships of foreign powers into 
the estuaries, harbors, and inland waters of the State; 

Considering that it is desirable to fix new rules of the admission of 
warships of foreign powers into the Netherlands territorial waters and 
into the Netherland territorial waters situated within the territorial 
waters; 

Having consulted the council of state (report of the 17th August, 
1909); 

Having regard to the further report of our ministers of marine, of 
war, for foreign affairs, and of justice, of the 13th September, 1909, the 
6th October, 1909, the 11th October, 1909, and the 15th October, 1909; 

Have approved and agreed to stipulate as follows: 

Article 1. The aforesaid royal decree of the 2d February, 1893, shall 
be withdrawn. 

2. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of article 4, relative to 
previous permission to enter the estuaries therein mentioned, and rela- 
tive to the navigation of the inland waters of the State, warships of 
foreign powers shall be permitted to proceed from the sea into the 
Netherland territorial waters and the Netherland water territory 
situated within those territorial waters, provided this takes place in 



58 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

order to reach by the shortest way and with the observance of the pro- 
visions of article 3, the roadstead or harbor situated nearest the sea, 
in order to anchor there; and provided the number of warships, in- 
cluding those under the same flag already present within the Nelher- 
land jurisdiction, does not exceed three. 

3. The provisions of the first paragraph do not prevent the free passage 
through the territorial waters, so far as this is recognized in interna- 
tional law. 

3. (1) When navigating the estuaries and inland waters of the State, 
warships of foreign powers shall not be permitted to proceed outside 
the buoyed channels of which use is made by the State pilots on behalf 
of shipping. 

(2) A warship of a foreign power shall only be permitted to find the 
ship's position and to make soundings as far as is required for safe navi- 
gation. 

(3) We reserve to ourselves the right to cause the strict observance 
of this provision to be controlled by causing the ship to be guided by 
an officer of the royal navy or an official of the pilot service. 

4. (1) It shall be prohibited for warships of foreign powers to enter 
the estuaries mentioned hereafter without the permission of our min- 
ister of marine, or to navigate the inland waters of the State without such 
permission. 

(2) The estuaries referred to are those of Terschelling, Texel, Ymui- 
den, Hook of Holland, Goeree. 

(3) By inland waters of the State shall be meant all navigable waters 
situated within the estuaries of the State. 

5. In special cases permission may be granted by us to deviate from 
the prescriptions of article 2 respecting the number of warships. 

6. (1) Warships of foreign powers may not stay within the territory 
of the State longer than 14 consecutive days. 

(2) The same warship may not, after its departure, again enter one 
of the estuaries of the State within 30 days without the permission of 
our minister of marine. 

7. (1) The restrictive prohibitive provisions of articles 2, 4, and 6 
shall not be applicable — 

(2) (a) To the warship on board which, according to the standard or 
the flag flown, there is reigning sovereign, a member of a reigning 
royal house, the president of a republic, or the head of a legation of a 
foreign power in the Netherlands, or the head of a mission of a foreign 
power destined for the Netherlands, or the accompanying warships. 

(3) (6) To cruisers for the police supervision by the powers for which 
the convention of the 6th May, 1892, is in force in the North Sea 
fisheries. 

(4) (c) To warships of foreign powers which are exclusively destined 
for religious, scientific, or benevolent objects. 

(5) (d) To warships of foreign powers in cases of distress, danger from 
the sea, or casualty. As soon as, in the opinion of the minister of marine, 
these causes cease to exist, the provisions of articles 2,4, and 8 shall 
again enter into operation. 



NETHERLANDS DECREE, 1909. 59 

, (6) The exceptions to the restrictive prohibitive provisions mentioned 
in points (a) to (c), inclusive, shall only be applicable toward the powers 
which observe the same line of conduct toward Netherlands warships. 

8. (1) The permission mentioned in article 4 must, so far as it is not 
obtained through the diplomatic channel, be applied for. 

(2) (a) As regards the estuaries: 

For the estuaries of Terschelling, through the intermediary of the 
commissioner of pilots at Terschelling. 

For the estuary of Texel or that of Goeree, through the intermediary 
of the director and commander of the navy at Willemsoord or at Helle- 
voetsluis, respectively. 

For the estuary of Ymuiden or that of the Hook of Holland, through 
the intermediary of the commander of the warship stationed there, 
or, failing such a warship, through the intermediary of the commander 
of the garrison of the fort. 

(3) (b) As regards the inland waters: 

In estuaries mentioned in article 4, through the intermediary of 
the authorities mentioned above under (a). 

In the other estuaries through the intermediary of the commander 
of the warship stationed there. 

(4) If no warship is stationed there, permission should be applied 
for through the intermediary of the State harbor master; failing a State 
harbor master, through the intermediary cf the commissioner of pilots; 
or, if none of these authorities are present, through the intermediary 
of the burgomaster. 

9.. A copy of these provisions and a form, to be fixed by our minister 
of marine, containing a few questions, which form should be filled in 
to the best of the knowledge (of the commander of the warship), shall 
be presented by the authorities mentioned in article 8 to the commander 
of the foreign warship. 

10. (1) Within the estuaries and territorial waters of the State, 
and in general within the limits of the State, warships of foreign powers 
may not make any hydrographic or terrain observations or carry out 
any exercises in landing, or, without having obtained the permission 
of our minister of marine, hold any gun, torpedo, or mine practice. 

(2) The crew may not come on shore otherwise than unarmed; this 
does not apply to officers and underofficers, so far as the sword or the 
dirk belonging to their uniform is concerned . 

(3) The ship's boats may not make any journeys otherwise than 
unarmed. 

(4) If on the occasion of funeral ceremonies on shore, it is desired to 
deviate from the prohibition contained in the second paragraph of this 
article permission to do so must first be asked of our minister of marine 
through the intermediary of the authorities mentioned in article 8. 

(5) No sentences of death may be executed within the estuaries and 
territorial waters of the State on board the warships of foreign powers. 

11. Warships of foreign powers shall be bound to respect the existing 
police, sanitary, and fiscal laws and regulations and to submit to all 
harbor regulations in so far as the warships of the royal navy are bound 
to do so. 



60 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

12. Warships of foreign powers staying within the limits of the State, 
which transgresses the aforesaid provisions, may be ordered to depart; 
if necessary they may be compelled by force to do so. 

13. (1) If permission to enter has been granted through the diplomatic 
channel, the State pilots stationed outside the estuaries and ports shall 
be notified thereof, if possible. 

(2) In general these pilots are acquainted with the contents of these 
provisions and with the existence or nonexistence of opportunity for 
answering a salute to the Netherlands flag. 

(3) So far as necessary they shall communicate the foregoing to the 
commander of the foreign warship which is to be piloted by them, and 
they shall further furnish to the said commander such information 
regarding the foregoing provisions as he shall desire to receive. 

14. (1) These provisions shall obtain in time of peace and toward 
warships of foreign powers who are not belligerent. 

(2) We reserve to ourselves the right in time of war, impending war, 
or maintenance of neutrality, and, further, in all special circumstances, 
to restrict or to prohibit entirely the admission of warships of foreign 
powers into the Netherlands territorial waters and into the Netherlands 
water territory situated within those territorial waters. 

(3) Warships of foreign powers which are present in the Netherlands 
territorial waters or in the Netherlands water territory situated within 
these territorial waters by virtue of this decree shall in any case be 
bound to put to sea within six hours or as soon as they shall have re- 
ceived an invitation to that end from or on behalf of our minister of 
marine. 

Our ministers of marine, of war, for foreign affairs, and of justice 
shall be charged with the execution of this decree, which shall be 
inserted in the "Staatsblad, " and of which a copy shall be sent to the 
council of state. 

The Loo, October 30, 1909. 

WlLHELMINA. 

J. Wentholt, Minister of Marine. 

W. Cool, Minister of War. 

R. de Marees van Swinderen, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Nelissen, Minister of Justice. 

Issued November 26, 1909. 

Nelissen, Minister of Justice. 

[From Brit, and For. St. Papers, Vol. 102, p. 708-712.] 

Italy. — Decree of the King of Italy regarding the entry of vessels into 
fortified harbors and other places in time of war. — Sant' Anna di 
Valdieri, Aug. 20, 1909. 

[Translation.] 

Victor Emmanuel III, by the grace of God and the will of the people, 
King of Italy: 

In view of the royal decree of the 21st April, 1895, No. 322, with 
regard to the approach and sojourn of ships in fortified harbors in time 
of war; 



ITALIAN DECREE, 1909. 61 

The opinion of the high naval council having been taken; 

On the proposal of our minister of marine in concert with the min- 
ister of war; 

We have decreed and do decree: 

Article 1. Whenever a fortified port is to be put on a war footing, 
the commandant may, if circumstances demand, require vessels, 
whether of war or of commerce, anchored within the fortified zones, 
to put out to sea or to move to other berths which it may be convenient 
to assign to them. 

Ships which receive the order to put out to sea are required to with- 
draw beyond the range of artillery fire within 12 hours from the 
moment that the order is received on board. 

Vessels which are not in a state to sail within the time allotted will 
be accorded every facility admitted by the requirements of the fortress. 

To secure the fulfillment of the order the commandant may resort 
to all means required by the needs of urgency of the case. 

2. It is absolutely forbidden in time of war, by day as by night, that 
any privately owned craft, or the boats of neutral warships anchored 
in the waters of a naval fortress, should cruise in these waters without 
a preliminary and special consent issued by the commandant of the 
fortress. 

National trading vessels and the trading vessels of allied nations, 
and also neutral warships anchored in a fortified port, may only com- 
municate with the land during the day between sunrise and sunset, 
and their boats must go by the most direct way to the landing place 
designated by the authorities. 

These same vessels are forbidden to keep boats in the water during 
the night. However, should an emergency render communication by 
night necessary, the authorities may furnish a suitable boat on receipt 
of a request made with the conventional signal previously fixed. Any 
other signaling is absolutely forbidden. 

3. Any vessel which in time of war approaches a naval fortress by 
day, whether with the intention of asking permission to enter or merely 
passing within sight of the defenses, must first of all make herself known, 
and can not proceed toward the anchorage without first obtaining the 
explicit permission of the commandant of the fortress or that of the 
commander of the local naval forces acting in his stead. 

4. Special very confidential papers containing the rules intended 
to control recognition of and approach to fortified places will be issued 
by the ministry (office of the chief of the staff) to vessels of war or 
national auxiliaries and vessels of allies. 

5. In order to make themselves known, national trading vessels and 
those of the allied nations, and neutral ships of war and trading ves- 
sels, must hoist in a conspicuous position their respective national flags 
and the signal flags indicating their names according to the Inter- 
national Code of Signals. 

If they desire to enter the fortified harbor, they must stop at the 
greatest distance from the port which the possibility of seeing the 
signals and the range of the semaphore permit (and this must never in 



62 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

any case be less than 5 miles), and must communicate to the port 
their request to enter; this consists in hoisting along with their own 
above-mentioned indication of name either the usual flag for calling 
the pilot or else the international code signal P. D.: "I ask leave to 
enter the harbor." 

6. The semaphore of the fort, on receiving this signal, communicates 
it immediately to the authorities, with the addition of such informa- 
tion as the officer in command may think it fit, as, for example, the 
name, nationality, distance, description, etc. 

If the authorities do not think it desirable to permit the vessel to 
enter the port, they send a reply through the same semaphore by 
the signal V. S. X.: "I regret I can not accede to your request." 

If, on the other hand, they agree, they send the pilot on board to 
bring the vessel to her anchorage. 

An officer may also be sent with the special duty to reconnoiter at 
close quarters and to visit, and with instructions to grant permission 
to enter the port or not, according to the result of his investigations. 

The authorities in command of the fortified harbor shall provide for 
special signals by which the officer sent to examine the vessel or the 
pilot can transmit through the semaphore stations any information 
which it may be found urgent or necessary to communicate. One of 
these signals should indicate that the vessel has been visited and 
another that the pilot has been taken on board; but, above all, provi- 
sion must be made for a signal, which shall be changed daily and must 
be hoisted in a conspicuous position, by which it may be conveyed 
to the seamphore stations and to the defending fleet that the vessel 
flying it has obtained permission to enter the harbor and is steering 
to her anchorage. 

7. It is for the officer in command to judge whether or not it be 
opportune to permit the vessels specified in article 5 to enter the port, 
always provided that their presence does not disturb or hinder the prog- 
ress or measures of defense; with this object the authorities shall bear 
in mind — 

(a) That entry into the harbor by night is forbidden. 

(6) That neutral vessels, to whom it is absolutely necessary to enter 
the port, may be permitted to anchor in a suitably ordained space 
outside the boom. 

(c) That in case of doubt or in special circumstances they can request 
instructions from the ministry to which they are responsible. 

8. To enforce the observance of the dispositions laid down in the 
articles of the decree by ships transgressing them, whether inadvert- 
ently or willfully, the signals of the international code appropriate to 
the case shall be hoisted by the semaphore stations, and they shall 
be emphasized by a blank shot fired from the battery appointed for 
this purpose. Should this warning not suffice to obtain the execution 
of the orders after five minutes have elapsed from the first shot, a live 
shell shall be fired about a hundred meters in front of the vessel's 
bows; if she still remains refractory, she shall be fired upon. 



RUSSIAN REGULATION, 1904. 63 

If the conditions urgently require it, the previous warning by a 
blank shot may be omitted. 

9. The ministry of marine shall draw up and publish a list of the 
fortified harbors and other places to which the present decree is 
applicable. 

In the list shall be clearly stated in words the anchorages and por- 
tions of coast included in the radius of the said fortified harbors and 
places in question, as well as the semaphore stations, which, in accord- 
ance with the dispositions of articles 5, 6, and 8, shall reply to the 
signals made by the ships. 

10. The royal decree of the 21st April, 1895, No. 322, which regu- 
lates the entry of ships into fortified harbors in time of war and their 
stay in them, is abrogated. 

We order that the present decree, furnished with the seal of state, 
be inserted in the official collection of the Laws and Decrees of the 
Kingdom of Italy, enjoining on whomsoever it may concern to observe 
it and to cause it to be observed. 

Given at Sant' Anna di Valdieri, the 20th August, 1909. 

Victor Emmanuel. 

Mirabello. 

Spingardi. 

[British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 102, pp. 453-455.] 

Russia. — In 1904 Russia, by special regulations and for 
military reasons, assumed control over maritime areas off 
certain commercial and military ports. Among the ports 
was that of Libau. To the coast waters near this port 
"at a distance of five miles seaward from the shore" 
special regulations were extended. These regulations 
were to be temporary. Their character may best be seen 
from the published translation: 

Temporary regulations for the protection in time of war of certain 
Russian ports so long as martial law shall not have been proclaimed 
therein. (Sanctioned by His Majesty the Emperor, Mar. 25 
(Apr. 6), 1904.) 

As long as martial law shall not have been proclaimed in the ports of 
Cronstadt, Sveaborg, Libau, Sevastopol, and Batum, and the fortress 
of Otchakoff , the special measures hereinafter mentioned shall be taken 
there for the purpose of securing unity of action among the organs of 
government instituted to insure public safety (arts. 2 and 3) with regard 
to the formalities to be observed by commercial vessels in entering the 
protected area. 

2. The general control of the measures for the maintenance of security 
in the harbors, roadsteads, and, generally speaking, all the space occu- 
pied by the above-mentioned ports (art. 1), as well as by their estab- 
lishments and buildings, is intrusted at Cronstadt to the commander in 
chief of the port at Cronstadt; at Sevastopol, to the commander in chief 



64 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

of the Black Sea fleet; and at Sveaborg, Libau, Otchakoff, and Batum, 
to the commandants of these places. 

3. The officer in charge of the defense of the port is intrusted with 
directing and supervising the execution of all the measures of order and 
security emanating, according to the laws in force, from the military 
and naval authorities, from the administrative authorities of the port, 
and from other administrative authorities established in the port. 

4. Vessels bound for one of the above-mentioned ports (art. 1) are 
obliged not to approach it nearer than the radius fixed for each port with- 
out having provided themselves in each case with a special permit 
emanating from the authorities of the port. The latter do not grant this 
permit until they have examined the proper persons and, in case of 
necessity, visited the vessel. 

5. The areas mentioned in article 4, as well as their limits, are fixed by 
common accord by the director general of navigation and commercial 
ports, the minister of war, and the director of the naval ministry, and 
are made public at the same time as the present regulations. These 
high officials are also obliged to formulate by common accord the 
instructions defining the method of making the examination (of per- 
sons) and the preliminary visitation (of the vessel), to authorize the 
approach of the vessel to the port, to designate the administrative 
officers of the port who are to be delegated for this purpose, and to 
indicate the coercive measures to be taken by the port authorities. 

Note. — -As regards the port of Sveaborg, the measures enumerated 
in the present article are taken by common accord by the minister of 
war and the director of the naval ministry. Complaints of private 
parties (art. 15) against the dispositions made by the officer in charge 
of the defense of this port (art. 2) must be presented within one month 
to the minister of war, who decides on them after an understanding with 
the director of the naval ministry. 

6. Access to the port within a distance less than the radii indicated 
in article 4 is allowed vessels only from sunrise to sunset. The officer 
in charge of the defense of the port may, in exceptional cases, prolong 
this period and authorize certain vessels to enter the port during the 
night. 

7. An administrative officer of the port must be sent out to vessels 
which are approaching the radius of the port. Upon the arrival of this 
officer on board the vessel, the captain or the person taking his place, 
after having received a copy of these regulations, is obliged to deliver 
to the said officer all the ship's papers and documents relating to the 
cargo, and, if the officer demands it, to give all the explanations 
required, to allow the visitation of the vessel in all its parts, and to have 
opened for this purpose all the holds, coal bunkers, and other parts 
of the vessel. 

8. All communication between the vessel and the coast is prohibited 
until the preliminary examination, and, if necessary, the visitation of 
the vessel have been carried out. 

9. If, after the examination, and, if necessary, the visitation, the 
authorities of the port deem it possible to admit the vessel into port, 
these authorities cause a special flag to be hoisted on the foremast. 



RUSSIAN REGULATION, 1904. 65 

10. Every vessel which has been refused access to the port must 
withdraw therefrom as soon as the order to that effect has been given it. 

11. In case the authorities of the port do not deem it possible to Alow 
the unloading of the vessel on the mooring line, this operation must be 
performed by means of lighters while the vessel is at anchor or moored 
to a buoy. If the captain or the consignee of the vessel does not consent 
to submit to this regulation, the vessel is obliged to quit the port. 

12. In case vessels do not comply with the provisions of articles 4, 10, 
and 11, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the defense of the port to 
compel the vessels in question to submit to these provisions, and even 
to employ armed force for this purpose, if necessary. The captain of 
the vessel or his substitute is responsible for the consequences which 
these measures may involve. 

13. If there should be in the ports designated by the present regula- 
tions any commeicial houses or private persons who are the owners or 
consignees of vessel"? such commercial houses or private persons, as 
soon as they have been informed that a vessel consigned to them has 
left a Russian pert or any foreign port, must communicate to the port 
authorities information concerning the port of departure of the said 
vessel, indicating the date of its departure, the approximate time of its 
arrival, its name, and its nationality. 

Note. — The commercial houses and private persons mentioned in the 
preceding article may, in order to expedite the free passage into port of 
a vessel consigned to them, communicate to the authorities of the port, 
besides the information required by article 13, also data concerning the 
merchandise with which such vessel is laden, the quantity thereof, its 
place of shipment, its destination, and the nationality of the captain of 
the said vessel. 

14. If the information mentioned in aiticle 13 and the note thereto 
appended is communicated within the proper time to the administra- 
tive authorities of the port, the vessels should be admitted, if possible, 
into port after a preliminary examination and without being subjected 
to the visitation mentioned in article 4. 

If, however, it is discovered, with regard to any vessel, that the infor- 
mation indicated in aiticle 13, although received in due time by the 
owners cr consignees of the vessels, has not been communicated to the 
administrative authorities of the port before the arrival of the vessel, 
the persons who have, without plausible reason, refrained from commu- 
nicating this information to the proper authority, may be punished by 
order of the officer in charge of the defense of the port by a fine not 
exceeding 500 rubles ($250). 

15. Complaints of private parties against the measures taken by the 
officer in charge of the defense of the port, according to articles 4 to 14 of 
the present regulations, must be presented within one month to the 
director general of navigation and commercial ports, except in the 
cases contemplated by article 5. This high official decides on these 
complaints after having submitted them to the examination of the com- 
mittee on fort matters, assisted by a representative of the naval ministry. 

71396—15 5* 



66 REGULATIONS AS TO FOREIGN VESSELS. 

In case, within the committee, the delegates of the ministries of 
war and navy are not in accord with the decisions reached by a majority 
of the members of the committee, the matters in question are trans- 
mitted to the proper person according to articles 52 and 53 of the organic 
statutes of the office of director general of navigation and commercial 
ports, approved by His Majesty the Emperor on June 10 (22). 1903. 
(U. S. Foreign Relations 1904, p. 712.) 

Conclusion. — From discussion of the needs in time of 
poace and in time of war and from the principles embodied 
in regulations issued by other States the following regu- 
lations may be proposed for the United States: 

REGULATIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR 
IN WATERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OP THE UNITED 
STATES. 

General. 

1 . The term " vessel of war" applies to all vessels under 
public control for hostile purposes. 

/. In time of peace. 

2. In general, foreign vessels of war need no special 
authorization to enter American waters, but previous 
notice of intended arrival should be given through diplo- 
matic channels. Foreign ships of war are, however, 
excluded from certain American waters. 

3. Not more than three foreign vessels of war of the 
same flag shall at the same time sojourn in any naval dis- 
trict without specific authorization. 

4. The sojourn of foreign vessels of war in American 
waters is limited to 15 days unless a longer period is spe- 
cifically authorized. 

5. Foreign vessels of war must leave American waters 
within six hours if requested by the authorities, even if 
the limit of time of their sojourn has not expired. 

6. Foreign vessels of war are subject to regulation as 
to anchorage. 

7. Foreign vessels of war must observe the regulations 
to which American war vessels are subject, except as to 
customs inspection. 

8. The taking of soundings, except as required for im- 
mediate safe navigation, the making of surveys, the use 
of submarine or air craft, target, or similar practice in 
American jurisdiction are prohibited, though any of these 
may be specifically authorized. 



WHEN UNITED STATES IS AT WAR. 67 

9. Arms other than the dress arms of officers are not to 
be worn outside the foreign vessels of war except by special 
authorization. 

10. Disregard of any of the above regulations will be 
reported to the senior officer present of the foreign war 
vessels and the vessel or vessels may be requested or may 
be required to leave American jurisdiction immediately. 

11. The above regulations do not apply when a foreign 
vessel of war is carrying the sovereign or is upon a special 
diplomatic mission. The arrangements for the treatment 
of such ships should be made through diplomatic channels. 

12. Vessels of war may be granted special privileges in 
case of vis major. 

13. In general, the passage through canals is permitted 
only after notification by diplomatic channels and after 
permission is granted. 

II, When United States is at war. 

14. In time of war any foreign vessel, public or private, 
even with permission, enters American waters at its own 
risk. 

15. Desire to enter American waters between sunrise 
and sunset shall be made known by flying the national 
flag with the signal for pilot, but the vessel must remain 
outside of American waters till permission to enter is 
granted. 

16. Entrance to American waters during the night is 
prohibited. Desire to enter American waters between 
sunset and sunrise shall be made known by such signals 
as do not admit of mistake, but the vessel must remain 
outside American waters till permission to enter is granted. 
The same rule applies in fog or in storm. 

17. If permission is granted, the foreign vessels must 
strictly observe its provisions. 

18. Any vessel entering American waters without per- 
mission does so at its peril and such force may be used 
against it as the American authorities deem necessary. 



Topic III. 

BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

What changes should be made in the Hague conven- 
tion concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of 
war? 1 

(a) Should paragraph 2 of article 1 be omitted on the 
ground that mines constitute a defense? 

(b) As almost any vessel may now be converted into a 
vessel of use in war, how would paragraph 1 of article 2 
apply ? 

(c) What would constitute " military necessity" under 
paragraph 3 of article 2 ? 

id) Should article 3 be retained ? 

1 IX. Convention concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war. 

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc. 

[List of Heads of States.] 

Animated by tbe desire to realize tbe wish expressed by the First Peace Conference 
respecting the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, and villages; 

Whereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to 
rules of general application which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and as- 
sure the preservation of the more important buildings, by applying as far as possible to 
this operation of war the principles of the Regulation of 1899 respecting the Laws and 
Customs of Land War; ' 

Actuated, accordingly, by the desire to serve the interests of humanity and to 
diminish the severity and disasters of war; 

Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have, for this purpose, ap- 
pointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries: — 

[Names of Plenipotentiaries.] 

Who, after depositing their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed 
upon the following provisions: — 

Chapter I. — The Bombardment of Undefended Ports, Towns, Villages, Dwellings, or 

Buildings. 

Article I. 

The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, 
or buildings is forbidden. 

A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are 
anchored off the harbor. 

Article II. 

Military works, military or naval establishments, depfits of arms or war materiel, 
workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, 
and the ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. 
The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons 

68 



CONCLUSION. 69 

CONCLUSION. 

(a) Paragraph 2 of article 1 should not be accepted in 
its present form. 

(b) Under the present rules in regard to conversion, 
the presence in a belligerent port of vessels which are 
suited for conversion into vessels of war may be a suffi- 
cient ground for bombardment unless satisfactory 
arrangements are made to guaranty that these vessels 
shall not be used for war purposes. 

(c) Military necessity under paragraph 3 of article 2 
applies to actions immediately " indispensable lor secur- 
ing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according 
to modern law and usages of war" and not of a nature 
"to make the return to peace unnecessarily difficult." 

(d) Unless the whole of Convention IX is revised, 
article 3 in regard to requisitions by naval forces should 
be retained. 

followed by a reasonable delay, if all other means are impossible, and when the local 
authorities bave not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed. 

He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a 
bombardment under such circumstances. 

If military necessity demanding immediate action permits no delay, it is understood 
that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in 
paragraph I, and that the commander shall take all requisite measures in order that 
the town may suffer as little harm as possible. 

Article III. 

After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of undefended ports, towns, 
villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded with, if the local authorities, after a 
formal summons has been made to them, decline to comply with requisitions for pro- 
visions or supplies necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the 
place in question. 

These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of the place. They shall 
only be demanded in the name of the commander of the said naval force, and they 
shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by 
receipts. 

Article IV. 

The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings on 
account of failure to pay money contributions is forbidden. 

Chapter II. — General Provisions. 

Article V. 

In bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be taken by the 
commander to spare as far as possible, buildings devoted to religion, to the arts, to 
sciences, or to charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where 
the sick or wounded are collected, on condition that they are not used at the same time 
for military purposes. 



70 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

NOTES. 

Admiral Aube on bombardment in 1882. — The matter of 
bombardment of undefended towns and places was partic- 
ularly emphasized in an article by Admiral Aube in 1882. 
This article appearing in the Revue des Deux Mondes at- 
tracted much attention. While the limitations upon bom- 
bardment in warfare upon land had received consideration, 
little attention had been given to the conduct of bombard- 
ment of coast towns. It was partly the change in the con- 
struction of ships that had made maritime bombardment 
of more importance. In the early part of this article 
Admiral Aube says: 

L'objectif Evident de toute marine militaire est la guerre maritime. 
Le probleme fondamental qui s'impose a nos recherches avant tout 
autre est done: Que sera une guerre maritime? Chose Strange! nul 
aujourd'hui, menie parmi les plus distingues des hommes de mer, ne 
peut r^pondre a cette question. J'ajoute: nul d'entre eux ne peut 



It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, edifices, or places by 
visible signs, which shall consist of large stiff rectangular panels divided diagonally into 
two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white. 

Article VI. 

Unless the military exigencies will not permit, the commander of the attacking 
naval force, before commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the 
authorities. 

Article VII. 

It is forbidden to give over to pillage a town or place, even when taken by assault. 

Chapter III. — Final Provisions. 

Article VIII. 

The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting 
Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention. 

Article IX. 

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible. 

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 

The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a procks-verbal signed by the Rep- 
resentatives of the Powers which take part therein and by the Netherlands Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 

The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means of a written notifi- 
cation addressed to the Netherlands Government and accompanied by the instrument 
of ratification. 

A duly certified copy of the procbs-verbal relative to the first deposit of ratifications 
of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as well as of the instru- 
ments of ratification, shall be at once sent by the Netherlands Government, through 
the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as 
well as to the other Powers which have adhered to the Convention. In the cases 



ADMIRAL AUBE'S DOCTRINE. 71 

dire quel sera veritablement l'instrument de combat dans une telle 
guerre. 

Cette double assertion veut etre prouvee. Ne semble-t-elle pas, en 
effet, un pur paradoxe, alors que non seulement l'Angleterre, pour 
qui la mer est le supreme interet, mais toutes les nations du monde, 
depensent chaque annee, et depuis plus de trente ans, des sommes 
fabuleuses pour le maintien ou le developpement de leur marine 
militaire? L'Angleterre a ses Invincible, l'ltalie ses Duilio, la France 
ses Devastation, et pas un de ces formidables engins de guerre, oil le 
bronze, le fer, l'acier s'accumulent sous toutes les formes, ne serait le 
type definitif du vaisseau de combat de l'avenir! et leur reunion ne 
constituerait pas une de ces flottes puissantes, sinon invincibles, sur 
lesquelles une nation pourrait comme autrefois se reposer en toute 
confiance et de ses interets commerciaux et de la securite de ses 
frontieres mari times! S'il en etait ainsi, si ce double but n'etait pas 
atteint, si ces depenses etaient vaines et vains ces longs et perseverants 
efforts, a quoi bon continuer dans une voie sans issue? Mais alors 
quelles sont les causes de cette impuissance supposee des flottes de 
guerre actuelles a assurer ces resultats superieurs et de leur inferiority 
en regard des flottes d'autrefois qui y suffisaient pleinement? (50, 
Revue des Deux Mondes, 1882, p. 315.) 

The more particular reference to bombardment created 
considerable discussion, and the maneuvers carried out 
by various States on the supposition that bombardment 
of undefended towns would be permitted aroused further 
interest which continued. Admiral Aube stated his 
position as follows : 

La guerre peut etre definie: l'appel supreme du droit contre la force 
qui nie ce droit; d'ou l'objectif superieur de la guerre: faire le plus de 
de mal possible a l'ennemi. Or, si un grand roi, philosophe et maitre 
en l'art de la guerre, declare que la richesse est le nerf de la guerre, 



contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the said Government shall inform them at 
the same time of the date on which it received the notification. 

Akticle X. 

Non-Signatory Powers may adhere to the present Convention. 

The Power which desires to adhere shall notify its intention to the Netherlands Gov- 
ernment, forwarding to it the act of adhesion, which shall be deposited in the archives 
of the said Government. 

This Government shall immediately transmit to all the other Powers a duly certified 
copy of the notification, as well as of the act of adhesion, mentioning the date on which 
it received the notification. 

Article XI. 

The present Convention shall take effect, in the case of the Powers which were a party 
to the first deposit of ratifications, sixty days after the date of the proch-verbal of that 
deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which ratify subsequently or which adhere, sixty 
days after the notification of their ratification or of their adhesion has been received by 
the Netherlands Government. 



72 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

tout ce qui frappe l'ennemi dans sa richesse, a fortiori tout ce qui 
l'atteint dans les sources memes de cette richesse, devient non-seule- 
ment legitime, mais s'impose comme obligatoire. II faut done s'atten- 
dre a voir les flottes cuirass£es, maitresses de la mer, tourner leur 
puissance d'attaque et de destruction, a defaut d'adversaires se d6ro- 
bant a leurs coups, contre toutes les villes du littoral, fortifiees ou non, 
pacifiques ou guerrieres, les incendier, les ruiner et tout au moins les 
ranconner sans merci. Cela s'est fait autrefois; cela ne se faisait plus! 
cela se fera encore: Strasbourg et Peronne en sont garants. 

Par ce nouveau role et ces nouvelles missions que la logique impose 
aux escadres cuirassees nous entrons dans un nouveau systeme de 
guerre maritime: celui de l'attaque et de la defense des cotes. Quel 
que soit le but de l'assaillant, il est evident qu'il se presentera en 
force avec tous les moyens d'action que les circonstances lui permet- 
tront de reunir et qui seront calcules en vue du but special a atteindre. 
Quant a la defense, elle semble devoir etre scindee en deux elements 
distincts: defense fixe, defense mobile; l'une comprenant les tor- 
pilles dormantes, les barrages, les fortifications de tout genre, etablies 
d'avance ou improvisees sur le rivage; l'autre, reposant sur Paction 
isolee ou combined des beliers, des batteries flottantes, des canonnieres; 
des thornycrofts porte-torpilles a grande vitesse, s'appuyant suivant 
les lieux sur les vaisseaux cuirasses, sortant de 1' inaction ou les condam- 
nait en haute mer l'inferiorite du nombre. (Ibid., p. 331.) 

Prof. Holland's opinion in 1888. — As the British naval 
maneuvers of 1888 were carried on with the supposition 
that the attacking squadron might fire upon any port in 
Great Britain, this proposition created much discussion. 
Prof. Holland, of Oxford, took an active part in the dis- 

Article XII. 

In the event of one of the contracting Powers wishing to denounce the present Con. 
vention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Netherlands Government, 
which shall at once communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the 
other Powers informing them of the date on which it was received. 

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying Power, and one 
year after the notification has reached the Netherlands Government. 

Article XIII. 

A register kept by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs shall give the date of 
the deposit of ratifications made in virtue of Article IX, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as 
the date on which the notifications of adhesion (Article X, paragraph 2) or of denuncia- 
tion (Article XII, paragraph 1) have been received. 

Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register and to be supplied 
with duly certified extracts from it. 

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures to the present 
Convention. 

Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single copy, which shall remain depos- 
ited in the archives of the Netherlands Government, and duly certified copies of which 
shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers which have been invited 
to the Second Peace Conference. 



HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899. 73 

cussion. One of his letters to the Times shows his view 

in 1888: 

Sir: In my first letter I called attention to certain operations of the 
Spider and her consorts which seemed to be inspired by no principle 
beyond that of doing unlimited mischief to the enemy's seaboard. In 
a second letter I endeavored to distinguish between the mischief which 
would and that which would not be regarded as permissible in civilized 
warfare. The correspondence which has subsequently appeared in 
your columns has made sufficiently clear the opposition between the 
view which seems to find favor just now in naval circles and the prin- 
ciples of international law as I have attempted to define them. The 
question between my critics and myself is, in effect, whether the 
medieval or the modern view as to the treatment of private property 
is to prevail. According to the former all such property is liable to be 
seized or destroyed in default of a "Brandschatz," or ransom. Accord- 
ing to the latter it is inviolable, subject only to certain well-defined 
exceptions, among which reasonable requisitions of supplies would be 
recognized, while demands of money contributions, as such, would 
not be recognized. (Letters on War and Neutrality, p. 78.) 

Authorities on international law were in general accord 
with Prof. Holland's view. 

The Hague Conference of 1899. — At the First Hague 
Conference the question of application of the same rules 
to bombardment by naval forces which had been pro- 
posed for bombardment by land forces was raised. 
Article 25 of The Hague laws and customs of war on land, 
adopted in 1899, provided: "The attack or bombardment 
of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not 
defended is forbidden." Count Nigra, of Italy, proposed 
that this rule should extend to bombardment by naval 
forces, and several delegates were of the same opinion. 
The subcommittee, considering the matter after discus- 
sion, decided to refer the question to the full conference, 
as difference of opinion had arisen as to the competence 
of the committee to deal with the subject, which was 
thought by many to relate particularly to maritime war- 
fare. (Conference Internationale de la Paix, 1899, pt. 3, 
p. 103.) 

The disposition of this question was that in the final 

act of the First Hague Conference the following was 

inserted : 

6. The conference expresses the wish that the proposal to settle the 
question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval 
force may be referred to a subsequent conference for consideration. 



74 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

The matter accordingly received some attention be- 
tween the years 1899 and 1907. 

General discussion at The Hague, 1907. —The discussion 
in 1907 on the general subject of bombardment by naval 
forces made it clear that there was reason for distinguish- 
ing bombardment on land from bombardment by naval 
forces. The regulation for bombardment by land forces 
had been discussed at Brussels in 1874 in drawing up the 
rules for war upon land, and it was evident that the rules 
could not be directly applicable to warfare upon land and 
on sea, as had been shown at the conference at The Hague 
in 1S99 and in earlier discussions at the meetings of the 
Institute of International Law. Bombardment by mari- 
time forces would partake both of the nature of land 
warfare and of naval warfare. An inland place might 
be indirectly defended by fortifications on a coast at a 
considerable distance. The Netherlands delegate main- 
tained that such defense of the coast should be distin- 
guished from defense of the place itself, because this would 
be only an indirect defense of the place and the place 
itself would not be regarded as defended. This was fol- 
lowed by the discussion upon the question as to whether 
submarine mines could be regarded as a direct defense. 
Upon this subject there was decided difference of opinion: 

Propositions at Second Hague Conference, 1907 . — Prop- 
ositions in regard to bombardment by naval forces in 
time of war were made at The Hague conference of 1907 
by the delegations of the United States, Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands, and Russia. These propositions were re- 
duced to a single pro jet, and submitted to the first sub- 
committee of the third committee in the following form: 

Article 1. Dans le bombardement par les forces navales toutes les 
mesures necessaires doivent etre prises par le commandant pour epar- 
ner, autant que possible, les monuments historiques, les edifices con- 
sacres aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et a la bienfaisance, les hopitaux 
et les lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blesses a condition 
qu'ils ne soient pas employes en meme temps a un but militaire. 

Le devoir des habitants est de designer ces monuments, ces Edifices 
ou lieux de rassemblement par des signes visibles speciaux. 

Art. 2. Le commandant de forces navales assaillantes, avant d'entre- 
prendre le bombardement, devra faire tout ce qui depend de lui pour 
avertir les autorites. 



WHAT CONSTITUTES DEFENSE. 75 

Art. 3. II est interdit de livrer au pillage meme une ville ou locality 
prises d'assaut. 

Art. 4. II est interdit de bombarder des ports, villes, villages, habita- 
tions, ou batiments qui ne sont pas defendus. 

Art. 5. Lorsque les necessity des operations militaires exigent la 
destruction d'ouvrages militaires, d'etablissements militaires ou 
navales, de depots d'armes ou de materiels de guerre, d'ateliers 
utilises pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie, ou de vais- 
seaux de guerre se trouvant dans le port, le commandant de la force 
navale pourra proceder lui-meme a la dite destruction par bombarde- 
ment, si les autorites locales ont, apres sommation formelle et apres 
l'expiration d'un delai raisonnable, refuse de satisfaire a ces exigences. 

Dans ce cas, les ports, villes et villages, habitations ou batiments 
sont passibles des dommages involontaires resultant du bombardement. 

Art. 6. Le bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations 
ou batiments est admissible, apres qu'avis en aura ete donne quand la 
fourniture de vivres, ou d' appro visionnements necessaires pour les 
besoins du moment de la force navale presente, apres sommation 
formelle faite aux autorites locales, est refusee. 

Art. 7. Le bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations 
ou batiments non defendus, pour le non payement d'une contribution 
en argent, est prohibe." (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de 
la Paix, Tome III, p. 657.) 

France proposed to substitute for article 5 of the 
above projet the following: 

Ne sont pas compris dans cette interdiction les ouvrages militaires, 
4tablissements militaires ou navales, depots d'armes ou de materiel 
de guerre, ateliers et installations propres a &tre utilises pour les besoins 
de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie, et les navires de guerre se trouvant 
dans le port que le commandant d'une force navale pourra, apres som- 
mation avec delai raisonnable, detruire par le canon si tout autre moyen 
est impossible et lorsque les autorites locales n'auront pas proc^de a 
cette destruction dans le delai fixe. 

Si des necessites militaires imperieuses exigeant une action imme- 
diate ne permettaient pas d'accorder de delai, il reste entendu que 
Pinterdiction de bombarder la ville non defendue subsiste comme dans 
le cas precedent et que le commandant prendra toutes les dispositions 
voulues pour qu'il en resulte pour cette ville le moins d'inconvenients 
possibles. (Ibid., p. 658.) 

What constitutes defense? — One of the early questions 
raised at The Hague in 1907 was as to what constitutes 
defense. Gen. den Beer Poortugael, of the Netherlands 
delegation, in discussing the question and referring to 
the projet before the subcommittee, said, in giving his 
opinion : 



76 BOMBARDMENT By NAVAL FORCES. 

Qu'entend-on par ville non-d£fendue? 

Dans les guerres terrestres il n'y a pas de doutes, c'est clair comme 
le jour. Une force arm£e est en marche vers une ville. Cette ville 
peut etre fortifiee ou ouverte. Meme si elle est ordinairement ouverte, 
les entries pourront etre d^fendues par des ouvrages temporaires devant 
les entries, par des £paulements, des barricades, des tambours. II va 
sans dire que Passaillant a parfaitement le droit de briser cette defense 
a l'aide de son artillerie de la maniere qu'il trouvera la plus efficace, 
pour 8'emparer de la ville. Toutefois, il concentrera cette artillerie 
contre les inoyens de defense, contre les 6paulements, contre l'artillerie 
et les soldats d^fenseurs, et se gardera bien d'envoyer ses grenades ou 
obus en pure perte dans la ville elle-meme, car ces projectiles ne pour- 
raient avoir pour resultats que d'incendier quelques maisons. En 
agissant de la sorte il prouvera qu'il est a la fois homme de cceur et 
qu'il sait son metier, qualites qui, la dans plupart des cas, se trouvent 
reunies. 

Mais dans ce qui nous occupe a present, il existe le danger qu'on 
pourrait en juger differemment. 

La marine ne marche pas vers une ville. Elle n'aura pour but de 
s'en emparer, que dans le cas ou elle agit conjointement avec des forces 
de terre. Je n'ai naturellement pas en vue des ports fortifies mais des 
villes ou villages non-fortifies et non-defendus. 

Prenons, par exemple, pour mieux exprimer ma pensee, notre cote, 
que baigne la Mer du Nord. Le long de cette cote se trouvent a proxi- 
mite de la mer, par-ci, par-la, une ville et des villages, La Haye, ou 
Scheveningue, Katwyck, Noordwyck, etc. 

Supposez le cas — dont le bon Dieu nous garde — qu'au lieu de tant 
d'amis dont les representants sont reunis ici, nous ayons un jour un 
ennemi, qui tente d'entreprendre, seconde de sa flotte, un debarque- 
ment. Naturellement nous 1'acceuillerons avec tous les honneurs dus 
a sa gentillesse; nous ferons tout pour Ten empecher. On enverra des 
d^tachements d'artillerie, d'infanterie et de cavalerie dans les dunes 
de Scheveningue, de Katwyck, etc., et nous d£fendrons notre cote, 
pour que l'ennemi ne prenne pas pied. 

Scheveningue c'est pour ainsi dire La Haye. Est-ce que de la 
defense de la cote de Scheveningue on pourra conclure que La Haye 
est defendue pour bombarder cette ville toute ouverte? 

Non, assurement non. L'ennemi a certainement tout les droits 
d'employer son artillerie contre notre artillerie et les autres defenses de 
la cote, autant qu'il le jugera utile, mais il n'a pas le droit de bombarder 
la ville sous pretexte que ce serait une ville defendue. 

Selon moi, ce serait la une cruaute et une violation des principes du 
droit, parce que ce serait une cruaute' inutile; car il va soi que meme 
si la moitie de ces villes paisibles et fleuries que vous admirez avec le 
Chateau des Comtes dans lequel nous avons la Conference de la Paix, 
etait entamee par les flammes et si le Palais de la Paix, dont dans 
quelques jours nous verrons poser la premiere pierre s'ecroulait sous 
les bombes, nos soldats dans les dunes n'en ressentiraient rien, et meme 
leur ardeur de combattre de tels barbares destructeurs en serait stimulee. 



BRITISH OPINION BECAUSE OF MINES. 77 

J'ai pris pour exemple la ville que nous avons tous sous les yeux, 
mais naturellement le cas est le meme pour toutes les villes ouvertes 
situees pres d'une cote. 

Je constate done qu'il faut bien distinguer la defense de la cote de 
celle d'une ville, situee pres de cette cote et que, par ville defendue il ne 
doit etre entendu qu'une ville qui est elle-meme defendue directement. 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 545.) 

British opinion on bombardment because of mines. — 
Article 4 of the original projet was transposed and became 
article 1 of the proposed convention on bombardment, 
and a second paragraph was added so that article 1 was 
drafted in the following words: 

The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, vil- 
lages, dwellings, or buildings is forbid d en. 

A place can not be bombarded bc ; 4y because automatic contact 
submarine mines are anchored off the harbor. 

The second paragraph of this article was the subject 
of difference of opinion. The British delegate, Capt. 
(Admiral) Ottley, speaking in the name of the British 
delegation, gave a full statement of the objections to the 
provision, saying: 

Je voudrais dire quelques mots pour expliquer la reserve faite au 
nom de la Delegation britannique, en ce qui concerne l'alinea 2 de 
Particle 1, qui est ainsi concur 

"Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee pour le seul fait que devant 
elle se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines automatiques de 
contact." 

A premiere vue cette proposition pourrait paraitre tout a fait accep- 
table par le fait que ces mines ne sont, en effet, qu'une defense passive, 
et qu'elles ne peuvent frapper un ennemi que s'il s'approche de cette 
localite. 

Bombarder une ville parce qu'elle s'est ainsi assuree de son inviola- 
bilite semble done, a ce point de vue, etre un outrage injustifiable. 

Mais, d'autre part, on pourrait egalement soutenir que des canons ne 
constituent qu'une defense passive, puisque e'est seulement en s'en 
approchant qu'un vaisseau peut etre atteint. 

Or, le tir des canons peut rarement detruire un vaisseau au large, 
tandis que 1' explosion d'une seule mine le coulera certainement. 

Aussi, ne nous parait-il pas logique de rendre inviolable une ville 
defendue au moyen de mines tandis qu'en m&me temps on refuse le 
meme privilege a une ville defendue par des canons. 

C'est l'interet de tous les pays neutres de rendre la mer libre de ces 
engins meurtriers, puisque, etant completement aveugles, ils sont 
egalement dangereux pour amis, ennemis, neutres et non-combattants. 



78 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

11 est, a ce point de vue, de la plus haute importance que l'emploi 
illimite et sans but de ces mines soit restreint le plus possible. 

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, la pose des mines sera certainement 
sans but, puisque — par hypothese — la ville etant autrement non 
defendue, ne sera pas exposee au bombardement. 

On peut franchement se demander pour quelle raison on mouillera 
des mines devant un tel port? 

Tout d'abord il ne se trouve expose a aucun danger et la pose de 
mines n'est en consequence pas autre chose qu'une defense douteuse 
contre un danger nonexistant. 

II semble que la proposition envisage la situation speciale de cer- 
taines villes maritimes qui, quoique non defendues par des canons, 
sont pourvues de chan tiers de construction ou d'autres etablissements 
militaires qu'un ennemi pourrait vouloir avec raison detruire. 

II est naturel que Pidee soit venue de vouloir ainsi defendre des 
ports de ce genre, en meme temps qu'on les mettrait a Pabri d'un 
bombardement. 

Mais je crains que les interets des neutres aussi bien que ceux des 
belligerants ne soient serieusement leses si Ton adoptait une telle 
regie; aussi je prie la commission de bien vouloir accepter notre amen- 
dement, c'est-a-dire de " supprimer le deuxieme alinea de Particle 1." 

Cet amendement nous mettrait d'accord avec Particle 25 du Regle- 
ment concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre. De 
plus, il appliquerait ce principe fondamental qu'un belligerant, en 
accordant une immunite a une localite ennemie non defendue, a le 
droit de faire usage de cette localite non defendue et de s'attendre 
a ce qu'en s'approchant d'une ville soi-disant non defendue, il ne soit 
pas expose a etre detruit par ceux-la meme qui pretendent etre inviola- 
bles sous le pretexte alors bizarre que leur ville n'est pas defendue. 
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome III, p. 343.) 

Vote on article 1, paragraph 2. — After the expression of 
opinion 1 y the British delegate and some discussion, the 
first paragraph of article 1, having been generally ap- 
proved, the second paragraph was put to a vote and 22 
voted for the paragraph, 5 voted against, and 10 did not 
vote. Among the states that did not vote for the para- 
graph were Great Britain, Japan, Germany, United 
States, France, and ^ussia. 

Ratification of convention. — The convention relative to 
bombardment by naval forces in time of war has been 
generally ratified, though some of the states as Germany 
and Great Britain, have mule reservation as to article 1, 
paragraph 2. The United States proclaimed this con- 
vention February 28, 1910. 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 79 

Opinion of Dupuis. — Dupuis, writing in 1911, gives an 
interpretation of paragraph 2, of article 1, saying: 

La question ne laisse pas assurement d'etre delicate. Autoriser le 
bombardement des localites defendues par des mines sous-marines 
automatiques de contact, ce serait, semble-t-il, risquer de faire une 
breche formidable au principe de l'interdiction, si les belligerants 
venaient a faire un large usage de ces moyens de defense. Et comme 
il est impossible de voir si une ville est ou non protegee par des mines 
sous-marines, les navires de guerre pourraient etre portes a interpreter 
le doute comme autorisant le bombardement. 

Mais, d'autre part, il est difficile de refuser le caractere de defense a 
l'immersion de mines; cette immersion n'a, en effet, d'autre but que 
d'empecher l'ennemi d'entrer au port, et c'est la precisement le but 
de toute defense. Les mines, dira-t-on, ne constituent qu'une defense 
passive, puisqu'elles ne peuvent frapper un ennemi que s'il s'approche; 
mais, selon la tres juste observation du Capitaine Ottley, il en est de 
meme des canons dont le tir n'est a craindre qu'autant que Ton s'en 
approche; d'autre part, il y a correlation logique — pour ne pas dire 
n^cessaire — entre le droit, pour une localite, de n'etre pas attaqu^e et 
le droit, pour l'ennemi, de p£n6trer dans cette locality. D'ailleurs, 
lier l'immunite de bombardement a l'absence de mines serait un sur 
moyen de rar^fier l'emploi d'engins peu recommandables, sinon meme 
de le supprimer, devant les ports qui ne pourraient avoir d'autre 
defense. La faculte de bombarder les localites defendues par des 
mines n'augmenterait sans doute pas le nombre des bombardements; 
elle ne ferait vraisemblablement que diminuer le nombre des mines 
et ce serait un heureux resultat. (Le droit de la guerre maritime, p. 
95, no. 43.) 

Institute of International Law, 1913. — The subject of 
bombardment was considered at the Oxford meeting of 
the Irstitute of International Law in 1913. The dis- 
cussion of 1 ombardment on account of mines before the 
port came up in connection with the proposed article 28, 
and as several amendments were suggested, the resume 
of the discussion shows the trend of opirion: 

M. le Rapporteur donne lecture de Particle 28, qui est ainsi concur 

"Bombardement. — II est interdit de bombarder des ports, villes, 
villages, habitations ou batiments qui ne sont pas defendus. 

"Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que, 
devant son port, se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines auto- 
matiques de contact." 

M. Fusinato estime que l'expression "qui ne sont pas defendus" est 
Equivoque. Faut-il entendre par la les villes ouvertes ou bien les 
villes, meme fortifiees, qui ne se defend ent pas? L'article 29, qui 
permet la destruction d'ouvrages fortifies dans le cas vise" par l'article 
28, parait indiquer que la deuxieme interpretation est plus conforme 
aux sentiments de la commission. 



80 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

II serait bon, en tous cas, pour ecarter toute confusion, de remplacer, 
dans cet article et dans les dernieres lignes de Particle 29, les mots 
"qui ne sont pas defendus" par les mots "qui ne se dependent pas." 

31. Hagerup fait observer que 1'amendement de M. Fusinato souleve 
une grave question. Un commandant d'escadre ne peut-il commencer 
le bombardement d'une ville munie de fortifications en plein etat de 
defense, avant que ces fortifications aient servi a un acte de defense? 
L'amendement semble entrainer comme consequence qu'un bom- 
bardement ne peut jamais commencer sans une sommation prealable, 
ce qui va tres loin. Toutefois, en principe il trouve louable la tendance 
de restreindre les conditions de bombardement. 

M. Strisower declare accepter l'amendement de M. Fusinato; car, 
si la regie s'applique rarement a des villes fortifiees ne se defendant 
pas, elle trouvera au contraire souvent son application dans Phypo- 
these de villes non fortifiees qui se defendraient. Ces dernieres pour- 
ront etre bombardees. 

M. Fusinato fait remarquer que le premier cas indique par M. Stri- 
sower s'est presente lors de la recente guerre italo-turque; on s'est 
demande si, pour amener l'ennemi a la paix, on pouvait bombarder 
des villes fortifiees alors meme qu'elles ne se defendaient pas. La 
solution negative parait devoir etre admise. 

L'amendement de M. Fusinato sur le premier alinea est mis aux 
voix et adopte. 

M. le President donne lecture d'un amendement de MM. Harburger, 
Oppenheim, de Bar, Krauel et Lawrence tendaut a la suppression du 
deuxieme alinea. 

Lord Reay expose qu'une localite protegee par des mines sous- 
marines est evidemment defendue et peut, par consequent, etre born- 
bardie. 

M. le Marquis Corsi appuie l'observation de Lord Reay. Tous les 
Etats s'empresseraient de placer des mines devant le3 ports difficiles 
a defendre, s'ils pouvaient par la echapper au bombardement. 

M. le Rapporteur repond a Lord Reay que s'il fallait considerer 
comme defendues, et des lors comme susceptibles de bombardement, 
les localites oil des mines seraient mouillees, toutes les localites pour- 
raient en fait etre bombardees, car un belligerant ne sera jamais certain 
que des mines n'auront pas ete placees et dans le doute il croira tou- 
jours a leur immersion. 

M. Ed. Rolin Jaequemyns, d'accord avec M. Clunet, exprime l'avis 
que le seui fait d'avoir place des mines ne saurait suffire a justifier 
un bombardement. 

Si, par contre, des mines restent mouillees devant le port sous le 
controle des autorites, elles constituent une defense qui rend le bom- 
bardement licite. 

M. Ed. Rolin Jaequemyns propose done de substituer aux mots "se 
trouvent mouillees" les mots "ont ete mouillees." 

M. Fiore propose, pour plus de clarte, d'ajouter au deuxieme alinea 
de Particle 28 la phrase: "une localite devant laquelle se trouvent 
mouillees des mines de contact peut etre bombardee." 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 81 

M. Hagerup se declare partisan du maintien du texte de la commis- 
sion. Les Anglais verraient, sans doute, sans deplaisir l'abandon de 
l'usage des mines, mais il est essentiel pour les pays disposant de cdtes 
Vendues et d'une faible marine de pouvoir employer ce moyen de 
defense. L'amendement de MM. Edouard Rolin et Clunet semble 
du reste etre en contradiction avec la decision prise au sujet de l'amen- 
dement de M. Fusinato, interdisant la destruction des villes pour la 
seule raison qu'elles seraient fortifiees. 

M. Axel de Vedel se rallie a l'opinion de M. Hagerup. 

Lord Reay declare qu'il n'est pas plus partisan du bombardement 
que M. Hagerup n'est partisan de l'abandon de l'usage des mines. 
Toutefois, il lui parait evident qu'un port protege par des mines est en 
£tat de se defendre. Des lors, il n'y a pas de raison pour interdire le 
bombardement. 

M. Strisower observe que le bombardement doit avoir pour but de 
vaincre la resistance de la ville. Or, de fait il ne peut pas servir comme 
moyen d'ecarter des mines et il ne saurait etre employe comme une 
peine pour avoir pose des mines. C'est pourquoi il se declare pour le 
maintien de l'alinea et de Particle. 

M. de Bar fait remarquer que l'interdiction de bombarder une ville 
defendue par des mines aurait pour effet de conferer a celle-ci une 
veritable immunite. 

L'amendement de M. Ed. Rolin Jaequemyns est mis aux voix et 
rejete par 27 voix contre 6 voix. 

M. Fauchille, rapporteur, propose, en son nom personnel, de modifier 
le second alinea de la maniere suivante: "Une localite peut etre bom- 
bardee s'il est etabli que, devant son port, se trouvent mouillees des 
mines sous-marines automatiques de contact." 

M. Niemeyer propose de substituer le mot "cdte" au mot "port," 
afin d'eviter qu'on puisse conclure du projet actuel que le bombarde- 
ment d'une cote protegee par des mines est licite. 

La proposition de M. Niemeyer est nrise aux voix et adoptee par 
20 voix contre 12 voix. 

L' ensemble de l'article 28 est vote par 24 contre 16 voix. (An- 
nuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International, XXVI, pp. 533-537.) 

A committee was appointed to draft the rules in such 
form as would make the arrangement and phraseology 
consistent, and article 28 was numbered 25, and in the 
final draft reads; 

Article 25 (28). Bombardement. — II est interdit de bombarder des 
ports, villes, villages, habitations ou biatiments qui ne se dependent pas. 

Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que, 
devant ses cotes, se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines auto- 
matiques de contact. (Ibid., p. 615.) 

The Institute of International Law at Oxford modified 
the phraseology in regard to bombardment in article 25 

71396—15 6* 



82 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

of the manual adopted so as to read, "II est interdit de 
bombarder des ports, villes, villages, habitations, ou 
batiments qui ne se defendent pas." The last clause 
had been in earlier drafts as in article 1 of the Hague 
convention of bombardment "qui ne sont pas defendus." 
The change here and elsewhere from places "which are 
not defended" to places "which do not defend them- 
selves" materially modifies the application of the rules 
and makes the ground of bombardment an act of defense 
which may be uncertain instead of a condition of de- 
fense which may be discoverable by observation. In- 
deed, there has not been as yet any satisfactory deter- 
mination of what kind of an act may constitute defense. 
It is doubtful whether the change introduced by the 
Institute in the first paragraph from "qui ne sont pas 
defendus" to "qui ne se defendent pas," will be ap- 
proved by an international conference. The prohibition 
against the bombardment of an undefended place is 
based upon the genrally accepted principle of exemption 
of noncombatants. The changed phraseology prohibits 
bombardment of places which do not defend themselves, 
or which do not exercise a power of defense which they 
may possess. In actual practice, such a regulation 
may put the approaching fleet at a great disadvantage 
in some instances, placing it perhaps at the mercy of the 
commander of the place which it approaches. A fleet 
may approach a defended place. The place may have 
guns of a less range than the fleet or may have mines at 
a certain distance. The commander of the fleet knows 
the place is defended. He could compel the surrender 
of the place by his longer range guns. By implication 
bombardment is forbidden because no defense is offered. 
When the fleet comes within range of the shore guns, 
however, there is no obligation upon the commander on 
shore to refrain from attack which may sink or disable 
the fleet which, but for this regulation, would control 
the coast. If the regulation should be drawn in such 
fashion as to prohibit bombardment of places which, 
whether or not defended, agree to offer no defense, or to 
refrain from hostile action against the fleet, the fleet and 



RESUME. 83 

the shore forces are placed upon a footing more nearly- 
equal. 

Resume. — The attitude toward bombardment as shown 
in the article by Admiral Aube was succeeded by an at- 
titude much more in accord with the modern tendency 
toward mitigation of the evils of war as regards noncom- 
batants. The Hague Conference of 1899 did not reach a 
conclusion on the matter of bombardment, and the Con- 
ference of 1907 adopted the paragraph prohibiting " bom- 
bardment solely because automatic contact submarine 
mines were anchored off the harbor" by a vote of 22 out 
of 37. Among those not voting for this paragraph were 
the more important maritime States. Some of these 
States, as Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, have made 
reservations on this paragraph. Some of the leading au- 
thorities on international law regard the paragraph as 
illogical and as tending to aggravate the evil it aimed to 
remedy. The Institute of International Law adopted 
a somewhat modified form by changing the word " har- 
bor" to "coasts." The vote was 24 against 16. There 
was naturally a reluctance to change a paragraph which 
had received much consideration at The Hague in 1907. 

It may be observed that the statement that a place 
can not be bombarded solely because mines are anchored 
off the coast is not any considerable restriction upon 
bombardment, as there would seem to be little or no 
reason for such bombardment. Other reasons would 
usually be present before bombardment would be con- 
sidered expedient. Reasons could ordinarily be found 
by a commander who wishes to bombard a place which 
is defended by mines. Every enemy port might prop- 
erly be regarded with suspicion. 

It is said in the convention concerning bombardment 
by naval forces in time of war that it was drawn with a 
" desire to serve the interests of humanity and to dimin- 
ish the severity and disasters of war." 

Few instruments of war are more to be feared than 
submarine mines. They constitute a hidden danger 
tending to increase rather than diminish the horrors of 
war. It is even doubtful whether this paragraph 2 of 



84 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

article 1 does not tend to increase the possibility of bom- 
bardment because sanctioning to a degree the use of 
mines before places which would otherwise be clearly un- 
defended and therefore not liable to attack. A place not 
liable to attack solely because of the mines before the 
harbor may be bombarded when an additional military 
reason is present. This military reason might not be 
sufficient to justify the bombardment if mines were not 
before the place. Paragraph 2 of article 1, stating that 
" a place can not be bombarded solely because automatic 
contact submarine mines are anchored off the harbor," 
may lead to the placing of mines along an otherwise un- 
defended coast. The opposing belligerent would find 
some means to meet a situation which might place his 
forces at a disadvantage. 

The paragraph of article 1 providing that " a place can 
not be bombarded solely because automatic contact sub- 
marine mines are anchored off the harbor" has not been 
accepted by some of the larger naval powers who have 
ratified the remaining articles of the convention. 

The reasons seem sufficient to warrant a revision of 
paragraph 2 of article 1 and possibly its entire rejection. 

Bombardment of materiel of war. — While the first arti- 
cle of the convention relative to bombardment by naval 
forces prohibits the bombardment of strictly undefended 
towns, the second article shows that the materiel of war 
of the neighborhood is not therefore exempt. The first 
paragraph of article 2 is as follows: 

Article 2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots 
of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilized 
for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in the har- 
bor, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander 
of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons fol- 
lowed by a reasonable delay, if all other means are impossible, and when 
the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the 
time fixed. 

As is shown in the report to the conference, article 2 
is closely related to article 1, and enumerates certain ex- 
ceptions to the general prohibition of article 1. The 
proposition before the subcommission having the sub- 
ject of bombardment in charge, to include the words 



HAGUE CONFERENCE. . 85 

" provisions qui peuvent etre utilises," did not receive 
sufficient support and was withdrawn. 

Report at Hague Conference. — The report of the sub- 
committee on bombardment explains the meaning of 
this article. This report says: 

L'article 2 est si etroitement lie a la disposition de Particle 1, comme 
il appert d'ailleurs du mot "toutefois" qui l'y rattache, qu'on a onge 
a reunir les deux articles en un seul. Apres mure reflexion, le comite 
d'examen s'en est abstenu, pour bien faire ressortir, degage de toute 
consideration secondaire, le principe etabli par le premier article. 

L'article 2 envisage la premiere exception a ce principe; elle semble 
s'imposer vu les besoins speciaux de la guerre navale; en effet, tandis 
que dans la guerre terrestre le belligerant aura la faculte de s'emparer 
d'une place non defendue et d'y proceder, sans avoir recours a un 
bombardement, a toute destruction qui servirait a ses operations mili- 
taires, le commandant des forces navales sera quelquefois tenu de 
detruire, sous certaines conditions, par le canon, si tout autre moyen 
lui echappe, les constructions ennemies servant a des buts militaires, 
lorsqu'il ne dispose pas d'un corps de debarquement suffisant ou qu'il 
est oblige de se retirer rapidement; de meme, il se trouvera peut-etre 
dans la necessite de detruire par le canon, dans des conditions ana- 
logues, les vaisseaux de guerre ennemis se trouvant dans un port, 
meme dans les cas ou ces vaisseaux de guerre ne serviraient pas a 
defendre la ville et que partant il s'agitait d'une ville non defendue. 

Sur le principe de cette premiere excpetion tout le monde etait 
d'accord. On a egalement fini par reconnaitre unanimement qu'il y 
aurait lieu d'ajouter aux constructions, qui, le cas echeant, pourraien 
etre detruites par un bombardement, les "installations" propres a 
etre utilisees pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie (par 
exemple, des lignes ferrees ou des docks flottants) ; une proposition plus 
large, tendant a y faire ajouter encore "les provisions" (par exemple, 
des depots de charbon) fut retiree par son auteur, l'expression "mate- 
riel de guerre," qui est contenue dans cet article, lui donnant une 
satisfaction suffisante et parce que 1' objection fut formulee de plu- 
sieurs cotes que pareil amendement aurait une portee trop generale et 
pourrait compromettre la teneur meme de 1' interdiction. 

Mais la sous-commission n'a pu se mettre d'accord et des tentatives 
faites en ce sens dans le comite d'examen ont egalement ete infruc- 
tueuses sur les conditions qui permettraient au commandant des forces 
navales, se trouvant devant une place non defendue, de proceder lui- 
meme a une destruction par le canon des etablissements militaires, 
etc., a defaut, bien entendu, d'autres moyens moins dangereux, dont 
il pourait se servir. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, 
Tome III, p. 344.) 

This explanation implies that there is a right to destroy 
the lines of railway under certain circumstances. The 



86 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

laws regulating the conduct of war on land permit the 
seizure of the means of transport. On the sea, private 
enemy ships may be captured, and by the laws in regard 
to the days of grace giving exemption to certain ships, 
the exemption is not extended to vessels intended to be 
converted into vessels of war. It is evident that very few 
vessels may not serve a hostile purpose, such as for trans- 
portation of coal, supplies, or tioops. The means of trans- 
portation are often the most effective means of attack 
or of defense, enabling a belligerent to center his forces 
at a point of advantage at a given time. 

The bombardment of a ship of war is specifically per- 
mitted under the restrictions provided in article 2. A 
private ship which had been converted to a ship of war 
would be similarly liable. The word u installations," 
which is used in the convention, is considered to include 
floating docks. A partly completed ship of war or collier 
designed for the fleet would be included in the u materiel 
de guerre." A completed private ship may be more 
easily rendered serviceable by conversion than a partly 
completed public ship, therefore should be regarded and 
treated as "materiel de guerre." 

Private ships of the enemy may, under certain circum- 
stances, be destroyed. One of the necessary prerequi- 
sites is that the persons on the private vessel be placed 
in safety. It would be particularly easy for those on 
board a private vessel in a harbor to withdraw to a place 
of safety, thus meeting the requirement in that respect, 
and the vessel may be destroyed by bombardment if there 
be controlling reason. 

Article V of the Hague convention relative to the status 
of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities 
provides as to exemption that "the present convention 
does not affect merchant ships whose construction indi- 
cates that they are intended to be converted into ships 
of war." 

Vessels already converted into ships of war would not 
be entitled to any exemption. 

It has been admitted that "no objection can be taken 
to the bombardment of shipbuilding yards in which ves- 



DOCTRINES OF NECESSITY. 87 

sels of war or cruisers can be built." (Hall, Int. Law, 
5th ed., p. 536, note 3.) 

The belligerent passing along a coast would seem there- 
fore to have the right to take such action as should pre- 
vent undue risk to the success of his operations. An 
undefended place should also be exempt from war risks 
as far as the exigencies of war permit, The commander 
of a naval force may destroy war material with artillery 
"after a summons followed by a reasonable delay, if all 
other means are impossible, and when the local authori- 
ties have not themselves destroyed them within the time 
fixed." (IX Convention, art. 2.) 

Vessels, even though private property, are not granted 
the same exemptions as some other classes of private 
property. Many vessels are now built with the view to 
possible conversion to war uses. This conversion may 
be made within a very brief period, when the vessel will 
be completely ready for use for war purposes. The trans- 
fer of control may be all that is necessary for vessels 
which are to be used for transport and similar service. 
As bridges in land warfare may be absolutely necessary, 
so vessels may be absolutely necessary in naval warfare. 
The treatment of both must within the law be determined 
by military necessity. Enemy private vessels at sea may 
be captured, and under certain conditions may be de- 
stroyed. 

The regulations in regard to the treatment of enemy 
vessels which may easily be converted into ships of war 
are not yet satisfactory. A belligerent should not be 
liable to undue risk because of liberality in the treatment 
of the merchant vessels of the enemy. 

Some arrangement may possibly be made by which 
the conversion of merchant vessels into ships of war may 
be prohibited, or the innocence of merchant vessels may 
be satisfactorily guaranteed. Such arrangement must, 
however, be satisfactory to the belligerent who threatens 
bombardment, and he bombards at his own risk. 

Doctrines of military necessity. — There seem to be two 
doctrines of military necessity: (1) There are still some 
who maintain that military necessity may overrule all 
law. (2) There are others who maintain that military 



88 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

necessity may justify certain extreme action within the 
law. 

The first doctrine has gradually received less and less 
support, and action in accord with it would probably be 
just ground for retaliation which might be beyond the 
laws of war. The Hague laws and customs of war on 
land pronounce in article 22 that ' ' the right of belligerents 
to the choice of means of injuring the enemy is not un- 
limited." Even if a belligerent should be hard pressed 
and in imminent danger of capture, this necessity would 
not justify the use of poisoned weapons against his oppo- 
nent, or the improper use of the ilag of truce. This first 
doctrine of military necessity is one which dates from 
a period before there existed laws of war, and barbarous 
or inhuman action sought sanction in what was called 
necessity. Grotius, writing in 1625, shows that necessity 
was to be strictly interpreted, but some, writing much 
later, have reverted to the early idea that any act could 
be justified in an extreme case. Even Von Moltke, in 
1881, expressed his disagreement with the Declaration of 
St. Petersburg which expressed the doctrine that "the 
weakening of the military forces of the enemy" was the 
legitimate object of war. Von Moltke maintained that a 
"speedy conclusion" was the main object of war, and 
that all methods, save those absolutely objectionable, 
could be used. This position of Von Moltke is not as 
extreme as those who find no limit which military neces- 
sity may not justify. 

The second doctrine, that military necessity may justify 
certain extreme action within the law, is the one generally 
accepted by civilized states. This is the point of view 
accepted by the United States in one of the earliest of the 
codes of war, the War Department General Order 100, 
of April 24, 1863, generally known as Lieber's Code. 
Articles 14, 15, 16, and 19 show the attitude of the United 
States in 1863, and this attitude purports to reflect that 
of civilized nations: 

14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 
securing the ends of the war and which are lawful according to the 
modern law and usages of war. 



HAGUE DISCUSSION, 1907. 89 

15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb 
of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is inciden- 
tally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the cap- 
turing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the 
hostile Government or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all 
destruction of property and obstruction of the ways and channels of 
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance 
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an 
enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the 
army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good 
faith either positively pledged regarding agreements entered into 
during the war cr supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men 
who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on 
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God. 

16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty — that is, the infliction 
of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge — nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does 
not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation 
of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, 
in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which 
makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. 

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their 
intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially 
the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment 
commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit 
thus to inform the enemy; surprise may be a necessity. 

it is therefore understood that military necessity does 
not justify acts which are forbidden by the laws of war, 
though it may justify acts ordinarily prohibited, it is 
forbidden to bombard an undefended building, yet if such 
a building be in the line of fire in the bombardment of a 
military establishment, its destruction would be justified 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907. — The discussion at 
The Hague, 1907, showed that the proposers of the 
exception on the ground of military necessity intended 
to make this clause a decided limitation upon the action 
of the commander: 

Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Ottley, au nom de la Delegation britan- 
nique, declare approuver entierement les consid6rations exposees par 
son collegue francais et accepter le texte fancais de l'article 2 dans 
son entier. 

S. Exc. M. Van den Heuvel expose que le 2 e alinea de l'article 
2 de la proposition francaise lui parait renfermer une disposition d'une 
gravitee exceptionnelle. 

Le 2 e alinea lui semble enlever presque toute l'efficacite de la 
protection contenue dans le I er alinea. II equivaut en effet a dire 



90 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

que chaque fois qu'un commandant de forces navales se croira pressed 
par les circonstances, il pourra no pas accorder de delai; les mots " neces- 
sity imperieuses" le rendenl juge de la situation et ceux "d'action 
immediate" lui permettent de supprimer tout retard et meme toute 
sommation. 

Ce systeme peut entrainer tres loin. II s'agit non de villes defen- 
dues, mais de villes ouvertes, occupees non par des combattants mais 
par des habitants paisibles. II s'agit de permettre de detruire par le 
bombardement et d'une maniere soudaine, sans aucun avertissement, 
les depots publics et prives, non seulement les installations propres 
au service de la flotte et de L'armee, mais aussi les chan tiers, les ponts, 
les gares, etc. Quelle est la ville qui, bombardee dans ces conditions, 
ne souffrira pas un dommage incalculable par suite des projectiles 
tombant sur les etabl^sements et les endroits occupes, dans les rues et 
accidentellement aussi sur les nombreuses habitations voisines? 

L'orateur fait remarquer en terminant que, dans le comite d'examen, 
on n'a mentionne qu'un seul cas vraiment exceptionnel, celui de la 
presence de na vires de guerre dans un port non def endu ; et on pourrait 
permettre dans ce cas. si les necessites militaires 1 'exigent, la destruc- 
tion immediate par le bombardement de ces na vires. Mais cette 
hypothese particuliere ne parait pas a la Delegation de Belgique 
justifier la disposition generale contenue dans l'alinea 2 de la proposi- 
tion francaise. 

Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Lacaze demande a faire bien ressortir que 
la proposition francaise pose comme regie generale la sommation avec 
delai raisonnable; le cas contraire n'est que l'exception. Et Ton ne 
saurait croire qu'un commandant de forces navales puisse user de ce 
droit exceptionnel en des cas ou des "necessites imperieuses" ne l'y 
contraindraient pas. II y a lieu de remarquer d'autre part que d'une 
facon generale, il sera procede aux destructions visees par Particle 2, 
au moyen d'un materiel special; ce n'est que dans des cas tout a fait 
exceptionnels et lorsqu'on ne pourra pas agir autrement qu'on aura 
recours a l'emploi du canon qui entraine une perte de temps et des 
depenses de munitions. 

Enfin, le commandant d'une force navale, loin de chercher a procoder 
sans moderation, aura tou jours interet, pour sauvegarder sa responsa- 
bilite morale, a effectuer toujours les destructions d'accord avec les 
autorites locales et en leur presence. (Deuxieme Conference de la 
Paix, Tome III, p. 347.) 

S. Exc. M. Leon Bourgois desirerait ajouter quelques mots, car il ne 
lui est pas possible de laisser croire que la proposition francaise puisse 
constituer une aggravation du statu quo. C'est le contraire qui est 
la verite. Quelle est en effet la situation? Actuellement, il n'y a 
aucune regie protegeant contre le bombardement eventuel des ports, 
villes et villages non defendus. Cette regie protectrice interdisant le 
bombardement est posee dans le projet de convention: le l er alinea de 
la proposition francaise confirme expressement ce principe en edictant 
la regie de la sommation et du delai raisonnable pour les exceptions 
admises. Mais la discussion generale a montre que certaines Puis- 



BOMBARDMENT IN TURCOITALIAN WAR. 91 

sances ne pouvaient accepter sur ce point une regie absolue s'il n'y 
6tait apporte une derogation pour certains cas exceptionnels, ceux 
notamment de la presence ou de 1'arrivee imminente de navires de 
guerre ennemis dans le port non defendu. II est bien evident que, 
dans le premier cas, le commandant d'une force navale ne pourrait, 
sans faillir a son devoir, accorder de delai avant de detruire la force 
ennemie et que, dans la seconde hypothese il peut etre contraint de 
proceder sur le champ a la destruction des ouvrages utiles a l'ennemi 
avant son arrivee. 

La proposition francaise a done pour objet de concilier ces n£ces* 
sites militaires imperieuses, qui sont l'exception, avec les considera- 
tions d'humanite qui ont dicte la regie generale. 

En ce faisant, elle contribue a faire aboutir une ceuvre pratique, 
acceptable pour tous, et facilite ainsi la signature d'une convention 
qui constituera un progres reel, car elle assurera reellement la protec- 
tion efficace des villes ouvertes contre le bombard ement. (Ibid., 
p. 348.) 

Bombardment in Turco- Italian War, 1911-12. — A case 
involving bombardment of ships of war in an enemy 
harbor took place during the Turco-Italian War. The 
Turkish gunboat Awni-Illa was with a torpedo boat in 
the port of Beirut. Early in the morning these vessels 
were summoned by the Italians to surrender before 
9 o'clock. As no reply was made to the Italian 
demand, bombardment was begun and the vessels in 
the harbor answered the fire. Some of the shells from 
the Italian fleet damaged other property, and it was 
reported that several persons on shore were killed. 
The Turkish authorities protested that this bombard- 
ment was contrary to the rules of the Hague convention, 
but the protest does not seem to have received much 
consideration, and if, as seems probable, due notice was 
given, there was little ground for the protest. The 
Italian account of the reasons for the operation and of 
the operation itself, is as follows: 

Apres avoir complete en fevrier une premiere organisation defensive 
des positions occupees sur la cote de la Lybie, en laissant les batiments 
suffisants pour assurer la surveillance du littoral et appuyer eventuelle- 
ment, de la mer, les operations entreprises sur terre, la marine tourna 
son activite vers un nouveau theatre d'opeVations. 

La flotte turque, quoique refugiee dans les Dardanelles depuis les 
premiers jours de la guerre, n'en representait pas moins une menace 
pour nous. Les nouvelles qu'on en recevait de temps en temps, 
amenaient a penser qu'on pouvait regarder comme possible une tenta- 
tive desesperee de sa part, soit comme represailies, soit comme diver- 



92 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

sion destine*e a troubler nos operations bin la cdtes de l'Afrique. La 
conformation topographique dea cotes de l'Asie dans la mer Eg£e,qui se 
pretait aux einbuscades, donnait a ces forces oavales, par elle-mdme 
pen redoubtables, une valeur qni n'otait pas a oegliger. 

II etait done n£cessaire <lo prendre des dispositions poui enlever a 
la flotto ennemie L'avantage qu'elle pouvait retirer de la configuration 
speciale des cotes but le theatre de la mer Eg6e. 

D'antre part, toute action navale pouvant DOUS procurer un avan- 
tage anr I'ennemi devait certainement avoir nne influence conside- 
rable but L' issue de la guerre. 

11 rut done decide de transporter nos forces oavales sur ee theatre 
d'operations et, avant tout, on resolut de debarrasscr le bassin oriental 
de la Mediterranee de la presence de deux navires turcs, une canon- 
niere-cuirassee et un torpilleur, qui etaient restes a Beyrouth depuis 
le commencement de la guerre. 

L'entreprise, confiee par le Oontre-amiral Faravelli a la division 
Thaon de Revel, fut executee le 24 fevrier par le Garibaldi et le 
Ferruccio et se termina par la destruction complete des deux navires 
ennemis, apres un court man violent combat. 

Cette action de detail, conduite avec une grande vigueur et une 
admirable precision, se prete singulieremcnt a mettre en lumiere 
l'habilete professionnelle de nos canonniers, deja suffisamment demon- 
tree dans les bombardements precedents. Cette habilete s'afRrma 
d'une maniere toute speciale a Beyrouth, en raison des conditions 
particulierement difficiles dans lesquelles se deroula Taction. Les 
deux navires turcs, le torpilleur en particulier, se trouvaient dissimul6s 
au milieu d'une veritable foret de navires marchands appartenant en 
partie a des puissances neutres qui se trouvaient a l'ancre dans l'6troit 
bassin interieur du port. 

Malgre cela, le tir de nos vaisseaux fut dirige avec une precision si 
grande qu'aucun^ des nombreux navires qui entouraient les deux 
batiments pris comme cibles n'eut a subir de d^gats; il en fut de 
meme des edifices publics qui, tous epargnes a dessein par nos vaisseaux 
ne furent que tres faiblement endommages par les effets indirects du 
tir. Cela n'empecha pas, il est vrai, de violentes protestations de 
B'elever contre la destruction des deux batiments turcs qui etait un 
acte parfaitement legitime de notre part; d'ailleurs, 1' eloquence des 
faits ne tarda pas a se faire jour. (La marine dans la guerre Italo- 
Turque, 1911-12, traduit par Lieut. -Col. Morier, p. 25.) 

Bombardment on plea of military necessity. — While 
summons and reasonable delay is usually required before 
bombardment, yet it is granted that sometimes delay 
may be impossible without undue risk. It is conceiva- 
ble that a summons and a delay would hardly be reason- 
able if a large fleet of the enemy were in a port which it 
was proposed to bombard. 



BOMBARDMENT FOR PROVISIONS. 93 

Considering all phases of the question, military neces- 
sity would justify those measures which are immediately 
" indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and 
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages 
of war." 

Institute of International Law, 1896. — The Institute of 
International Law at its meeting at Venice in 1896 con- 
sidered a body of rules in regard to bombardment pre- 
pared by Prof. Holland and Gen. Den Beer Poortugael. 
The first article of the conclusions reached was that 
"there is no difference between the rules of the law of 
war as to bombardment by military forces on land and 
by naval forces." (Annuaire, Tome XV, p. 145 et seq.) 

Yet under this principle, bombardment was permitted 
under article 3 of the proposed rules, u in order to obtain 
by requisitions or contributions what is necessary for 
the fleet." (Ibid.) 

Comparison of rules for land and sea. — Article 3 of the 
Convention concerning the bombardment by naval 
forces in time of war is as follows : 

After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of unde- 
fended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded 
with if the local authorities, after a formal summons has been made to 
them, decline to comply with requisitions for the provisions or supplies 
necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the place 
in question. These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources 
of the place. They shall only be demanded in the name of the com- 
mander of the said naval force and they shall, as far as possible, be paid 
for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by receipts. 

The article corresponding to this in the Laws and 
Customs for War on Land is as follows : 

Article 52. Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be de- 
manded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the 
army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of 
the country, and of such a nature as not to involve for the inhabitants 
an obligation to take part in the operations of the war against their 
own country. These requisitions and services shall be demanded only 
on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied. 

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if 
not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall 
be made as soon as possible. 

Bombardment for provisions, Hague Conference, 1907. — 
The proposition to allow bombardment for failure to fur- 



94 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

nish provisions necessary for the fleet received considera- 
tion from various points of view. These were summarized 
in the report of the committee as follows: 

L' article 3 statue la seconde exception a rinterdiction contenue 
dans Particle 1. Bien qu'elle ait figure" dans le texte combine, Son 
Excellence le Comte Tornielli a tenu a declarer, des le debut de la 
discussion, que 1'initiative de cette proposition n'£tait pas due a la 
Delegation italienne. De son cote, la Delegation de Belgique a 
egalement repudie cet article, qu'elle desirerait voir disparaitre tout 
entier, sans toutefois formuler une proposition dans ce sens. Aussi 
les debats ne porterent pas sur l'existence meme de cette exception, 
qui, parait-il, a ete consideree comme une concession necessaire aux 
besoins de la guerre maritime, les forces navales etant souvent obligees 
de se procurer, par voie de requisitions, des vivres et des provisions 
dont elles ne sauraient se passer. Mais on a insiste sur le point de 
savoir quelle devrait etre l'etendue des requisitions permises, et dans 
ce sens la Delegation espagnole avait demande, au sujet de la propo- 
sition des Etats-Unis, qui parlait de requisitions raisonnables, qu'on 
precisat quelles sont les requisitions qui doivent etre considerees 
comme raisonnables et dont le refus rendrait les villes, etc., passibles 
de bombardement. La Delegation d'Espagne proposait en meme 
temps que ces requisitions devraient se borner aux fournitures et provi- 
sions necessaires, que les navires des Puissances belligerantes auraient 
le droit de se procurer dans un port neutre. De meme, le Vice-Amiral 
Mehemmed Pacha demanda, au nom de la Delegation cttomane, 
Fadjonction d'un alinea specifiant "que le commandant des forces 
navales ne devrait pas pouvoir recourir au bombardement s'il 6tait 
prouve que les ports, villes, villages, et habitations en question ne 
sont pas en etat de fournir les vivres ou autres provisions necessaires 
aux besoins immediats de la force navale presente." Son Excellence 
le Comte Tornielli ayant propose de bien preciser que les requisitions 
doivent etre "en rapport avec les ressources locales" et son Excellence 
M. le premier delegue de Belgique ayant rappele qu'il y aurait encore 
d'autres dispositions, puisees au Reglement sur les lois et coutumes 
de la guerre sur terre, qui devraient etre appliquees aux requisitions, 
que pourraient reclamer les forces navales, la commission, tout en ne 
s'estimant pas competente de regler ex professo la question des requisi- 
tions pour la guerre maritime en general, a decide d'ajouter, a la fin 
de 1' article 3, une disposition, analogue a celle adoptee deja dans 
l'article 52 du Reglement precite, et specifiant que la fourniture de 
vivres ou d' appro visionnements dont il s'agit doit, non seulement 
correspondre aux necessites des besoins du moment de la force navale 
presente, mais encore etre en rapport avec les ressources de la locality 
ces requisitions ne seront reclamees qu'avec l'autorisation du com- 
mandant de la elite force navale; elles seront autant que possible 
payees au comptant; sinon, elles seront constatees par des recus. 
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome I, p. 115.) 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF REQUISITIONS. 95 

Bombardment for supplies. — Article 3 of the convention 
concerning bombardment by naval forces is: 

After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of undefended 
ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded with 
if the local authorities, after a formal summons has been made to them, 
decline to comply with requisitions for the provisions or supplies nec- 
essary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the place in 
question. These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of 
the place. They shall only be demanded in the name of the com- 
mander of the said naval force, and they shall, as far as possible, be paid 
for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by receipts. 

This article was not approved by all at the conference 
at The Hague in 1907, and since that time seems to have 
been received with less and less favor. 

Many have argued that such an article would not be 
necessary, but that necessary supplies might be obtained 
without such extreme measures. 

Some see in the provision that "requisitions shall be 
in proportion to the resources of the place/' a source of 
controversy owing to the difficulty under which a naval 
commander would be in determining the resources. 

The demand would to some seem questionable from the 
point of view of policy because a confession of the needs 
to which the fleet had been reduced. 

Further, as the town is undefended a force might land, 
and would then come under the ordinary rules of land 
warfare in regard to requisitions which would be in some 
respects more favorable to the party making the requi- 
sition. 

General character of requisitions. — In land warfare, 
requisitions may be for provisions, supplies, or articles 
needed for the use of the army. Beasts of burden, carts, 
railway material, boats for use of the army, and other 
means of transportation may be demanded. Similarly, 
services of the inhabitants for nonmilitary work may be 
required. 

In naval warfare, if requisitions are allowed, correspond- 
ing articles and services may be demanded. It would be 
possible to require that supplies needed for the support 
of the personnel of the ship, fuel for the use of its engines, 
or other articles necessarv for immediate use be furnished. 



96 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

There is the condition that these requisitions be in pro- 
portion to the resources of the place. As it may be 
presumed that a naval force demanding supplies or 
making requisitions is often under pressure on account of 
lack of time, the transportation of the supplies to a con- 
venient point might reasonably be required if the resources 
of the place permitted. The gathering and transporta- 
tion of the supplies to the ships might be even more 
essential than corresponding service for land forces, as the 
land forces would ordinarily have equipment better 
adapted for such purposes. 

Conclusion. — The transportation of the supplies, if 
within the resources of the place, would come within the 
limits of the requisition. 

Institute of International Law, 1913. — The committee 
of the Institute did not, in presenting a manual for mari- 
time warfare, propose many changes in the Hague conven- 
tion concerning bombardment. There were some who 
proposed to eliminate article 31 of the proposed manual 
which corresponded to article 3 of the Hague convention. 
There was considerable discussion in the committee upon 
the subject, and this is summarized in the report as 
follows : 

Un membre de l'lnstitutde Droit International, M. Kebedgy, dans 
une proposition dont il a ete donne connaissance a la commission, 
avait demande la suppression de Particle 31 autorisant le bombarde- 
ment des localites et des batiments non defendus pour refus d'obtem- 
p6rer a des requisitions de vivres ou d'approvisionnements: " II ne sied 
pas, disait-il, a une societe savante comme l'lnstitut, poursuivant la 
'civilisation de la guerre' de consacrer formellement un tel abus de la 
force." M. Strisower, au sein de la commission, s'est de merae declare 
hostile a cette disposition; il n'a pas ete, toutefois, comme M. Kebedgy, 
jusqu'a en reclamer le retranchement du projet; il a propose seulement 
de la modifier en ce sens qu'il ne faudrait reconnaitre au commandant 
le droit de bombarder que si, apres reception de refus par les autorites 
locales, il a employe tous les moyens en son pouvoir pour pren- 
dre ce qu'il veut requisitionner et qu'on lui refuse. M. Edourd Rolin 
Jaequemyns a fait observer que cette exigence ne changerait pas grand'- 
chose: "elle ne ferait qu'ajouter une formalite de plus." La com- 
mission a estime que, liee par les regies directrices votees a Christiania, 
elle ne pouvait faire droit a la demande de M. Kebedgy qui supprimait 
un article admis, non seulement par la Convention de La Haye No. IX, 
du 18 octobre 1907, mais par l'lnstitut lui-meme dans son Reglement 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 97 

de 1896 sur le bombardement des villes ouvertes par des forces navales 
(art. 4); mais, a l'instigation de M. Paul Fauchille, elle a decide, pour 
donner satisfaction a M. Strisower, d'ajouter dans la disposition, afin 
d'en attenuer la rigueur, apres les moti: "II peut, apres notification 
expresse," les mots: "et si aucun autre moyen n'est posiible." (26, 
Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International, p. 237.) 

With this change the article came before the Institute 
at the Oxford meeting, and it was voted to suppress the 
whole article which corresponded in some respects to 
article 3 of the Hague convention. 

The form of the article upon which the vote was taken 
was as follows: 

Art. 30. II peut, apres notification expresse, et si aucun autre 
moyen n'est possible, etre procede au bombardement des port?, villes, 
villages, habitations ou batiments non defendus, si les autorites locales, 
mises en demeure par une sommation formelle, refusent d'obtemperer 
a des requisitions de vivres ou d' appro visionnements necessaires au 
besoin present de la force navale qui se trouve devant la localite. 

Ces requisitions seront en rapport avec les ressources de la localite. 
Elles ne seront reclamees qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant de la 
dite force navale et elles seront, autant que possible, payees au comp- 
tant; sinon elles seront constatees par des recus. 

It will be seen that this article differs from article 3 of 
the Hague convention on bombardment by the introduc- 
tion of the clause l 'et si aucun autre moyen n'est possible," 
which would make it to read : 

After explicit notice, and if no other way is possible, the bom- 
bardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, buildings 
may be proceeded with, etc. 

In this form some thought it would be useless to 
retain the article I ecause the restriction, "if no other 
way is possible," would nullify in practice what seemed 
to be a grant and that such a regulation should not be 
approved by a body of jurists who should endeavor to 
make clear the regulations. Corsequently some voted 
against the article 1 ecause they were opposed to bom- 
bardment for requisitioi s and others opposed it because 
of its modified form, which made it in effect a prohibi- 
tion if strictly ot served. Under such conditions 31 
voted to reject the article, 23 voted to retain, and 2 did 
not vote. 

71396—15 7* 



98 BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES. 

If these rules of the Institute are adopted, therefore, 
it would be necessary under ordinary conditions to land 
forces in order to obtain supplies or provisions under 
requisitions which could then be made according to the 
rules of land warfare. The locality would in either case 
be obliged to furnish the supplies. The naval com- 
mander would be compelled to use a somewhat different 
method to obtain compliance with his demands. Article 
3 as embodied in the convention of The Hague is so sur- 
rounded with restrictions as to make it of little real value 
as a permissive regulation— e. g. there must be formal 
summons to the local authorities, the supplies must be to 
meet immediate needs, in proportion to the resources of 
the place, demanded in name of commander, paid for or 
acknowledged by receipt, etc. — procedure involving about 
as many difficulties as actual landing and requisition 
under land rules. 

It is thought by many that the permission would rarely 
if ever be of value to States having considerable navies 
and carrying on war in civilized manner while the reten- 
tion of the article might give less stable States a ground 
for extreme action in some instances and encouragement 
to prey on a stronger enemy. Others think the article 
might give sanction to an act which might be necessary 
under extreme conditions. 

If the regulations in regard to requisitions in land 
warfare are to be retained, this regulation of article 3 of 
the Hague convention seems to be fairly in accord with 
the laws and customs of war on land. 

The vote on the subject at the Oxford meeting of the 
institute in 1913 while against retaining the article 
embodying the principle of article 3, as somewhat dif- 
ferently stated, was in a ratio less than 3 to 2. 

Considering the matter from all points of view, article 3 
of the Hague convention concerning bombardment by 
naval forces is one upon which there seems to be a well- 
grounded difference of opinion which should be given 
further consideration. 

Conclusion. — (a) Paragraph 2 of article 1 should not be 
accepted in its present form. 



CONCLUSION. 99 

(b) Under the present rules in regard to conversion, 
the presence in a belligerent port of vessels which are 
suited for conversion into vessels of war may be a suffi- 
cient ground for bombardment unless satisfactory 
arrangements are made to guarantee that these vessels 
shall not be used for war purposes. 

(c) Military necessity under paragraph 3 of article 2 
applies to actions immediately u indispensable for secur- 
ing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according 
to modern law and usages of war" and not of a nature 
"to make the return to peace unnecessarily difficult." 

(d) Unless the whole of Convention IX is revised, 
article 3 in regard to requisitions by naval forces should 
be retained. 



Topic IV. 

SUBMARINE MIXES. 

The Hague Convention VIII, 1907, relative to the 
laying of automatic contact submarine mines was ad- 
mitted to be tentative. In view of this fact should this 
convention be revised? 

(a) Should the use of submarine mines be absolutely 
prohibited ? 

(b) If submarine mines are not prohibited, should un- 
anchored automatic contact submarine mines be pro- 
hibited ? 

(c) Should there be a regulation as to the area within 
which mines may be placed? 

(d) What precautions should be taken in laying 
anchored and unanchored contact mines '. 

(e) Should a neutral State be forbidden to lay mines 
within its territorial waters? 

(f) Should article 6 be renewed ? 

(g) Should the use of torpedoes be further regulated ? 

CONCLUSION. 

(a) The use of submarine mines should not be abso- 
lutely prohibited. 

(6) The use of unanchored automatic contact mines 
should be prohibited or more definitely restricted. 1 

(c) The area within which mines may be placed should 
be determined by regulation. 

(d) When anchored automatic contact mines are em- 
ployed, every possible precaution must be taken for the 
security of peaceful shipping, including — 

1. An advance notice to foreign Governments and to 
mariners, specifying the general limits of the mined area. 

1 Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and introducing the proposed 
changes, the following form may be suggested as meeting present requirements and 
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines except when they 
are so constructed as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before ] assing outside the area of belligerent 
activities. 

100 



RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 101 

2. Provision for warning peaceful vessels approaching 
the mined area. 

3. Specification of the time during which the mines 
will be dangerous. 

(e) The laying of mines by a neutral State should not 
be prohibited. 

(/) Article 6 of Convention VIII should not be con- 
tinued in force. 

(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but 
should be less regulated if any change is made in the 
convention. 

notes. 

Mines in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904—5. — The use 
of submarine mines in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-5 particularly attracted the attention of the world 
to dangers of the use of these instruments of war. 
Mines had been used before this time, but not in such a 
general manner. Whether or not mines were deliberately 
allowed to drift out to sea, it seems probable that a large 
number of mines did drift about in the waters in the 
neighborhood of Port Arthur. The reports seem to show 
that many mines were found outside the immediate area 
of the belligerent activities. As the danger from drifting 
contact mines might be equally great to the party placing 
the mines, it is difficult to believe that mines which would 
not become harmless after a fixed time would be set 
adrift in an area of general operations, even if there were 
no regulation against the use of submarine mines. 

The destruction of the Japanese battleship Hatsuse on 
May 15, 1904, was reported by Admiral Togo, as follows: 

While the fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the Hatsuse 
struck an enemy's mine. Her rudder was damaged, and she sent a 
message for a ship to tow her. One was being sent, when another 
message brought the lamentable report that the Hatsuse had struck 
another mine and had sunk immediately after. She was then 10 
knots off the Liau-tie-Shan promontory. There was no enemy in 
sight, and her loss must have been caused by a mine or submarine. 

Later it was declared that the Hatsuse was sunk by a 
submarine mine. The destruction of the Hatsuse by a 
mine at a point 10 miles from Port Arthur caused much 
discussion. It was admitted that belligerents had a right 



102 SUBMARINE MINES. 

to carry on war on the high sea, but it was also con- 
tended that neutrals had a right to safe passage on the 
high sea when not within the area of actual active 
hostilities. It was contended that if a neutral vessel 
had passed over the same spot it would have been de- 
stroyed as was the Ilatsuse. Later, in 1907, the Chinese 
delegate at the Conference at The Hague explained 
that many Chinese vessels had been destroyed by 
mines drifting about the sea, some even entering the 
littoral sea. The Chinese delegate reckoned the number 
of Chinese who had lost their lives as 500 to 600. 

It was reported that the Russian vessel Yenisseij 
after laying 389 mines, was itself destroyed by the 
390th. The Russian vessel Petropavlovslc seems to have 
been destroyed by a mine when near Port Arthur. It is 
of course impossible to determine whether these vessels 
were -destroyed by mines laid by Russian or by Japanese 
forces. 

During the Russo-Japanese War the area in which mine 
laying was carried on was remote from the usual routes 
of commerce. The possible effects of contact mines 
drifting about the English Channel as in the neighbor- 
hood of Port Arthur was pictured effectively by some 
writers, and attention was called to the dangers from such 
forms of warfare and the necessity of regulation of 
the use of submarine mines became evident. 

Propositions at The Hague in 1907. — The British dele- 
gation at the Hague conference in 1907, following its 
instructions, offered the following proposition, which 
became the basis of much discussion: 

Article 1. L'emploi de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact 
non mouillees est interdit. 

Art. 2. Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact, qui, en 
quittant leur point de mouillage, ne deviennent pas inoffensives, sont 
prohibees. 

Art. 3. L'emploi des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact 
pour etablir ou maintenir un blocus de commerce est interdit. 

Art. 4. Les belligerants ne pourront se servir de mines sous-marines 
automatiques de contact que dans leurs eaux territoriales ou celles de 
Jeura ennemis. Toutefois, devant les ports de guerre fortifies cette 
zone pourra etre etendue jusqu'a une distance de dix milles des canons 
a terre, & charge, pour le belligerant qui poserait ces mines, d'en donner 



HAGUE PROPOSITIONS, 190 7. 103 

avis aux neutres, et de prendre en outre les dispositions que lea cir- 
constances lui permettront pour eviter, dans la mesure possible, que 
les navires de commerce qui n'auraient pu etre touches par cet avis 
eoient exposes a etre detruits. 

Seuls les ports possedant au moins un grand bassin a radoub et qui 
seront munis d'outillage necessaire a la construction et la reparation 
de vaisseaux de guerre et dans lesquels un personnel d'ouvriers payes 
par l'Etat pour effectuer la construction et la reparation de vaisseaux 
de guerre est entretenu en temps de paix, seront considered comme 
entrant dans la categorie de ports de guerre. 

Art. 5. D'une facon generale, les precautions necessaires seront 
prises pour sauvegarder les navires neutres qui se livrent a un commerce 
licite; et il est a desirer que, en raison des dispositions memes prises 
dans la construction des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact, 
ces engins cessent d'etre dangereux au bout d'un delai convenable. 

Art. 6. A la fin de la guerre les belligerants se communiqueront 
mutuellement dans ]a mesure possible les informations necessaires 
quant a 1' emplacement des mines automatiques de contact que chacun 
aura posees le long des cotes de l'autre, et chaque belligerant devra 
proceder dans le plus bref delai a l'enlevement des mines quise trouvent 
dans ces eaux territoriales. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de 
la Paix, Tome III, p. 660.) 

Italy proposed to limit the life of unanchored automatic 
contact submarine mines to one hour after they were 
launched and to permit the use of such anchored contact 
mines only as should become harmless on breaking adrift. 

Japan would limit the use of unanchored mines to the 
immediate sphere of hostilities and make the life by 
construction such as to offer no danger to neutrals. 

The Netherlands delegation introduced certain amend- 
ments looking particularly to the use of mines for pur- 
poses of defense by neutrals. 

Brazil offered an amendment of somewhat similar 
purport. 

Spain also made a proposition to limit the mines to 
territorial waters. 

Germany suggested the addition of the following 
clause : 

La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur 
le theatre de la guerre; sera considere comme theatre de la guerre 
l'espace de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de 
guerre ou sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite 
de la presence ou de l'approche des forces armees des deux belligerants. 
(Ibid, p. 663.) 



104 SUBMARINE MINES. 

The United States delegation offered an amendment 
as follows : 

1. Unanchored automatic contact mines are prohibited. 

2. Anchored automatic contact mines, which do not become innocu- 
ous on getting adrift, are prohibited. 

3. If anchored automatic contact mines are used within belligerant 
jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activities, due 
precautions shall be taken for the safety of neutrals. (Ibid., p. 664.) 

Russia added the provision in regard to torpedoes and 
approved form of mines: 

1. Les belligerants se serviront de mines automatiques de contact 
sous-marines amarrees construites de facon a ce que, en tant que cela 
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront rompu 
leurs amarres. 

2. Leur mines flottantes automatiques seront construites de facon a 
ce que, en tant que cela est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives 
apres un certain delai apres leur lancement. 

3. Les torpilles seront construites de facon a ce que, en tant que cela 
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque 
leur but. 

4. Un delai suffisant sera accorde aux Gouvernements pour mettre 
en usage les appareils de mines perfectionnes. (Ibid., p. 664.) 

A synoptical arrangement of all the propositions was 
made and then various amendments were suggested to 
the new arrangement. 

Several suggestions were made with view to allowing 
mines within the area of immediate belligerent operations 
or with view to making a definite limit from the coast 
for the employment of mines. Ten miles was frequently 
suggested. 

The propositions in general show a drift from the idea 
entertained by many at the commencement of the dis- 
cussion, which idea was favorable to absolute prohibition 
of the use of mines. 

M. Hagerup, the presiding officer of the subcommittee, 
summarized the propositions before the committee in the 
following manner: 

Les questions dont nous aurons a nous occuper sont les suivantes: 
Premiere question. — Certaines especes de mines ne doivent-elles paB 

etre l'objet d'une interdiction absolue, qu'elles soient placees dans des 

eaux territoriales ou en pleine mer? 



HAGUE PROPOSITIONS, 1907. 105 

La proposition britannique interdit: 

(a) Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact non amarrees; 
les amendements italiens et japonais (annexes 10 et 11) font exception 
pour les mines qui deviennent inoffensives un certain temps apres leur 
immersion. L'amendement italien fixe ce temps a une heure, tandis 
que 1'amendement japonais n'indique pas de fixation. 

(6) Sont en outre interdites, d'apres la proposition britannique, les 
mines qui en quittant leur point de mouillage ne deviennent pas 
inoffensives. La meme interdiction est, dans d'autres termes, con- 
tenue dans l'amendement italien et l'amendement espagnol. (Annexes 
10 et 14.) La difference entre ce dernier amendement et les dis- 
positifs sus-mentionnes est que l'ameiidement espagnol presuppose 
une espece d'autorisation internationale pour le placement de mines 
automatiques de contact. 

Seconde question. — Le placement de mines sous-marines ne doit-il 
pas etre interdit en pleine mer? 

La proposition anglaise, article 4, repond affirmativement, sous cette 
reserve qu'elle autorise la pose de mines en mer jusqu'a dix milles 
devant certains ports de guerre. La proposition contient en outre une 
definition de ce qu'on entend par port de guerre. L'amendement de 
la Delegation des Pays-Bas propose de supprimer cette definition. 

Troisieme question. — Dans quelles conditions les Etats peuvent-ils 
placer des mines dans leurs eaux territoriales? 

Cette question n'est traitee par la proposition britannique qu'en 
tant qu'elle concerne les belligerants, tandis que les amendements, 
proposes par les Delegations des Pays-Bas et du Bresil, visent aussi 
les neutres. La proposition britannique dans ses articles 4-6 prescrit 
d'une facon generale des precautions a prendre pour sauvegarder la 
navigation pacifique contre les dangers des mines. Sur ce point, il y 
a cette difference entre la proposition britannique et l'amendement 
neerlandais que la premiere demande aux belligerants de donner aux 
neutres un avis special du placement des mines, tandis que l'amende- 
ment neerlandais se contente d'une publication generale. La propo- 
sition de la Delegation de Pays-Bas qui traite egalement des neutres 
contient d'ailleurs les m ernes prescriptions pour le placement des mines 
par les neutres et par les belligerants. 11 est en outre a remarquer que 
cette proposition soumet tout placement de mines, soit par les bellige- 
rants, soit par les neutres, a la restriction que les detroits qui unissent 
deux mers libres ne peuvent pas etre barres. Pour le reste des disposi- 
tions proposees par les differentes delegations, il convient d'envisager 
separement les differentes hypotheses suivantes: 

(a) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans ses propres eaux 
territoriales. 

(&) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans les eaux de 1'adver- 
saire. L'amendement espagnol (annexe 14) le soumet a la condition 
que le belligerant y exerce un pouvoir effectif. La proposition britan- 
nique (article 3) prescrit de son cdte que l'emploi de mines pour eta- 
blir ou maintenir un blocus est interdit. 



106 SUBMARINE MINES. 

(c) Placement de mines dans les eaux territoriales des neutres. 
L'amendement neerlandais assimile ce cas completement au place- 
ment de mines par les belligerants, tandis que 1'amendement bresilien 
(annexe 13) r>e parait admettre pour les neutres que le placement de 
mines explosant sous Taction d'une impulsion provoquee en con- 
naissance de cause par des autorite^s d'Etat. Oet amendement con- 
tient du reste des prescriptions speciales quant a l'avertissement a 
faire et la responsabilite pour le deplacement des mines. 

La quatrieme question est celle visee par Particle 7 de l'amendement 
neerlandais (annexe 12). Y a-t-il lieu d'etablir par une convention 
internationale des regies pourl'indemniteencasde dommage cause par 
les mines? (Ibid., p. 522.) 

Preamble of the Hague convention. — The preamble of the 
Hague convention relative to the laying of automatic 
contact submarine mines shows that those who drew the 
convention did not regard its provisions as anything 
more than tentative. The form of the preamble is dis- 
tinctly favorable to much more rigid regulations than 
those embodied in the convention itself. The preamble 
states that the powers: 

Inspired by the principle of the freedom of sea routes, the common 
highway of all nations; seeing that, although in the existing state of 
affairs it is impossible to forbid the employment of automatic contact 
submarine mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate 
their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, 
as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is 
entitled, despite the existence of war; until such time as it is found 
possible to formulate rules on the subject which shall ensure to the 
interests involved all the guaranties desirable; have resolved to con- 
clude a convention for this purpose, and have appointed the following 
as their plenipotentiaries. 

Tentative character oj the convention. — Not only does the 
preamble of the convention itself and many of the discus- 
sions show that the convention relative to the laying of 
automatic contact submarine mines is tentative in char- 
acter, but some of the reserves made by States and the 
declaration of Great Britain show this. (Deuxieme Con- 
ference Internationale de la Paix, tome 1, page 281.) 

Types oj mines. — Mines are generally classified as an- 
chored and unanchored or free. Anchored mines vary in 
construction and operation, but usually are such as are 
under control so that they may be discharged at the will 
of an operator on shore, or such as explode on contact 
with a vessel or other hard body. Unanchored mines also 



TYPES OF MINES. 107 

vary in construction and operation. Some have a rea- 
sonably definite limit of effectivity, after which they sink 
or otherwise become harmless. Some unanchored mines 
seem to be effective for long periods. 

Controlled anchored mines. — Naturally there has been 
little objection to the use of controlled anchored mines. 
An anchored mine which can only be discharged at the 
will of an operator may differ little from a shell from a 
gun. The shell may be aimed to strike the vessel, while 
the mine may be placed so that it will be struck by a 
vessel, but will explode only when the operator in charge 
determines and at other times will be harmless. Such 
mines do not necessarily imperil neutral or innocent ship- 
ping. As these mines are under control of the operator, 
it is generally held that the State placing such mines is 
responsible for their use. The use of such mines has not 
met with much opposition, but has been generally ap- 
proved. 

Anchored contact mine*. — Anchored contact mines be- 
ing such as explode on contact with a vessel, may be dan- 
gerous to any vessel, whether the vessel be hostile, neu- 
tral, or of the nationality placing the mines. From the 
time when these mines are placed, the force placing them 
has no control over them except the negative control due 
to the knowledge of their supposed location. Currents 
may change according to circumstances the location of the 
mines. The storms and tides of some regions make it 
difficult to maintain the position of mines. These mines 
also sometimes drift from their moorings. In storm, fog, 
or stress of weather such mines may be particularly dan- 
gerous, because the usual precautionary measures may 
be impossible, and vessels may enter a mine field inad- 
vertently. When once adrift, a contact mine may re- 
main a menace to shipping unless so constructed as to be- 
come harmless on breaking adrift. 

It is open to question whether anchored contact mines 
are not so dangerous as to involve undue risk to all par- 
ties who use the sea. 

There is a general agreement upon the requirement 
that anchored contact mines should become harmless 
on getting adrift. 



108 SUBMARINE MINES. 

British instructions, 1907. — The delegates of Great 
Britain were acting in accordance with their instructions 
in advocating the entire abolition of the use of automatic 
contact mines. These instructions were as follows: 

His Majesty's Government woald view with satisfaction the aban- 
donment of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare 
altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition, they 
earnestly hope that the employment of these engines of war will only 
be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would advocate 
an arrangement by which the use of automatic mines should be limited 
to territorial waters, and. if possible, to such portions of territorial 
waters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus employed 
should be effectively anchored, and so constructed that, in the event 
of their breaking adrift, they would either automatically become harm- 
less or sink, and that in any case their active life should not exceed a 
limited period of. say, six months. (Correspondence Respecting the 
Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers Misc. Xo. 1 (1908) 
(Cd., 3857).) 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907. — The discussion of the 
subject of submarine mines at The Hague in 1907 showed 
that the conference considered it too early to give any 
definite pronouncement upon the matter. The report of 
the committee frankly admits this. The votes in the 
subcommittees were sometimes quite evenly divided. 

Several States maintained that the use of mines should 
not be prohibited not merely because mines would be 
needed in time of war, but also because they would be 
used to protect neutrality. The Brazilian delegate 
supported this position. 

The Netherlands delegate objected to the British pro- 
posal on the ground that it lacked any provision relating 
to the laying of mines during a war by neutral powers 
in their territorial waters in order to maintain their neu- 
trality. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, 
Tome III, p. 521.) Other States ordinarily neutral also 
supported the proposition to allow the use of submarine 
mines. 

The general argument was that belligerents were not 
yet prepared to renounce the use of a means of offensive 
and defensive warfare which was regarded as formidable 
and at the same time less costly than many other means. 
The States with smaller navies were particularly averse 
to the prohibition of mines. The general sentiment was 



HAGUE DISCUSSION, 1907. 109 



favorable to regulation but not to prohibition of the use 
of mines. Germany maintained a position less favorable 
to regulation than most States. Great Britain led the 
movement for restriction. At the time of the adoption 
of the convention relating to mines Sir Ernest Satow 
made a formal statement on behalf of the British delega- 
tion, of which a translation appeared in the London 
Times of October, 1907: 

Having voted for the mines convention which the conference has 
just accepted, the British delegation desires to declare that it can not 
regard this arrangement as furnishing a final solution of the question, 
but only as marking a stage in international legislation on the subject. 
It does not consider that adequate account has been taken in the con- 
vention of the rights of neutrals to protection or of humanitarian sen- 
timents which can not be neglected. The British delegation has done 
its best to bring the conference to share its views, but its efforts in this 
direction have remained without result. The high seas, gentlemen, 
form a great international highway. If in the present state of interna- 
tional laws and customs belligerents are permitted to fight out their 
quarrels upon the high seas, it is none the less incumbent upon them 
to do nothing which might, long after their departure from a particular 
place, render this highway dangerous for neutrals who are equally 
entitled to use it. We declare without hesitation that the right of the 
neutral to security of navigation on the high seas ought to come before 
the transitory right of the belligerent to employ these seas as the scene 
of the operations of war. 

Nevertheless, the convention as adopted imposes upon the bel- 
ligerent no restriction as to the placing of anchored mines, which con- 
sequently may be laid wherever the belligerent chooses, in his own 
waters for self-defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of attack, 
or finally on the high seas, so that neutral navigation will inevitably 
run great risks in time of naval war and may be exposed to many a 
disaster. We have already on several occasions insisted upon the 
danger of a situation of this kind. We have endeavored to show what 
would be the effect produced by the loss of a great liner belonging to a 
neutral power. We did not fail to bring forward every argument in 
favor of limiting the field of action for these mines, while we called 
very special attention to the advantages which the civilized world 
would gain from this restriction, since it would be equivalent to dimin- 
ishing to a certain extent the causes of warlike conflicts. It appeared 
to us that by acceptance of the proposal made by us at the beginning 
of the discussion dangers would have been obviated which in every 
maritime war of the future will threaten to disturb friendly relations 
between neutrals and belligerents. But since the conference has not 
shared our views it remains for us to declare in the most formal manner 
that these dangers exist, and that the certainty that they will make 
themselves felt in the future is due to the incomplete character of the 
present convention. 



110 SUBMARINE MINES. 

As this convention, in our opinion, constitutes only a partial and 
inadequate solution of the problem, it can not, as has already been 
pointed out, be regarded as a complete exposition of international law 
on this subject. Accordingly, it will not be permissible to presume the 
legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this convention has not 
prohibited it. This is a principle which we desired to affirm, and which 
it will be impossible for any State to ignore, whatever its power. (See 
Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 281.) 

There also appeared in the Times a translation of the 
declaration of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, of the 
German delegation, made immediately after the English 
statement, as follows: 

That a belligerent who lays mines assumes a very heavy responsi- 
bility toward neutrals and toward peaceful shipping is a point on which 
we are all agreed. No one will resort to this instrument of warfare 
unless for military reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But 
military acts are not solely governed by stipulations of intsrnational 
law. There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense 
of duty imposed by principles of humanity will be the surest guides for 
the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most effective guaranty 
against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it 
(je le dis a haute voix), will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the 
duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and civiliza- 
tion. I have no need to tell you that I entirely recognize the impor- 
tance of the codification of rules to be followed in war. But it would 
be a great mistake to issue rules the strict observation of which might 
be rendered impossible by the law of facts. It is of the first importance 
that the international maritime law which we desire to create should 
only contain clauses the execution of which is possible from a military 
point of view — is possible even in exceptional circumstances. Other- 
wise the respect for law would be lessened and its authority under- 
mined. It would also seem to us to be preferable to maintain at present 
a certain reserve, in the expectation that seven years hence it will be 
easier to find a solution which will be acceptable to the whole world. 
As to the humanitarian sentiments of which the British delegate has 
spoken, I can not admit that there is any country in the world which 
is superior to my country or my Government in the sentiment of 
humanity. (Ibid.) 

With such diversity of opinion among large States the 
prohibition of mines is not immediately possible. 

The action of States since the Hague Conference of 
1907 has shown that mines were not to be immediately 
set aside as engines of war. Opinion and usage, there- 
fore, seem at present unfavorable to the entire prohibi- 
tion of the use of submarine mines. 



OPINION OF DUPUIS. Ill 

Opinion of Dupuis. — After speaking of the discussion 
at The Hague in 1907, Prof. Charles Dupuis, writing in 
1911, says: 

II semble que ces constatations devraient suffire pour faire condamner, 
meme en dehors de tout accord conventionnel, l'usage d'engins aussi 
dangereux pour la navigation pacifique que pour les vaisseaux de 
guerre belligerants. Parce que la haute raer n'est soumise a aucune 
souverainete, il est loisible aux belligerants de s'y battre; il est admis 
que les batiments neutres qui se risquent sur le theatre des operations 
le font a leurs risques et perils; ces batiments pourraient se tenir a 
l'ecart ou fuir a l'approche des navires de combat; s'ils ne le font pas, 
ils s'exposent sciemment a un danger qu'ils pourraient eviter; ils ne 
peuvent se plaindre des e frets de leur propre imprudence. Mais si, de 
ce que la mer n'est a personne, il resulte que les belligerants ont liberte 
de s'y battre, il resulte aussi que les neutres, que les pacifiques ont 
liberte de s'y mouvoir et droit d'user de cette liberte sans courir des 
perils qu'ils ne peuvent ni prevoir, ni eviter. II est possible de pr6- 
voir et d'eviter le theatre d'un combat; il est impossible de prevoir et 
d'eViter les mines invisibles qui flottent a la derive, a des distances 
incalculables des operations de guerre, et qui conservent leur puissance 
de destruction pendant des mois et des annees apres le jour ou elles 
ont ete immergees. II est done inadmissible que les belligerants 
menacent et detruisent la liberte de la mer, en semant des engins 
aveugles et inevitables, qui portent au loin, pour un temps illimite, 
contre tous les navires, les perils qu'ils n'ont le droit de susciter que 
contre leurs seuls ennemis. 

On pourrait, sans doute, admettre que les eaux territoriales des 
belligerants fussent, pendant la guerre, rendues inaccessibles par des 
mines, a la condition que les neutres, prevenus du danger, aient la 
faculte de s'y soustraire, mais encore faudrait-il que les mines immer- 
gees dans les eaux territoriales fussent mise3 dans l'impossibilite d'aller, 
en pleine mer, repandre le peril qu' elles ne doivent creer que dans la 
zone soumise a la juridiction des Etats riverains. (Le Droit de la 
Guerre Maritime, No. 332, p. 547.) 

As a general principle, mines may be used when under 
control or within an area under the exclusive control of 
the belligerent within which peaceful shipping may not 
enter. Therefore, mines may be used within the area of 
and during actual belligerent action, as peaceful shipping 
is excluded from this area or enters it at the risk of injury. 

Conclusion. — The use of submarine mines should not be 
absolutely prohibited. 

TJnanchored mines. — The Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-5 caused many complaints upon the use of mines. 
The Chinese contended that their nationals had been 
sacrificed by the careless use of mines by the bellig- 



112 SUBMARINE MINES. 

erents. It was maintained that the seas had heen 
strewn with floating mines. Whether there was any 
justification for this supposition may be doubted and the 
injury to innocent vessels may have been caused alto- 
gether by mines which had broken adrift from their 
moorings. If this was the case, these mines were evi- 
dently not so constructed as to become harmless when 
getting free of their moorings, for they became in effect 
floating contact mines which were carried by the currents 
in many directions. 

The mine being in any case a particularly dangerous 
engine because hidden, becomes even more dangerous 
when floating freely, the knowledge of its location being 
unknown and its effective life indefinite in duration. The 
unrestrained use of unanchored mines is therefore gener- 
ally condemned as securing to the belligerent no advantage 
commensurate with the risk involved. 

The question then arises as to the use of unanchored 
contact mines for special purposes. A vessel may be 
pursued by another. It may fire a shell or discharge a 
torpedo at the pursuing vessel. May it not then drop a 
mine in the path of the pursuer? Evidently the prin- 
ciple is nearly the same as to the different measures so far 
as concerns the two belligerents. The shell will if it 
misses its mark sink to the bottom of the sea and may 
become immediately harmless. The torpedo will also 
usually become harmless when it has completed its rela- 
tively short run. The essential difference in the mine is 
that unless specially constructed it may remain a danger 
to any vessel for an indefinite period. The Naval War 
College in 1905 therefore proposed the following: 

Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except those that by con- 
struction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before 
passing outside the area of immediate belliegrent operations. (Inter- 
national Law Topics, 1905, p. 147.) 

The Hague Conference of 1907 adopted a somewhat 
different formula, making the time of effectivity definite, 
saying it is forbidden — 

to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so 
constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who 
laid them ceases to control them. 



ATTITUDE OF UNITED STATES, 1907. 113 

It may be observed that this fixing of one hour as the 
time of active life of an unanchored automatic contact 
mine may permit the mine to pass entirely outside the 
area of immediate operations. If the operations should be 
in or near an ocean highway of commerce, the period of 
one hour as the life of an unanchored mine might be long 
enough to place many neutral vessels in danger. The 
belligerent vessel which had thrown over the mine at the 
beginning of the hour might be many miles distant before 
the end of the hour, and if a vessel or fleet were pursuing 
the same might be true of the pursuers. 

From the drafting of the present rule also there is no 
reason why unanchored automatic contact mines might not 
be used even when the object might not be to escape pur- 
suit, but to endanger an enemy who was expected later to 
pass through the area. The only restriction is that the 
mine shall become harmless after one hour at most, other- 
wise there is no formal limitation, even the requirement 
(art. 3) that " every possible precaution must be taken for 
the security of peaceful shipping" is applied specifically 
to " anchored automatic contact mines." The Hague 
regulation in regard to unanchored mines is manifestly 
unsatisfactory, and if unanchored mines are not altogether 
prohibited this clause should be revised. 

Attitude of United States at The Hague, 1907. — The 
United States at The Hague in 1907 proposed the pro- 
hibition of unanchored mines. The course of discussion 
is shown in the report of the committee: 

Pourtant, la proposition d'une interdiction absolue de toute mine 
automatique de contact non amarree fut reprise par la Delegation des 
Etats-Unis d' Amerique (annexe 17) . Elle ne put rallier la majorite des 
voix dans le comite d'examen, qui la rejeta par 11 voix contre 4 et 2 
abstentions et se prononca ensuite unanimement en faveur de la limi- 
tation, dans le sens sus-indique, du temps pendant lequel la mine non 
amaree serait dangereuse. Mais, bien que d'accord sur ce dernier 
principe, les membres du comite n'etaient pas unanimes a vouloir aussi 
fixer d'une maniere determinee le laps de temps dans lequel les mines 
non-amarrees devraient devenir inoffensives. On a soutenu qu'il y a 
des cas ou une limitation fixee d'avance est impossible; on devrait se 
contenter d'une formule plus generale qui statuerait, sans fixer un laps 
de temps ' ' que les mines automatiques de contact non amarrees doivent 
devenir inoffensives apres un temps limite de maniere a n'offrir aucun 
danger aux na vires neutres." "Si une force navale," a dit le Contre- 
71396— 15 8* 



114 SUBMARINE MINES. 

Amiral Siegel, "se voit poursuivie et veut lancer des mines non amar- 
rees pour empecher son adversaire de l'atteindre, une limite deter- 
mines, avant tout la limite d'une heure, rendrait l'emploi de cette 
arme tres souvent inefficace et inutile, 6tant donne que celui qui pour- 
suit sera en mesure, soit par ses eclaireurs, soit par d'autres moyens, 
de connaitre que son adversaire a jete des mines; ce dernier trouverait 
done des moyens pour eviter tout danger, soit en faisant un petit detour, 
soit en attendant une heure avant de passer sur le lieu dangereux, apres 
quoi il sera en toute securite. Un autre cas se presente, si un ennemi 
bloque rembouchure d'un fleuve. Si le defenseur veut employer des 
mines flottante's contre son ennemi en les envoyant en aval, le temps de 
leur efficacite doit etre en rapport avec la longueur du chemin a par- 
courir et ne peut pas etre fixe d'avance." 

Malgre ces considerations, la majorite du comite, desirant assurer 
une efficacite reelle au principe adopte, se prononca en faveur d'une 
limite de temps fixee d'avance (9 voix contre 2 et 5 abstentions), apres 
quoi le comite, appele a choisir entre la limite d'une heure et celle de 
deux heures (la derniere proposee a titre transactionnel par S. Exc. M. 
de Hammarskjold) se prononca en faveur de la limite d'une heure, a la 
majorite de 8 voix, contre 1 et 7 abstentions." (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 403.) 

Precautions as to unanchored mines. — If mines are to 
be used they are evidently engines of such nature as 
should be used with some care that they do no injury to 
parties not concerned in the war. 

An innocent private vessel of the enemy may not be 
sunk unless under "exceptional necessity/' and those on 
board must be placed in safety before the destruction of 
the vessel, though when such a vessel deliberately comes 
within range in time of actual battle, it must take the 
consequences. The existence of an actual battle is a 
fact evident to the vessel. 

This condition is somewhat parallel to that of a float- 
ing unanchored mine thrown over by one belligerent ves- 
sel while another is pursuing. It would seem that to 
make the situation more nearly parallel the range of the 
mine should be that of a shell or of a torpedo or the actual 
limit of immediate operations. At the present time it is 
probable that the guns of any ship of war have not a range 
greater than the distance which could be made by a fast 
vessel in one-half hour. One hour would therefore seem 
a long life to allow to unanchored contact mines, because 
if not exploded they might continue for a half hour to 
be a danger to innocent shipping which might presume 



PRECAUTIONS AS TO UNANCHORED MINES. 115 

the sea to be safe after the pursued and pursuer had 
passed. If a long life is allowed to unanchored mines 
there is the correspondingly increased risk that these 
mines may drift in unexpected directions and to a greater 
distance from the point of launching. If allowed a life of 
one hour the vessel may be before the end of the hour 
beyond the distance within which an approaching neutral 
or other innocent vessel can be notified of 'the danger 
from the mine. 

The use of uncontrolled, unanchored contact mines 
should be prohibited. The reasons for prohibiting un- 
anchored, uncontrolled mines are many. Among the 
reasons would be the extreme danger to all who follow 
the sea as compared with the slight chance that the 
enemy against whom the mine is launched will be injured. 
These mines should be clearly distinguished from the 
controlled, unanchored contact mines, the range of action 
of which is determined by the belligerent who launched 
the mine. 

A belligerent at the present time has no right to com- 
plain of the use of mines against his vessels of war. It is 
true that the mine is a hidden means of attack, but the 
submarine boat may also be a hidden means of attack, 
and there is no prohibition of the use of hidden or secret 
measures provided no perfidy is involved. The innocent 
vessels of the enemy are generally exempt from attack 
though they may be taken as prize. SmaU coast fishing 
vessels and small boats engaged in local trade are, when 
innocently employed, by convention, exempt from cap- 
ture even. The obligation of the belligerent to guard 
such vessels against injury from mines would therefore 
be as imperative as to guard them against injury from 
cannon fire. The only way in which this can be done is 
by control of the life of the mine. 

As a life of one hour seems an unduly long time for an 
uncontrolled, unanchored mine and involves undue risks, 
it would seem best to further limit the maximum time, 
and as in many cases the maximum time should not be 
granted, there should be another basis for determination 
of the life depending upon the area of immediate hostili- 
ties. A combination of these would seem to give the 



116 SUBMARINE MINES. 

necessary and reasonable guaranty for safety of innocent 
vessels, particularly when an engagement might take 
place in the neighborhood of the highways of maritime 
commerce, as may be the case. The proposition of the 
Naval War (Allege in 1905 was that — 

Unanchi red, contact mines arc prohibited except those that by 
construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly 
before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent activities. 

The Hague convention of 1907 provided that it is for- 
bidden — 

to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so 
constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after those who 
laid them have lost control of them. 

It may be advantageous to combine these propositions, 
as the single limit of time proposed at The Hague does 
not seem to be sufficient. The War College proposition 
of 1905 contained a reference to time which was not made 
specific. There would probably be a little objection to 
making the time limit specific provided it were not too 
long. One hour seems too long. One-half hour seems 
ample from a belligerent point of view, and from the neu- 
tral point of view the shorter the time the more satis- 
factory, because the risk would be correspondingly 
lessened. 

Conclusion. — The use of unanchored automatic contact 
mines should be prohibited or more definitely restricted. 
Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and intro- 
ducing the proposed changes, the following form may be 
suggested as meeting present requirements and opinions: 

It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact 
mines except when they are so constructed as to become 
harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before passing 
outside the area of belligerent activities. 

General statement as to area. — It is generally admitted 
that one belligerent must at all times when outside of 
neutral jurisdiction be on guard against attack which 
may legitimately be made by the other belligerent. 
This attack may be made upon the high seas or within 
belligerent waters. The attack may be sudden under 
cover of night, of fog, or of ruse not involving perfidy. 



CONCLUSION, UN ANCHORED MINES. . 117 

When a neutral vessel enters the area of actual legiti- 
mate hostilities the vessel enters at its own risk. If the 
opposing belligerents are engaged in firing upon each other 
a neutral vessel comes within range at its peril. Certain 
areas in the neighborhood of fortifications or other points 
of military importance are sometimes set apart as strate- 
gic areas and vessels are notified or warned not to enter. 
Such action has been generally approved. Blockaded 
areas are universally recognized as closed to free com- 
munication. Blockaded and strategic areas are exam- 
ples of areas from which the innocent vessel is warned by 
public proclamation or notification. The liability of the 
neutral is based upon his action when knowledge of con- 
ditions based on proclamation or notification may be 
presumed. In case of an actual battle, knowledge is pre- 
sumed because of the evident facts. It is proper that a 
neutral should bear the consequences of disregard of 
knowledge which he reasonably may be presumed to have. 

The risk from mines is or may be such as can not be 
presumed to be known to the innocent vessel. In case 
of bombardment the commander of the attacking force 
is under obligation to do his utmost to warn the authori- 
ties. Other provisions are in the direction of safeguard- 
ing not only neutrals but also noncombatants. Many 
regulations are aimed to safeguard those not engaged in 
warfare from hidden dangers. 

The right of innocent use of the high sea has long been 
recognized as paramount to any right of a belligerent to 
exclude innocent vessels from a given area, except for 
immediate military reasons. Even a blockade to be 
binding must be effective. It is, of course, possible that 
a battle may be waged in any part of the high sea; this 
contingency does not, however, give a belligerent the 
right to exclude innocent shipping from any area in 
which he is not actually operating or maintaining a force. 

A belligerent has the right to place mines in certain 
areas for military purposes. These military purposes 
are supposed to be immediate and not remote or con- 
tingent. The propriety of placing of mines for the 
defense of a military port is widely admitted, though 
there is difference of opinion upon the distance from the 



118 SUBMARINE MIXES. 

port at which mines may be laid. The laving of mines 
in the high sea is not admitted by all to be allowable, 
but all demand proper precautions for innocent parties. 

The discussion as to mines in the high-sea areas shows 
less accord in reference to unanchored contact mines than 
in reference to anchored mines. 

Speaking of the mines in the seas of the Far East, 
during the Russo Japanese war (whether they might 
have been anchored and have broken loose, or whether 
they might have been unanchored, the results would 
have been the same), Prof. Westlake said: 

Now, the right of a State in the waters subject to its sovereignty ean 
certainly net rank higher than that of a private owner in the land or 
water which is his property. Still less, if possible, can the right of a 
State in the open sea, which is free to the use of all. rank higher than 
that of propeity. But no principle is more firmly established in the 
science of law than that which says to an owner sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas. The right of sovereignty, therefore, does not extend to 
employing anywhere what may be foreseen to be engines of slaughter 
and damage to unoffending foreigners. The foreign government whose 
subjects suffer from such engines does not need to inquire whether their 
use is prohibited by any positive rule of international law, whether 
resting on recognized custom or an agreement. They are indefensible 
in themselves, and the foreign government concerned will be justified 
not only in taking up the cause of its injured subjects. It will not have 
exceeded its rights if it interferes in order to stop the offending methods 
of war. (International Law, Part II, War, p. 322.) 

The contention of Prof. Westlake that the right of 
sovereignty does not extend to unregulated employment 
of mines is so generaUy supported at the present time as 
to scarcely need discussion. It may therefore be stated 
in a general way that mines may not be used except 
within certain denned areas. What these areas shall be 
is, however, a question upon which there still exists 
differences of opinion. 

Propositions as to area, The Hague, 1907. — The British 
proposition at the Second Hague Conference, 1907, in 
article 4 limited the use of automatic contact submarine 
mines to the territorial waters of the belligerents and to an 
area extending 10 miles from fortified places or military 
ports. 

The Netherlands delegation would also prevent the 
mining of straits which unite open seas. (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 661.) 



AREA OF MINES. 119 

The Spanish delegation wished to limit the placing of 
mines by one belligerent in the territorial waters of the 
other belligerent to the area over which the belligerent 
placing the mines was in effective control. 

Germany added an important suggestion: 

La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur le 
theatre de la guerre; sera considere comme theatre de la guerre l'espace 
de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de guerre ou 
sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite de la 
presence ou de l'approche des forces armees des deux belligerants 
(Ibid., p. 663.) 

Later a somewhat modified suggestion was made by 
the German delegation: 

La pose des mines automatiques de contact amarrees sera aussi 
permise dans Pemplacement de l'activite immediate des belligerants, 
pourvu que les precautions soient prises pour la surete a laquelle les 
neutres ont droit. (Ibid., p. 668.) 

A somewhat similar amendment was offered by the 
Netherlands delegation. 

The various propositions were put in definite form as 
basis for consideration by the comite d'examen, as fol- 
lows: 

Article 2. II est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de 
contact amarrees de la d'une distance de trois milles marins a partir de 
la laisse de basse mer, ou le long de toute l'etendue des cotes, ainsi que 
des lies et des bancs qui en dependent. 

Pour les baies, le rayon de trois milles marins sera mesure a partir 
d'une ligne droite, tiree en travers de la baie dans la partie la plus 
rapprochee de 1' en tree au premier point ou l'ouverture n' excedera pas 
dix milles. 

Art. 3. Devant les ports de guerre, la limite pour le placement des 
mines est portee a une distance de dix milles marins. 

Sont considered comme ports de guerre les ports, qui sont decretes 
comme tels par l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent et ceux ou existent des 
chantiers navals de construction. 

Art. 4. Dans les limites indiquees aux deux articles precedents, les 
belligerants ont le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact 
amarrees dans les eaux de leurs adversaires. 

Toutefois il est interdit d'y placer des mines automatiques de contact 
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce. 

Art. 5. Dans la sphere de leur activite immediate, les belligerants 
ont de meme le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact en 
dehors des limites fixees par les articles 2-4 du present reglement. 



120 SUBMARINE MINES. 

Les mines employees en dehors des limites fix^es par les article 2-A 
doivent etre construites de facon qu'elles soient rendues inoffensives 
dans un delai maximum de deux heures apres que le poseur les a 
abandonnees. 

Art. 6 (reserve). La communication entre deux mers libres ne peut 
etre barree entierement par des mines automatiques de contact. Mais 
le passage pourra y etre soumis a des conditions qui seront decr^tees par 
les autorites competentes. 

La disposition de Palinea l er ne porte aucune atteinte aux regies 
£tablies par les traites et conventions existanta, ni aux droits de la 
souverainete territoriale. (Ibid., p. 671.) 

With the exception of article 6 above the projet 
presented to the third committee closely resembled that 
before the comite d'examen. 

Later the Colombian delegation proposed to make 
certain changes and to introduce as article 2 — 

L'emploi des mines automatiques de contact amarrees est absolument 
interdit excepte comme moyen de defense. 

Les belligerantes ne pourront se servir desdites mines que pour la 
protection de leurs propres cotes et seulement jusqu'a la distance de la 
portee maxime des canons. 

Dans le cas des bras de mer ou des passages maritimes navigables 
conduisant exclusivement aux cotes d'une seule Puissance, cette 
Puissance pourra barrer leur entree, pour sa protection, en placant des 
mines automatiques de contact amarrees. 

II est absolument interdit aux belligerants de placer des mines 
automatiques de contact amarrees en pleine mer ou dans les eaux de 
Pennemi. (Ibid., p. 680.) 

Circumstances determining use of mines. — Some consid- 
eration must be given to the purposes for which mines are 
used. While there are those who would prohibit the use 
of mines altogether, these do not seem to be in the 
majority at the present time. Admitting that mines will 
for a time continue to be used, their use may be limited 
so that circumstances would condition the legality. 
Mines may be prohibited except for purposes of defense. 
There always arises in such a case a difference of opinion 
upon what constitutes defense, and it is not always 
possible to determine whether mines in a given region 
are placed for defense or offense. This difference of 
opinion appeared at the conference at The Hague in 
1907. Many States in favor of limiting the use of mines 
could not be convinced that this method of restriction 
would realize that end. The Colombian proposition that 



WAR COLLEGE DISCUSSION, 1913. 121 

the use of anchored automatic contact mines should be 
absolutely prohibited except for purposes of defense was 
voted upon, receiving 16 affirmative and 15 negative 
votes, while 6 abstained from voting and 7 were absent. 
As this did not give an absolute majority, further con- 
sideration of this proposition was abandoned. (Ibid., 
Tome I, p. 292.) 

Another proposition was made by the Netherlands 
delegation looking to special regulation of the use of 
mines in straits. This also did not receive sufficient 
support to make it a part of the proposed convention. 

Use of mines for intercepting commerce. — It was defi- 
nitely proposed at the Hague Conference to prohibit the 
use of mines for intercepting commerce. This proposi- 
tion was not sufficiently supported, and the question came 
upon the form of restriction. The British delegation 
proposed to allow mines only before such ports as are 
considered "military ports." 

The second draft of the report of the committee was as 
follows : 

It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and portt 
of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. 

The German delegate declared that he reserved his 
vote upon this form, as it introduced a subjective ele- 
ment in the determination of the character of the act 
which in application would give rise to difficulties. 

The British delegate remarked that the British propo- 
sition was advanced with the idea of avoiding the German 
objection. When the second draft was put to vote, 33 
voted yes, 3 abstained, 7 were absent, and Germany 
reserved its vote, and the convention provided that 
mines for "the sole object of intercepting commerical 
shipping" were prohibited. 

The recognized method of intercepting commerce with 
a belligerent is by blockade. The penalty for attempting 
to violate blockade may be condemnation of ship and 
cargo, but there is no penalty imposed upon the crew, as 
would be the case if mines were used to destroy the ship. 

Naval War College discussion, 1913. — The conclusions 
drawn from the discussions at the Naval War College 
in 1913 were in accord with the general opinion of naval 



122 SUBMARINE MINES. 

men and of writers. This opinion shows a tendency 
toward more definite restriction upon the use of mines, 
both as regards character of the mines and as regards 
area within which they may be placed. The subject 
was, however, considered only as one part of the general 
topic of means of injuring the enemy. The conclusion 
as to torpedoes and mines was as follows: 

Torpedoes and mines: 

(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not become harmless 
when they have completed their run. 

(6) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except within the 
immediate area of belligerent operations. 

(c) It is forbidden in the high seas and in marginal waters of the 
belligerent (1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines except when 
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after 
those who laid them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored 
automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they 
have broken loose from their moorings. 

(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the coast or before the 
ports of the enemy except for strictly military or naval purposes. 

It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to maintain a 
commercial blockade. 

(e) When mines- are employed, every possible precaution must be 
taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 

The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these 
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and should they 
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as 
military exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must also 
be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. 

(/) At the close of the war the belligerent States undertake to do their 
utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each State removing 
its own mines. 

As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the bel- 
ligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the 
other party by the State which laid them, and each State must proceed 
with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters. 

The belligerent States upon which the obligation to remove the 
mines falls after the end of the war should as soon as possible give notice 
that the mines have so far as possible been removed. (International 
Law Topics and Discussions, 1913, p. 147.) 

Institute of International Law, 1910-1913. — The Naval 
War College, International Law Topics, 1913, pages 143- 
146, show that with slight modification in regard to the 
provision for removal of the mines after the war the rules 
Of the Institute, approved in 1910, were approved in 1913. 



HAGUE DISCUSSION ON AREA. 123 

These rules of the Institute follow closely the Hague 
convention relative to the laying of automatic contact 
submarine mines except as to the area. The Institute 
rule provides: 

It is forbidden to lay in the open sea automatic contact mines, whether 
or not anchored. 

At earlier sessions there had been proposed the fol- 
lowing : 

It is forbidden to lay fixed or floating mines in the open sea. 

The main point upon which emphasis may be placed 
is the prohibition of mines in the open sea in distinction 
from marginal waters, and the report of 1910 shows that 
it was the intention of the Institute that this prohibition 
should be absolute. (23 Annuaire de Tlnstitut de Droit 
International, pp. 179, 429.) 

Discussion as to area, The Hague, 1907 . — The question 
as to limitation of area within which mines might be laid 
received much discussion and the propositions of the 
comite* d'examen in respect to limitation of area were 
much reduced. 

Admiral Siegel, speaking for the German delegation, 
assumed a hypothetical case to illustrate the ground of 
opposition to certain restrictions: 

Aussi, la Delegation allemande doit-elle faire des reserves sur les 
articles dont les dispositions peuvent causer des malentendus et qui 
d'autre part interdiraient l'emploi des mines en beaucoup des cas, 
ou cet emploi est indispensable. II sera cite un seul exemple. Si 
une flotte X bloque la cote d'un pays Y, elle le fait pour lui couper 
toute communication par mer. Elle veut faire mourir le pays d'une 
lente inanition en le privant de ses moyens d' existence. Le pays 
Y fera tout son possible pour eviter un pareil sort et cherchera a tenir 
les navires de la flotte X a une distance aussi grande que possible de 
ses rivages. Dans le cas ou les forces maritimes ne suffisent pas a 
atteindre ce but, l'Etat Y trouve dans les mines un auxiliaire pr6- 
cieux. Mais pour les mettre en activite, il faut les porter dans la 
proximity de l'ennemi. Or, la flotte X ne s'arretera pas toujours pres 
de la cote, elle stationnera peut-etre a une distance de 20 milles ou 
plus. Comme Particle 3 interdit l'emploi des mines a une distance 
au-dela de 3 milles, et en quelques cas de 10 milles de la cote, le defen- 
seur se verrait prive du seul moyen qui put forcer la flotte ennemie a 
s' eloigner de ces cotes. Cet etat de choses serait absolument inadmis- 
sible. Mais ce n'est pas tout. L'article 5 interdit toutes les mines qui 
ne deviennent pas inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles ont etc" 



124 SUBMARINE MIXES. 

abandonm rs par celui qui les a posees. Si done, dans le cas men- 
tionne, le defenseur y a pose des mines devant ses navires dans l'esp6- 
rance de pouvoir rester sur place pendant un certain temps, et s'il est 
attaque par la flotte X beaucoup plus forte que lui et qui l'oblige a, se 
retirer precipitamment, comment serait-il en mesure de trouver les 
moyens pour garantir que les mines qu'il a posees deviennont inoffen- 
sives dans les deux hemes? II est evident que e'est impossible, cet 
exemple qui reste parfaitement dans le cadre de ce qui peut arriver 
dans chaque guerre demontre jusqu'a 1' evidence que les dispositions 
des articles 3 et 5 sont inacceptables au point de vue militaire. II 
convient en outre de faire observer que dans le cas qui vient d'etre 
cite on ne saurait dire que les interets de la navigation pacifique soient 
en jeu. Entre une cote bloquee et la flotte bloquante aucune naviga- 
tion de commerce ne peut exister. Pourquoi alors ces restrictions inac- 
ceptables? (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome 
III, p. 378.) 

Sir Ernest Satow. of the British delegation, set forth 
the reasons why the general public should be deeply 
interested in the regulation of the use of submarine mines 
and the dangers of any considerable freedom in the use 
of mines. In one part of the somewhat extended dis- 
cussion Sir Ernest Satow remarks: 

Nous sommes d'avis que la pose de mines amarrees en dehors des 
eaux territoriales des belligerants et au-dela d'une limite de dix milles 
marins devant les ports de guerre, arsenaux militaires, ou etablisse- 
ments de constructions navales ou de radoub, doit etre interdite aux 
belligerants. Le droit qu'accorde le projet de poser des mines amarrees 
en pleine mer dans la "sphere d'activite immediate donne aux bel- 
ligerants la faculte de semer ces engins dans toutes les mers peu pro- 
fondes. Ainsi elles pourraient etre posees dans une grande partie de 
la Baltique, dans la Mer du Nord, la Manche, sur les cotes de la Medi- 
terranee, pour ne pas parler du Detroit de Malacca, des parages des 
Indes Neerlandaises, du Golfe du Tonkin et de la Mer Jaune. II est 
vrai qu'il est stipule au 2 e alinea de l'aiticle 5 que les mines amar- 
rees en pleine mer devront etre construites de facon a devenir inoffen- 
sives dans un delai maximum de deux heures apres qu'elles auront 
£te abandonnees par le billigerant poseur, mais comment cette stipula- 
tion pourra-t-elle etre mise a execution? Sauf dans le cas de la mine 
£lectro-mecanique, la mine une fois posee ne peut etre rendue inoffen- 
sive que par Taction d'une contre mine qui, elle, agit instantanement. 
Nous ne croyons pas que Ton puisse inventer une mine qui devienne 
inoffensive deux heures apres que le belligerant poseur aura quitte" les 
lieux, peut-etre a la hate pour echapper a la pourcuite de l'ennemi; 
la stipulation nous parait done demander l'impossible et il nous pa/ait 
preferable de supprimer Particle 5 en entier ce qui aura pour resultat 
de faire disparaitre aussi l'alinea 2 de l'article 9. 



AMERICAN OPINION. 125 

L'article 4, alinea 3, declare qu'il "est interdit de placer des mines 
automatiques de contact devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire 
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce." C'est la 
une clause qui laisse au belligerant une echappatoire bien dangereuse. 
On avait propose dans le comite de ne permettre la pose de mines 
devant un port de commerce qu'a la condition qu'il y eut dans ce port 
au moins une grande unite" de combat, mais la proposition fut vivement 
combattue et dut, par consequent, etre retiree. Cependant il serait, 
a not re avis, tout a fait contraire a 1' esprit et a la lettre de la Declaration 
de Paris de permettre qu'un blocus fut maintenu, totalement ou en 
partie, a l'aide de mines. Je me permets de vous rappeler le texte 
meme du passage qui a trait a cette question: "Les blocus, pour etre 
obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force 
suffisante pour interdire reellement 1'acces du littoral de l'ennemi." 
II est clair qu'il s'agit ici d'une force suffisante composee de navires de 
guerre, et que Ton ne peut comprendre dans cette categorie des mines 
sous-marines qui ne sont sujettes a aucun controle et qui ne contien- 
nent en elles aucune preuve evidente de l'intention de fermer acces 
du port bloque. II serait par consequent bon de tirer ce point au clair 
afin de ne laisser subsister aucun equivoque, et c'est pourquoi nous 
avons l'honneur de proposer le texte suivant a la place de celui que 
nous avons sous les yeux: 

"II est interdit de poser des mines automatiques de contact devant 
les ports de l'adversaire autres que ceux qui sont considered comme 
ports de guerre." (Ibid., p. 380.) 

Gen. Porter, of the American delegation, speaking on 
the proposed convention, says of the clauses particularly 
relating to area in which mines may be placed: 

II est evident que la determination de la limite de trois milles serait 
souvent extremement difficile sur une cote bordee d'iles et de bancs 
partiellement ou totalement submerges, et qui peut-etre ne seraient 
meme pas releves; mais Pobjection capitale a cet article est que la 
portee des canons de vaisseaux de guerre modernes etant de 15,000 
yards, la distance de trois milles ou 6,000 yards est moindre que la 
moitie de leur portee; ainsi des vaisseaux pourraient attaquer les cotes 
avec impunite malgre la defense au moyen de mines. 

II est vrai que la superficie de la pose des mines a ete etendue par 
un vote du comite a la "sphere d'activite immediate," et tel est le 
but du l er alinea de Particle 5, mais le 2 e alinea de cet article stipule 
que lee mines ainsi placees en dehors de la limite de trois milles 
deviendront inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles auront ete aban- 
donees. II est clair que ceci est impossible, etant donne qu'une mine 
aussi intelligente n'a jamais ete imaginee. Si le navire faisant la 
patrouille du champ des mines est force de rentrer par suite de l'ap- 
proche de l'ennemi toute communication physique avec les mines est 
necessairement rompue, et l'ennemi sefiant a la bonne foi et a l'habi- 
lete technique avec lesquelles les stipulations d'une convention ont 



126 81 BMABINE MINES. 

£te exec utoes par Padversaire peut prendre une base de tir commode 
apres que deux heures se sont ecoulees, et proceder a la destruction 
de routes, pouts, viaducs, tunnels, docks et autres etablissements de 
manufactures et de constructions de navires qui se trouvent en deca 
de trois milles de la laisse de basse-mer, malgre toute defense de mine. 

Evidemment les stipulations de Particle 5, alinea 2, sont prohibi- 
tives, et ceci etant tacitement admis, une disposition fut introduite 
dans 1' article 3, en vue de permettre 1' usage de mines amarrees a dix 
milles en avant des ports de guerre, vraisemblablement deja forte- 
ment fortifies, disposition qui ne subit aucune restriction par le 2 e 
paragraphe de Particle 5, tandis que, par contre, le meme droit est refuse 
a des ports sans defense. II est vrai que le 2 e alinea de Particle 3 
permet pratiquement de declarer tout port, port de guerre, mais le 
droit legitime de defense ne devrait pas etre subordonne a Pinterpre- 
tation d'une stipulation intentionnellement vague. 

L'article 3 permet a la defense de placer des mines jusqu'a la limite 
de 10 milles devant tout port que Pon peut declarer port de guerre. 
L'article 4, alinea 2, permet seulement a la force attaquante de placer 
des mines en dehors de la limite de trois milles a partir de la laisse de 
basse-mer de la cote de son adversaire, quand les etablissements de 
construction de navires ou autres sont la propriete de PEtat; inegalite 
qui a ete proposee a la session de PInstitut de Droit International et 
rejetee, ainsi que cela est signale dans le rapport tres competent actuelle- 
ment soumis a la commission. 

Les articles 2 et 3 ne sont pas acceptes par la Delegation des Etats- 
Unis. lis portent une atteinte serieuse aux droits existants et neces- 
saires a la defense; ils sont vagues et complexes au point de constituer 
une menace de serieux malentendus s'ils etaient acceptes. 

Les l er et 2 e alineas de Particle 4 ne sont pas accepters par nous 
en raison de P inegalite de leurs dispositions et aussi de Pincertitude 
de leur application. (Ibid., p. 386.) 

Admiral Sperry, also of the American delegation, had 
said in the comite d'examen: 

L'omission, dans la proposition de la Delegation des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique relativement aux mines sous-marines, d'une limitation 
definie des emplacements dans lesquels elles peuvent etre placees, 
n'est pas due a une sympathie quelconque pour Pusage general 
des mines au-dela des eaux territoriales, methode que, en commun 
avec tout le monde civilise, elle condamne, mais bien a d'autres con- 
siderations (annexe 17). 

Le terme "eaux territoriales" n'est peut-etre pas plus certain dans 
son application que les limites mesurees; mais le delegue naval des 
Etats-Unis n'est pas prepare a dire qu'une limitation d'une maniere 
ou d'une autre ne porterait pas atteinte au droit de defendre les 4,000 
milles de la cote continentale des Etats-Unis, a certains points qui 
doivent etre approches par un chenal tortueux entre des recifs sub- 
merges, loin du rivage, oil quelques mines empecheraient absolument 



AMERICAN OPIXIOX. 127 

d'avoir acces. Dans une ile, environnee de recifs, des Philippines, il 
y a une grande baie entouree de tous cotes par la terre, qui abriterait 
la flotte de la plus grande Puissance. 

Les Puissances, qui sont representees ici, ont de vastes et riches 
possessions dans l'Ocean Pacifique et l'Ocean Indien, oil les ports et 
les iles sont abrites par des barrierres de recifs de corail, avec seulement 
ici et la un passage qui peut etre ou non en deca de dix, ou en deca 
de cent milles de la terre ferme. 

Les recifs peuvent etre decou verts ou non a maree basse. Oil est 
la limite de la maree basse? A-t-il ete decide que toutes les eaux en- 
dedans de recifs sont des eaux territoriales? Les trois milles seront-ils 
mesures des recifs et au-dela? La cote (Lasteric) d'Australie est 
abritee pendant plus de mille milles par le Grand Banc de Recifs a 
une distance de vingt a cent cinquante milles du rivage. En dedans 
de ce recif, ou il n'y a que de loin en loin des passages, il existe un 
labyrinthe de recifs moindres et d'ilots, mais dans les mille milles les 
plus gros vaisseaux peuvent naviguer en surete sous la charge d'un 
pilote. II n'est pas necessaire pour un navire n'allant pas a un port 
australien de passer en dedans, et les eaux interieures ne peuvent 
guere etre considerees comme faisant partie de la haute mer. II n'est 
pas a la connaissance du Delegue des Etats-Unis si elles sont con- 
siderees ainsi; mais il semble douteux que les nationaux de cette 
grande et riche communaute abandonnent volontiers ce qui serait 
presqu'une defense parfaite des points importants. 

II y a beaucoup de Puissances representees ici, dont les cotes de 
leurs vastes empires coloniaux sont protegees par des remparts presque 
parfaits de corail, comme tous les officiers de marine le savent, et il 
serait bon de considerer avec soin les effets qui pourraient resulter de 
toute provision conventionnelle, sur laquelle nous pourrions nous 
mettre d'accord, et qui une fois faite, sera difficile a denoncer. (Ibid., 
p. 408.) 

When the articles of the proposed convention relating 
to areas in which mines might be placed were brought 
before the full committee, opinion was not sufficiently 
favorable to warrant presenting articles 2-5 of the report 
of the comite d' ex am en to the full conference. The 
suppression of these articles necessarily led to certain 
amendments in articles which were related. 

The suppression of reference to the limitation of area 
within which mines might be used was not regarded as 
giving an unlimited right to belligerent or to neutral to 
use mines indiscriminately in any area. It was recog- 
nized that a very heavy responsibility rested upon the one 
who placed a mine to see that it did not injure neutrals. 



128 SUBMARINE MINES. 

The area of the use of mines was broadly left to "the 
conscience, the good sense, and the consciousness of 
the obligations imposed by the principles of humanity." 
(Ibid., Tome I, p. 2S9.) 

Conclusion. — From the discussion there was evident 
widely divergent opinion as to the proper regulations in 
regard to area. From the votes there was no decisive 
conclusion. While much can be left to the sense of interna- 
tional obligation, it would seem that certain general rules 
might be established without unduly impairing the rights 
of innocent parties while securing reasonable freedom of 
action for belligerents. 

Removal of mines. — As belligerents may not only place 
mines within their own waters and on the high seas, but 
also within the waters of one another under present regu- 
lations, it is necessary that some provision be made for 
the removal of the mines at the close of the war. Natu- 
rally also a state would not desire that a foreign vessel 
should enter its waters for the purpose of removing mines 
even in time of peace. Of course, there may be, as the 
delegate of the United States pointed out, complications 
and difficulties in the removal of mines. Though the 
party who placed the mines is under obligation to notify 
the other of the situation of the mines, the difficulties of 
exact statement of these facts may be great, mines may 
have drifted, or may have broken loose so that it is 
impossible to give accurate information. The placing of 
mines off an enemy coast would usually be undertaken at 
considerable risk, would usually be hastily performed, 
and accurate locations would be corresponding^ lacking. 

The mines laid by a state within its own waters would 
naturally be removed by that state, but it may be well 
for the safety of navigation in general that this removal 
be made obligatory. 

The mines laid in the high seas, if this practice is 
allowed, might constitute the greatest danger. The 
difficulty in picking up these mines would be great. 

Article 5 of the Hague convention relative to the lay- 
ing of automatic contact submarine mines seems to be 
generally approved, though it may be questioned whether 



PRECAUTIONS. 129 

it will accomplish in fact what is hoped. The article is 
as follows: 

At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do 
their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each power 
removing its own mines. 

As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the 
belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to 
the other party by the power which laid them, and each power must 
proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own 
waters. 

Precautions as to anchored mines. — The Naval War 
College discussion in 1905 and the discussion at The 
Hague in 1907 as well as the discussion of the Institute 
of International Law through several years, show agree- 
ment upon the point that anchored contact mines should 
be so constructed as to become harmless when breaking 
adrift. 

Article 3 of The Hague Convention of 1907 is: 

When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every pos- 
sible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 

The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these 
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and, should they 
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as 
military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also 
be communicated to the Government through the diplomatic channel 

Manifestly this article is very general in its terms 
Such terms as " every possible precaution" seem to 
guarantee ample care for the peaceful shipping. 

The next clause provides that the mines " shall become 
harmless within a limited time/' but no limit is named. 
The limit may, therefore, be hours, days, weeks, months, 
or perhaps years. The notice of mines not under sur- 
veillance must be given "as soon as military exigencies 
permit." The belligerent must, of course, be the judge 
in most cases of " military exigencies." 

As Capt. Behr of the Russian delegation said, uncon- 
trolled mines should in principle become harmless as 
soon as possible. "La difhculte ne commence que 
lorsqu'on veut realiser ce principe." It is necessary to 
consider the technique of mine construction and the 
possibility of meeting the proposed requirements. Capt. 
Behr further maintained that a satisfactory solution 

71396—15 9* 



130 SUBMARINE MINES. 

would require time and experiment, but some regulation 
would then be valuable in calling attention to the matter 
of the necessity of further regulation at a later date. 
The discussion at The Hague in 1907 is summarized in 
the report as follows: 

Malgre le caractere plus ou moins vague des differentes obligations, 
enoncees dans Particle 6, on a ete d'accord sur leur efficacite, attendu 
que tout etat se fera certes un devoir de les observer rigoureusement, 
en procedant notarnment le plus tot possible aux notifications decre- 
tees, des que les exigences militaires lui permettront de le faire. Quant 
aux conditions de construction, dont parle Palinea 2 de Particle et "au 
laps de temps limite" qui y est prevu, tout en etant unanime, que la 
fixation de ce delai appartient a Petat, qui a pose des mines amarrees, 
afin que ces mines ne continuent pas a etre dangereuses longtemps 
apres la fin des hostilites, on a longuement discute la possibility, au 
point de vue technique, de suffire a ces obligations. Le Capitaine de 
Vaisseau Ottley rappela a ce propos "que les lois de Paction electro- 
gal vanique entre deux metaux dissemblables, en immersion, pretent 
un moyen facile et non couteux de changer ineme les coques des mines 
existantes, afin de satisfaire a la condition de Particle 6: il suffirait de 
percer un trou d'une grandeur de quelques centimetres dans la coque 
d'une mine et de fermer le trou par un bouchon en metal, tel que le 
zinc; en variant le caractere metallique du disque et en modifiant son 
epaisseur, on pourra regler plus ou moins la periode, pendant laquelle 
la mine restera flottante et active; plus le disque sera mince, plus la 
vie active de la mine sera courte." 

Ces constatations, presentees par la Delegation britannique dans une 
des dernieres seances du comite, ne rencontrerent pas d'objections de 
la part des autres delegues techniques presents; neanmoins, on ne crut 
pas pouvoir accepter la proposition, renouvelee par la Delegation 
britannique, de supprimer les mots "dans la mesure du possible" qui 
avaient ete adoptes auparavant. (Deuxieme Conference Interna- 
tionale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 418.) 

There are some who maintain that the anchored con- 
tact mine may be and is more dangerous than the un- 
anchored contact mine, saying: 

The unrestricted use of anchored contact mines in open shallow seas 
will prove such a menace to all vessels which traverse such waters, 
that their entire prohibition seems imperative for the safety of neutrals. 
Free distribution of anchored contact mines will deny navigation of 
such waters to all commerce during the period of hostilities and for an 
unlimited time after hostilities have ceased. The very fact that such 
mines will have to be laid in open shallow waters under cover of dark- 
ness or fog precludes accurate location of them, precludes accurate 
information of such mine dangers to innocent commercial vessels, and 
precludes removal of all such mines at the close of the war. Inaccu- 
rately located mine fields present a greater danger to shipping than a 



PRECAUTIONS. 131 

poorly charted reef, because a mine field laid quickly at night some 
distance from fixed observation marks would be a worse menace to 
navigation than a reef surveyed under similar adverse conditions. 

The loose uncontrolled buoyant contact mine is a terrible menace to 
human life and to neutral commerce — and such drifting buoyant mines 
will remain a danger to shipping throughout vast areas of the sea for a 
long time after peace has been declared. 

Unanchored contact mines ("floating" mines) being of a buoyant 
type can be designed with a positive limitation of operative life 
that is, they can be made to become harmless by sinking after being 
in the water for a fixed period of time. Thus the "floating" or un- 
anchored contact mine would not be a lasting menace to neutral ship- 
ping as would be the case with drifting mines of the anchored contact 
type. Nor would floating mines present as much danger to neutrals as 
securely anchored contact mines, for the reason that the former (owing 
to their limited operative life) would be laid in the immediate area of 
hostilities, which in itself would be sufficient warning of danger to 
neutral vessels, while on the other hand the hidden anchored mine 
fields might be laid anywhere on soundings, be very poorly charted, 
and probably without timely warning to neutrals. It would not be 
difficult to warn neutral vessels away from areas where "two-hour" 
floating mines have been strewn, but would a belligerent divulge to 
neutrals the location of fixed mined areas and thus run the risk of this 
information finding its way to the enemy? 

While the above position seems extrems to some, it is 
nevertheless necessary to observe the fact that during the 
Russo-Japanese war, the drifting mines caused great 
damage even in a maritime area where there was com- 
paratively little shipping. If a like situation should arise 
in the vicinity of a great sea route, the results are serious 
to contemplate. Whatever the view in regard to the 
matter of anchored contact mines if they are not to be 
entirely prohibited, the regulations as to their use should 
be clear and comprehensive. 

There are conditions for which it seems difficult to pro- 
vide adequate safeguards. Such would be the case when 
a vessel approaches a mined area in a fog. The vessel on 
guard to warn innocent vessels may not discover the 
approaching vessel or may be in doubt as to its identity. 
The same condition may arise in a storm or in darkness. 

The notification by public announcement of the general 
area of mining operations may be of little service to the 
neutral or innocent vessel unless it is of a nature to give 
such information to the opposing belligerent as to make 
the mining operations of little use to the belligerent plac- 



132 SUBMARINE MINES. 

ing the mines. For if sufficiently definite information for 
safe navigation is given in the notification this informa- 
tion will equally serve the other belligerent. It would 
seem therefore that the notification would necessarily be 
such as to define in general terms the mined area, the 
conditions of entrance, etc., and until this information 
can be presumed to be known to innocent shipping there 
should be a vessel or vessels stationed in the neighbor- 
hood to warn approaching shipping. 

From the discussion it is evident that the regulations 
in regard to precautions for the safety of peaceful ship- 
ping should be more specific in order that the innocent 
shipping may be properly protected and in order that the 
belligerent may know when he has conformed to require- 
ments. 

Conclusion. — The following regulation may be proposed 
for safeguarding peaceful shipping against the dangers of 
mined areas: 

When anchored automatic contact mines are employed 
every possible precaution must be taken for the security 
of peaceful shipping including — 

1. An advance notice to foreign governments and to 
mariners specifying the general limits of the mined area. 

2. Provision for warning peaceful vessels approaching 
the mined area. 

3. Specification of the time during which the mines 
will be dangerous. 

The same precautions should be taken in the use of 
mines by neutrals. 

Use of mines by neutrals. — The demand for the use of 
mines by neutrals was particularly emphasized by the 
Brazilian and by the Netherlands delegates at The Hague 
in 1907. The Brazilian delegate advocated the use of 
mines by neutrals for the guaranteeing of respect for 
their neutrality. The Netherlands delegate directed 
attention not merely to the preservation of neutrality, 
but also to the fulfillment of neutral obligations. The 
report contains a resume of the points of view: 

L'idee fondamentale contenue dans ces deux propositions etait la 
meme; la proposition bresilienne limitait seulement da vantage, quant 
a leur espece, les mines que les neutres pourraient employer. 



USE BY NEUTRALS. 133 

S. Exc. le Vice-Amiral Roell attira l'attention de la sous-commission 
sur la necessite de reglementer cette matiere et cela a un double point 
de vue; d'un cote, pour reconnaitre expressement la faculte des neutres 
de poser des mines, en vue de preserver leur neutralite, tout en leur 
^ermettant en meme temps de se conformer aux devoirs, qui leur in- 
combent vis-a-vis des deux belligerants, de l'autre cote pour leur 
imposer, quant a Pusage des mines, les memes obligations qui seraient 
imposees aux belligerants, dans l'interet de la navigation pacifique. 
Le Capitaine de Fregate Burlamaqui expliqua a son tour la necessite 
de completer dans ce sens le projet britannique, qui ne paraissait avoir 
en vue que les belligerants; il insista, en meme temps, sur la necessite" 
d'une notification par les neutres, generale ou speciale, selon les cir- 
constances du moment, des regions dans lesquelles ils auraient place 
des mines. II invoqua, a l'appui de ces considerations, les decisions 
prises par l'lnstitut de Droit International dans la session de Gand et 
les opinions de plusieurs auteurs, connus en matiere du droit des gens; 
il conclut en faveur de la faculte, pour les Etats neutres, de poser des 
mines en vue de leur droit primordial de conservation. (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 419.) 

Discussion on other important points is summarized in 
the report: 

Mais on se demanda, si l'assimilation des neutres aux belligerants 
devait aussi s'etendre quant aux lieux ou des mines sous-marines 
pourraient etre mouillees et si les precautions a prendre par les neutres 
ne devaient pas etre plus precises et plus rigoureuses que celles 
prevues pour les belligerants. Le Contre-Amiral Arago exposa que, 
quant a ce qui concerne les neutres, il faudrait se contenter de leur 
permettre la pose de mines seulement dans la zone de trois milles; il 
serait encore necessaire de les obliger a donner avis prealable a la 
navigation des lieux, ou ils voudraient poser des mines, et de notifier 
cet avis d'urgence aux autres Gouvernements; les raisons militaires, 
dit-il, qui donnent plus de latitude aux belligerants, ne peuvent pas 
etre invoquees pour les neutres; la zone de dix milles a ete accordee 
aux belligerants surtout en vue du danger de voir leurs ports bom- 
bardes par les forces navales ennemies; ce danger n'existe pas pour 
les neutres. La latitude accordee aux belligerants, quant a la notifica- 
tion, repond a des exigences de guerre imperieuses; le neutre ne se 
trouve pas dans pareille situation; il peut toujours notifier et il doit 
le faire d'avance, parce que ses eaux sont censees etre ouvertes au libre 
passage des navires pacifiques. 

Aux objections, tirees du droit des neutres de se defendre dans la 
meme mesure que les belligerants et de la possibility qui devrait etre 
accordee aux neutres en vue de se preparer eventuellement a la guerre, 
il fut repondu que les neutres n'ont pas a se defendre, ils n'ont qu'a 
defendre leur neutralite, ce qui n'implique pas une egalite" de droits 
avec les belligerants. Quant aux preparatifs pour une guerre e>en- 
tuelle il serait Evident que ces preparatifs ne sont pas vis£s par les 
dispositions restreignant les neutres a poser des mines dans une zone 
de trois milles. (Ibid, p. 420.) 



134 SUBMARINE MINES. 

The result of the vote showed practically no difference 
of opinion upon the main points, and the conference 
adopted a general regulation embodied in article 4: 

Any neutral power which lays automatic contact mines off its coasts 
must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are 
imposed on belligerents. The neutral power must inform mariners by 
a notice issued in advance where automatic contact mines will be laid. 
This notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through 
the diplomatic channel. 

Conclusion. — The laying of mines by a neutral State 
should not be prohibited. 

Provision for exemption from rules as to mines. — While 
the rules of the Hague convention relative to the laying of 
automatic contact submarine mines were not very strict, 
there were some States whose delegates were not prepared 
to accept even these regulations. To meet the demands 
of these States, article 6 was adopted: 

The contracting powers which do not at present own perfected mines 
of the type contemplated in the present convention, and which con- 
sequently could not at present carry out the rules laid down in articles 
1 and 3, undertake to convert the materiel of their mines as soon as 
possible, so as to bring it into conformity with the foregoing require- 
ments. 

The statement of the position in support of this arti- 
cle was more fully made by the Austrian d?legation in 
presenting the amendment upon which the article is 
based: 

La marine austro-hongroise ne dispose pas, a l'heure qu'il est, de 
mines automatiques de contact amarrees remplissant la condition 
prevue par Particle l er , 2 e alinea, du texte arrete sur la base des 
deliberations du comite d'examen, a savoir de devenir inoffensives 
des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres. Pour se conformer a la 
clause dont il s'agit, la marine austro-hongroise se trouve done dans 
la n^cessite de proceder a une transformation de son materiel de mines. 
Pour cette transformation la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie ne saurait, 
cependant, accepter ni le delai de trois ans propose, ni tout autre 
d61ai fixe a l'avance, une mesure de ce genre contenant, indepen- 
damment de la volonte" personnelle, un element d'incertitude qui, tant 
qu'il subsiste, s'oppose evidemment a, prendre a ce sujet un engage- 
ment formel que Ton ne serait, peut-etre, pas a meme de remplir. 

Dans tout prefectionnement en matiere technique, l'epoque ou Ton 
parviendra a trouver une solution satisfaisante a un probleme que Ton 
se propose de resoudre ne saurait guere etre indiquee a l'avance. M§me 
si le principe scientifique sur lequel repose 1' invention a faire £tait, 



EXEMPTION FROM RULES. 135 

au point de vue theorique, des plus simples, des obstacles absolument 
imprevus et qu'il est bien souvent difficile de vaincre peuvent, a tout 
bout de champ, venir entraver la realisation pratique de l'idee. 

Aussi ne faut-il pas perdre de vue que dans le cas qui nous occupe, il 
ne serait point suffisant de construire un appareil de fonctionnement 
exact, au moyen duquel une mine ayant rompu son amarre f ut auto- 
matiquement rendue inoffensive; il s'agit egalement, et ceci ne me 
semble pas de moindre importance, de donner a l'appareil en question 
une construction telle que les autres parties mecaniques de la mine 
n'en soient point alterees au prejudice de sa valeur militaire, que 
la mine reste simple et non dangereuse a manier et qu'elle ne cesse 
de fonctionner d'une maniere sure et efficace. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir 
eprouve, a ces differents points de vue, l'appareil a construire, ce qui 
selon toute probabilite necessitera une serie de longues experiences, 
que Ton pourra se mettre a la transformation du materiel de mines et 
indiquer alors approximativement Pepoque a laquelle cette operation 
pourra etre terminee. 

Or, si, telles que les choses se presentent, nous voulions fixer, des 
maintenant, par voie conventionnelle, un terme pour la mise en usage 
des mines perfectionnees, et si a l'expiration du delai la transformation 
en question n'etait pas encore executee par une des Puissances con- 
tractantes, cette derniere se trouverait en presence d'une situation des 
plus embarrassantes. Car elle devrait, si une guerre venait a eclater 
dans l'intervalle, ou renoncer a l'emploi des mines qui n'ont pas encore 
ete soumises a la transformation, ou bien manquer a 1' engagement con- 
ventional. L'une et 1' autre de ces eventualites doivent necessaire- 
ment etre ecartees. II nous semble done que si Ton prend au serieux 
l'engagement qu'il s'agit de contraeter, on ne saurait accepter, dans 
l'espece, un delai fixe a l'avance. 

Dans cet ordre d'idees la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie se permet 
de proposer les amendements suivants: 

Article premier. — Ajouter a l'alinea 2 la disposition suivante: 

Les Puissances maritimes qui ne disposent pas encore de ces mines 
perfectionnees et qui, par consequent, ne sauraient actuellement 
s'associer a cette interdiction, s'engagent a transformer, aussitot que 
possible, leur materiel de mines afin que ces dernieres respondent a la 
condition susmentionnee. 

Article 9. — Supprimer cet article. 

Le fait que la transformation des mines s'impose non seulement par 
des considerations humanitaires, mais aussi par l'interet meme des 
Puissances, offre une garantie suffisante que l'engagement formule dans 
la proposition ci-dessus soit fidelement execute. De cette facon le but 
humanitaire auquel on aspire sera realise des qu'il y aura moyen de le 
faire. Agir autrement et accepter des- maintenant ur Jelai determine 
pour la transformation des mines, ce serait, de l'avis de la Delegation 
d'Autriche-Hongrie, prendre un engagement avec une restriction 
mentale, ce qui evidemment ne serait guere en harmonie avec l'obli- 
gation absolue decoulant d'une stipulation conventionnelle. 



136 SUBMARINE MINES. 

Quant aux mines non-amarrees dont il est question au premier alin£a 
de l'article l er de la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie, s'associantentiere- 
ment aux observations present6es a ce sujet par le Delegue naval de 
Grande-Bretagne, estime que Ton pourrait bien se passer d'une dispo- 
sition analogue a celle dont il vient d'etre parle ou de toute autre dispo- 
sition conlenaut la fixation d'un terme. 

En ce qui concerne la disposition de 2 e alinea de l'article 5, la 
Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie s'abstient de toute proposition, la 
clause en question lui paraissant, en principe, inacceptable. (Ibid., 
p. 673.) 

There were propositions to fix a limit of time for trans- 
formation of mines not meeting the requirements of the 
proposed regulations as one year for unanchored mines 
and three years for anchored mines or one year for all 
mines. 

It is plain that as most powers did not disclose the type 
of mines which they possessed almost any power might 
contend that it had not had time for conversion of its 
mines. The expression, "as soon as possible," which 
should determine the limit of the period for conversion to 
the prescribed type might allow, as some parties assumed 
it would, an indefinite period. In fact this clause in most 
respects renders the convention of little use except as a 
statement of what may be desired and as a project which 
may become the basis of further discussion. However, 
there would tea just ground for maintaining that seven 
years would be sufficient time for any State intending to 
act "as soon as possible" to carry out the conversion of 
mines into the type required in the convention. 

Conclusion. — Article 6 of Convention YIII should not 
be continued in force. 

Use of torpedoes. — The Fussian delegation proposed an 
amendment to the original project submitted by Great 
Britain to the effect that — 

Les torpilles seront construites de facon a ce que, en tant quecela est 
possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront manque 
leur but. 

The words "en tant que cela est possible" were not 
acceptable, but the idea embodied in the remaining part 
of the clause was introduced with little discussion into 



GENERAL CONCLUSION. 137 

the first article of the convention. The report of the 
committee says of this subject: 

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees et aux torpilles 
automatiques, l'entente fut, en ce qui concerne leur construction, plus 
facile a etablir. La proposition russe sur les torpilles automatiques 
(annexe 18) fut adoptee a l'unanimite avec suppression des mots 
"autantque possible" qui figuraient dans l'interdiction propcsee par 
la Delegation Imperiale, concernant l'emploide pareilles torpilles, qui 
ne deviennent pas inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but." 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 404.) 

Recently there has been objection to the restriction 
imposed upon the use of torpedoes. Some regard these 
as propelled mines and under a measure of control, be- 
cause their speed, direction, and time of sinking may be 
regulated with much greater degree of certainty than in 
the case of un anchored mines. Unanchored mines are 
usually of simple and inexpensive construction as com- 
pared with the elaborate and expei sive torpedo. Un- 
anchored mines are much more at the mercy of the cur- 
rent and may drift in any direction. The torpedo may 
be directed for a corsiderable time and its mechanical 
corstruction is such that it can be made to sink at a fixed 
time with a great degree of certainty that there will he no 
mistake. The proposition has accordingly been made to 
allow to the torpedo a period equivalent to that allowed 
to the unanchored mine on the following grounds: that 
from its nature the torpedo is more under control than 
the Unanchored mine, that the present regulation is not a 
practicable one as there is no way by which the belligerent 
at which the torpedo is aimed can tell whether the torpedo 
has failed to hit its mark in most instances, and that it is 
inexpedient to discriminate in favor of the cheap and 
dangerous unanchored mine against the carefully con- 
structed and controlled torpedo. 

Conclusion.— The use of torpedoes should not be further, 
but should be less, regulated if any change is made in the 
convention. 

General. — The Hague Convention VIII, 1907, relative 
to the laying of automatic contact submarine mines was 
admitted to be tentative. There was much difference of 
opinion in the conference which adopted the convention. 



138 SUBMARINE MINES. 

The interests of the powers were not identical. The 
actual value of mines in maritime warfare was a matter 
of difference of opinion. The coupling of the idea of 
submarine mine with the idea of the torpedo was not alto- 
gether logical without further distinction, as torpedoes 
would in general be more completely under control than 
would some forms of mines. Uncontrolled and hidden 
perils like unanchored submarine mines or torpedoes of 
similar character should be prohibited outside the area of 
immediate belligerent operations. At present it seems 
possible to draw certain conclusions of a general character. 
Conclusion. — (a) The use of submarine mines should 
not be absolutely prohibited. 

(b) The use of unanchored automatic contact mines 
should be prohibited or more defmiteh r restricted. 1 

(c) The area within which mines may be placed should 
be determined by regulation. 

(d) When anchored automatic contact mines are em- 
ployed, every possible precaution must be taken for the 
security of peaceful shipping, including — 

1. An advance notice to foreign governments and to 
mariners specifying the general limits of the mined area. 

2. Provision for warning peaceful vessels approaching 
the mined area. 

3. Specification of the time during which the mines 
will be dangerous. 

(e) The laying of mines by a neutral State should not 
be prohibited. 

(/) Article 6 of Convention VIII should not be con- 
tinued in force. 

(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but 
should be less regulated if any change is made in the 
convention. 

1 Using the phraseology of The Hague Convention and introducing the proposed 
changes, the following form may be suggested as meeting present requirements and 
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines except when they 
are so constructed as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before passing outside the area of belligeren 
activities. 



APPENDIX. 



LES LOIS DE LA GUERRE MARITIME DANS LES 
RAPPORTS ENTRE BELLIGERANTS. 



139 



LES LOIS DE LA GUERRE MARITIME DANS LES RAPPORTS 

ENTRE BELLIGERANTS. 

Manuel Adopte par l'Institut de Droit International 
(Session d'Oxford, 1913). 1 

preambule. 

L'Institut de droit international, dans sa session de Christiania, 
a declare maintenir fermement ses Resolutions anterieures, en ce qui 
concerne l'abolition de la capture et de la confiscation de la propriety 
privee ennemie dans la guerre maritime. Mais, constatant, en meme 
temps, que l'acceptation de ce principe n'est pas encore acquise et 
considerant qu'aussi longtemps qu'elle ne le sera pas, le reglement 
du droit de capture est indispensable, il a charge une Commission 
d'elaborer des dispositions prevoyant l'une et l'autre eventuality. 
C'est en execution de cette derniere decision que l'Institut a, dans sa 
session d'Oxford, le 9 aout 1913, adopte, en premier lieu, le Manuel qui 
suit, fonde sur le droit de capture. 2 

Section I re . — Des lieux ou des hostilites peuvent etre commises. 

Article l er . Les regies speciales a la guerre maritime ne sont 
applicables qu'a la pleine mer et aux eaux territoriales des belligerants 
a l'exclusion des eaux qui, sous le rapport de la navigation, ne doivent 
pas etre considerees comme maritimes. 

1 Ce Manuel a ete adopte, a l'unanimite des 54 membres et associes presents, sauf une 
abstention, apres cinq jours de deliberations. D'apres les resolutions de l'Institut le 
texte en a 6te revise par un Comite de redaction, au point de vue de la forme et de la 
terminologie, et accompagne' de quelques definitions. 

2 Definitions. — La capture est l'acte par lequel le commandant du batiment de guerre 
substitue son autorite a celle du capitaine du navire ennemi sous reserve du jugement 
ulterieur de la juridiction des prises quant au sort definitif du navire et de sa cargaison. 

La saisie, lorsqu'elle s'applique au navire, est l'acte par lequel le batiment de guerre 
prend possession du navire arrete, avec ou sans l'assentiment du capitaine de celui-ci. 
La saisie differe de la capture en ce que le sort ulterieur du navire peut n'§tre pas en 
cause quant a l'eventualite de sa confiscation. 

Appliqu6e aux marcbandises seules, la saisie est l'acte par lequel le batiment de 
guerre, avec ou sans l'assentiment du captaine du navire arrets, prend possession de ces 
marchandises et les detient ou en dispose sous reserve du jugement ulterieur de la juri- 
diction des prises. 

La confiscation est l'acte par lequel la juridiction des prises valide la capture d'un 
navire ou la saisie de marchandises. 

Le mot prise est une expression generate s'appliquant au navire capture" ou a la 
marchandise saisie. II designe 6galement le fait de s'emparer d'un batiment de guerre. 

Sont designed comme navires publics tous navires autres que les batiments de guerre 
qui, appartenant a l'Etat ou a des particuliers, sont affected a un service public et se 
trouvent sous les ordres d'un fonctionnaire dument commissionne" de l'Etat. 

141 



142 APPENDIX. 

Section II. — De la force armee des etats belligerants. 

Article 2. Bdtiments de guerre. — Font partie de la force arm£e d'un 
Etat belligerant et sont, des lors, soumis comme tels aux lois de la 
guerre maritime: 

1° Tous batiments appartenant a PEtat qui, sous la direction d'un 
commandant militaire et montes par un equipage militaire, portent 
avec autorisation le pavilion et la flamme de la marine militaire. 

2° Les navires transformed par l'Etat en batiments de guerre con- 
formement aux articles 3 a 6. 

Article 3. Transformation des navires publics et prives en bdtiments 
de guerre. — Aucun navire transforme" en batiment de guerre ne peut 
avoir les droits et les obligations attaches a cette qualite", s'il n'est 
place* sous Pautorite" directe, le controle immediat et la responsabilite 
de la puissance dont il porte le pavilion. 

Article 4. Les navires transformed en batiments de guerre doivent 
porter les signes exterieurs distinctifs des batiments de guerre de leur 
nationality . 

Article 5. Le commandant doit etre au service de l'Etat et dument 
commissionne par les autorites competentes; son nom doit figurer sur 
la liste des officiers de la flotte militaire. 

Article 6. L'equipage doit etre sounds aux regies de la discipline 
militaire. 

Article 7. Tout navire transforme en batiment de guerre est tenu 
d 'observer dans ses operations les lois et coutumes de la guerre. 

Article 8. Le belligerant qui transforme un navire en batiment de 
guerre doit, le plus tot possible, mentionner cette transformation sur 
la liste des batiments de sa flotte militaire. 

Article 9. La transformation d'un navire en batiment de guerre ne 
peut etre faite par un belligerant que dans ses propres eaux, dans celles 
d'un Etat allie egalement belligerant, dans celles de l'adversaire, ou 
enfin dans celles d'un territoire occupe par les troupes de l'un de cea 
Etats. 

Article 10. Transformation des bdtiments de guerre en navires publics 
ou prives. — Un batiment de guerre ne peut, tant que durent les hos- 
tilites, etre transforme" en navire public ou en navire prive. 

Article 11. Personnel belligerant. — Font partie de la force arm£e 
d'un Etat belligerant et sont, des lors, soumis comme tels aux lois de la 
guerre maritime, en tant qu'ils accomplissent des operations sur mer: 

1° le personnel des batiments indiques a Particle 2; 

2° les troupes de 1 'armee de mer, active ou de reserve; 

3° le personnel militarise existant sur les cotes; 

4° les troupes regulieres ou regulierement organisees conformement 
a Particle l er du Reglement de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 concernant 
les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, autres que celles de l'arm£e 
de mer. 

Article 12. Course, Navires prives, Navires publics ne constituant pas 
des navires de guerre. — La course est interdite. 



MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 143 

En dehors des conditions determinees aux articles 3 et suivants, les 
navires publics et les navires prives, ainsi que leur personnel, ne peu- 
vent pas se livrer a des actes d'hostilite contre l'ennemi. 

II est toutefois permis aux uns et aux autres d 'employer la force 
pour se defendre contre l'attaque d'un navire ennemi. 

Article 13. — Population du territoire non occupe. — La population 
d'un territoire non occupe qui, a l'approche de l'ennemi, arme spon- 
tanement des navires pour le combattre, sans avoir eu le temps de les 
faire transformer en batiments de guerre conformement aux articles 3 
et suivants, sera consideree comme belligerante, si elle agit ouverte- 
ment et si elle respecte les lois et usages de la guerre. 

Section III. — Des moyens de nuire a l'ennemi. 

Article 14. Principe. — Les belligerants n'ont pas un droit illimite" 
quant au choix des moyens de nuire a l'ennemi. 

Article 15. Moyens perfides et barbares. — Les ruses de guerre sont 
considerees comme licites. Toutefois les moyens qui impliquent la 
perfidie sont defendus. 

Ainsi il est interdit: 

1° De tuer ou de blesser par trahison des individus appartenant a 
la partie adverse. 

2° D'user indfiment du pavilion parlementaire, de faire usage de 
faux pavilions, uniformes ou insignes, quels qu'ils soient, notamment 
de ceux de l'ennemi, ainsi que des signes distinctifs de l'assistance 
hospitaliere indiques aux articles 41 et 42. 

Article 16. Outre les prohibitions etablies par des conventions 
speciales il est interdit: 

1° d'employer du poison ou des armes empoisonnees, ainsi que des 
projectiles que ont pour but unique de repandre des gaz asphyxiants 
ou deleteres. 

2° d'employer des armes, des projectiles ou des matieres propres a 
causer des maux superflus. Rentrent specialement dans cette cat6- 
gorie les projectiles explosibles ou charges de matieres fulminantes ou 
inflammables, d'un poids inferieur a 400 grammes, et les balles qui 
s'epanouissent ou s'aplatissent facilement dans le corps humain, telles 
que les balles a enveloppe dure dont l'enveloppe ne couvrirait pas 
completement le noyau ou serait pourvue d'incisions. 

Article 17. II est egalement interdit: 

1° de tuer ou de blesser un ennemi qui, ayant mis bas les armes ou 
n'ayant plus le moyen de se defendre, s'est rendu a discretion. 

2° de couler un navire qui s'est rendu avant d' avoir recueilli 
1' equipage. 

3° de declarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier. 

Article 18. Le pillage et la devastation sont interdits 

II est interdit de detruire des proprietes ennemies, hors les cas ou 
ces destructions seraient imperieusement commandees par les neces- 
sites de la guerre ou autorisees par les dispositions du present regle- 
ment. 



144 APPENDIX. 

Article 19. Torpilles. — II est interdit de faire usage de torpilles 
qui ne deviennent pas inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur 
but. 

Article 20. Mines sous-marines. — II est interdit de placer en pleine 
mer des mines automatiques de contact, amarrees ou non. 

Article 21. Les belligerants peuvent placer des mines dans leurs 
eaux territoriales et dans celles de l'ennemi. 

Mais il leur est interdit, meme dans ces eaux territoriales: 

1° de placer des mines automatiques de contact non amarrees, a 
moins qu'elles ne soient construites de maniere a devenir inoffensives 
une heure au maximum apres que celui qui les a placets en aura 
perdu le controle. 

2° de placer des mines automatiques de contact amarrees qui ne 
deviennent pas inoffensives des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres. 

Article 22. Un belligerant ne peut placer des mines devant les 
cotes et les ports de son adversaire que pour des buts navals et mili- 
taires. II lui est interdit de les y placer pour etablir ou maintenir 
un blocus de commerce. 

Article 23. Lorsque des mines automatiques de contact, amarrees 
ou non amarrees, sont employees, toutes les precautions doivent etre 
prises pour la securite de la navigation pacifique . 

Les belligerants pourvoiront notamment, dans la mesure du possible, 
a ce que les mines deviennent inoffensives apres un laps de temps 
limite. 

Dans le cas ou les mines cesseraient d'etre surveillees par eux, les 
belligerants signaleront les regions dangereuses, aussitot que les exi- 
gences militaires le permettront, par un avis a la navigation, qui devra 
etre aussi communique aux gouvernements par la voie diplomatique. 

Article 24. A la fin de la guerre, les Etats belligerants feront tout 
ce qui depend d'eux pour enlever, chacun de son c6te, les mines qu'ils 
auront placees. 

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees que l'un des 
belligerants aurait laissees sur les cotes de l'autre, l'emplacement en 
sera notifie a l'autre partie par l'Etat qui les aura pcs^es, et chaque Etat 
devra proceder, dans le plus bref delai, a l'enlevement des mines qui 
se trouvent dans ses eaux. 

Les Etats belligerants auxquels incombe l'obligation d'enlever les 
mines apres la fin de la lutte devront, dans le plus bref delai possible, 
faire connaitre que l'enlevement de ces mines a ete termine dans la 
mesure du possible. 

Article 25. Bombardement. — II est interdit de bombarder des port6, 
villes, villages, habitations ou batiments qui ne so dtfendent pas. 

Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que, 
devant ses cotes, se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines auto- 
matiques de contact. 

Article 26. Toutefois, ne sont pas compris dans cette interdiction 
les ouvrages militaires, etablissements militaires ou navals, depots 
d'armes ou de materiel de guerre, ateliers et installations propres a 
etre utilises pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie et les 



RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF BELLIGERENTS. 145 

batiments de guerre se trouvaat dans le port. Le commandant d'une 
force navale pourra, apre3 sommation avec delai raisonnable, les 
d^truire par le canon, si tout autre moyen est impossible et lorsque les 
autorites locales n'auront pas procede a cette destruction dans le d61ai 
fixe. 

II n'encourt aucune responsabilite dans ce cas pour les dommages 
involontaires qui pourraient etre occasionnes par le bombard ement. 

Si des neces3ite3 militaires, exigeant une action immediate, ne per- 
mettaient pas d'accorder de delai, il reste entendu que l'interdiction 
de bombarder une ville qui ne se defend pas, subsiste comme dans le 
cas enonce dan3 Palinea l er et que le commandant prendra toutes les 
dispositions voulue3 pour qu'il en resulte pour cette ville le moins 
d'inconvenients possibles. 

Article 27. Est interdit le bombardement, pour le non paiement 
des contributions en argent ou pour le refus d'obtemperer a des 
requisitions de vivres ou d'approvisionnements, des ports, villes, 
villages, habitations ou batiments qui ne se dependent pas. 

Article 28. Dans le bombardement, toute devastation inutile reste 
interdite et, notamment, toutes les mesures doivent etre prises par le 
commandant de la force assaillante pour epargner, autant que possible, 
les edifices consacres aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et a la bien- 
faisance, les monuments historiques, les hopitaux et les lieux de ras- 
semblement de malade3 ou de blesses, a condition qu'ils ne soient pas 
employes en meme temps a un but militaire. 

Le devoir des habitants est de designer ces monuments, ces edifices 
ou lieux de rassemblement par des signes visibles, qui consisteront en 
grands panneaux rectangulaires rigides, partages, suivant une des 
diagonales, en deux triangles de couleur, noire en haut et blanche en 
bas. 

Article 29. Sauf le cas oil les exigences militaires ne le permet- 
traient pas, le commandant de la force navale assaillante doit, avant 
d'entreprendre le bombardement, faire tout ce qui depend de lui pour 
avertir les autorites. 

Article 30. Blocus. — Les ports et cotes de l'ennemi ou occupes 
par lui peuvent etre soumis a un blocus conformement aux regies du 
droit international. 

Section IV. — Des droits etdes devoirs du belligerant en ce qui 

CONCERNE LES CHOSES DE L'ENNEMI. 

Article 31. A. Navires et cargaisons. — Batiments de guerre. — La 
force armee d'un Etat peut attaquer, pour s'en emparer ou les d^truire, 
avec leur armement et leurs approvisionnements, les batiments de 
guerre de l'ennemi, meme s'ils se trouvent, au debut de la lutte, dans 
un port de l'Etat, ou sont rencontres en mer dans l'ignorance des hos- 
tilites, ou si la force majeure les a contraints d'entrer dans un port ou 
les a jetes sur les cotes du dit Etat. 

Article 32. Navires publics et navires prives: Arret, visite et recher- 
ches. — Tous navires autres que ceux de la marine de guerre, qu'ila 

71396—15 10* 



146 APPENDIX. 

appartiennent a l'Etat ou a des particuliers, peuvent etre sommes par 
un batiment de guerre belligerant de s'arreter pour qu'il soit procede, 
a leur bord, a une visite et a des recherches. 

Le batiment de guerre du belligerant, pour inviter le navire a s'ar- 
reter, tirera un coup de canon de semonce a poudre et, si cet avis n'est 
pas suffisant, il tirera un projectile dans l'avant du navire. Aupara- 
vant, ou en meme temps, le batiment de guerre hissera son pavilion 
an dessus duquel, en temps de nuit, un fanal sera place. Le navire 
re'pond au signal en hissant son propre pavilion et en s"arretant aussitot; 
dans ce cas, le batiment de guerre enverra au navire arrete une chaloupe 
montee par un officier accompagne d'un nombre d'hommes suffisant, 
dont deux ou trois seulement se rendront avec l'officier a bord du 
navire arrete. 

La visite consiste en premier lieu dans l'examen des papiers de bord. 

Si les papiers de bord sont insuffisants ou ne sont pas de nature a 
exclure les soupcons, l'officier qui a opere la visite est en droit de 
proceder a des recherches sur le navire, et il doit requerir a cet effet 
le concours du capitaine. 

La visite des paquebots-poste doit, comme il est dit a l'article 53, 
etre effectuee avec tous les managements et toute la celerite possibles. 

Les navires convoyes par un batiment de guerre neutre ne sont soumis 
a la visite que dans la mesure des regies relatives aux convois. 

Article 33. Principe de la capture. — Les navires publics et les navirea 
prives, de nationalite ennemie, sont sujet a capture, etles marchandises 
ennemies, publiques ou privees qui existent a, leur bord, sont passible 
de saisie. 

Article 34. La capture et la saisie sont admises alors meme que 
les navires ou les marchandises sont tombes au pouvoir du belligerant 
a, la suite d'une force majeure, par naufrage ou relache forcee. 

Article 35. Sont passibles de saisie les navires qui ne possedent 
aucuns papiers de bord, ont cache ou detruit intentionnellement ceux 
qu'ils possedaient ou en presentent de faux 

Article 36. Attenuations au principe de la capture — Lorsqu'un 
navire public ou prive relevant d'une des puissances belligerantes se 
trouve, au debut des hostilites, dans un port ennemi, il lui est permis 
de sortir librement, immediatement ou apres un delai suffisant, et de 
gagner directement apres avoir ete muni d'un laisser-passer,' son port 
de destination ou tel autre port qui lui sera designe 

II en est de meme du navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart 
avant le commencement de la guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi 
sans connaitre les hostilites. 

Article 37. Le navire public ou prive qui, par suite de circonstances 
de force majeure, n'aurait pu quitter le port ennemi pendant le delai 
vise a l'article precedent, ne peut etre confisque. 

Le belligerant peut seulement le saisir moyennant l'obligation de le 
restituer apres la guerre sans indemnite, ou le requisitionner moyennant 
indemnite. 

Article 38. Les navires ennemis, publics ou prives, qui ont quitte 
leur dernier port de depart avant le commencement de la guerre et qui 



HOSPITAL SHIPS. 147 

sont rencontres en mer ignorants des hostility, ne peuvent §tre cap- 
tures, lis sont seulement sujets a etre saisis, moyennant l'obligation 
de les restituer apres la guerre sans indemnity, ou a etre requisitionn£s, 
ou meme a etre detruits, a charge d'indemnite et sous obligation de 
pourvoir a la securite des personnes ainsi qu'a la conservation des 
papiers de bord. 

Neanmoins, au cas ou ces navires seraient rencontres en mer avant 
l'expiration d'un delai suffisant a accorder par le belligerant, la saisie 
ne peut etre operee. Les navires ainsi rencontres sont libres de gagner 
leur port de destination ou tel autre port que leur serait design^. 

Apres avoir touche a un port de leur pays ou a un port neutre, ces 
navires sont sounds au droit de capture. 

Article 39. Les marchandises ennemies se trouvant a bord des 
navires saisis par application des articles 37 et 38 peuvent egalement 
§tre retenues. Elles seront restituees apres la guerre sans indemnite, 
saui a etre requisitionnees moyennant indemnite. 

II en est de meme des marchandises ayant le caractere de contre- 
bande de guerre qui se trouvent a bord des navires vises aux articles 
36, 37, et 38, alors meme que ces navires ne sont pas soumis a la saisie. 

Article 40. Dans tous les cas vises aux articles 36, 37, et 38, lea 
navires publics ou prives dont la construction indique qu'ils sont 
destines a etre transformed en batiments de guerre, peuvent etre saisis 
ou requisitionnes moyennant indemnity. Ces navires seront restitu6s 
apres la guerre. 

Les marchandises qui se trouvent a bord de ces navires seront traitees 
d'apres les regies de l'article 39. 

Article 41. Exceptions aux principes des articles 31 et 33. — Bdtiments 
hospitaliers . — Sont respectes et ne peuvent etre saisis pendant la 
duree des hostilites les batiments-hopitaux militaires, c'est-a-dire les 
batiments construits ou amenages par les Etats specialement et unique- 
ment en vue de porter secour3 aux blesses, malades et naufrages, et 
dont les noms auront ete communiques, a l'ouverture ou au cours des 
hostilites, en tout cas avant toute mise en usage, aux puissances 
belligerantes. 

Les batiments-hopitaux militaires seront distingues par une peinture 
exterieure blanche avec une bande horizontale verte d'un metre et 
demi de largeur environ. 

Les embarcations des batiments qui viennent d'etre mentionn^s, 
comme les petits batiments qui pourront etre affectes au service hospi- 
talier, se distingueront par une peinture analogue. 

Tous les batiments hospitaliers se feront reconnaitre en hissant, avec 
leur pavilion national, le pavilion blanc a croix rouge prevu par la 
Convention de Geneve. 

Les batiments et embarcations ci-dessus mentionnes, qui veulent 
s'assurer, la nuit, le respect auquel ils ont droit, ont, avec Tassentiment 
du belligerant qu'ils accompagnent, a prendre les mesures necessaires 
pour que la peinture qui les caracterise soit suffisamment apparente. 

Les signes distinctifs prevus au present article ne pourront etre 
employes que pour proteger ou designer les batiments mentionnes. 



148 APPENDIX. 

Ces batiments ne peuvent etre utilises pour aucun but militaire. 

lis ne devront gener en aucune maniere les mouvements des com- 
battants. 

Pendant et apres le combat, ils agiront a, leurs risques et perils. 

Les belligerants auront sur eux droit de co.itrole et de visite; ila 
pourront refuser leur concours, leur enjoindre de s' Eloigner, leur 
imposer une direction determined et mettre a bord un commissaire, 
meme les detenir si la gravite" des circonstances l'exigeait. 

Autant que possible, les belligerants inscriront sur le journal du 
bord des batiments hospitaliers les ordres qu'ils leur donneront. 

Les batiments hospitaliers qui, dans les termes du present article, 
sont detenus par l'ennemi auront a rentrer le pavilion national du 
belligerant dont ils relevent. 

Article 42. Les batiments hospitaliers, equipes en totalite ou en 
partie aux frais de particuliers ou des societ£s de secours officiellement 
reconnues, sont egalement respectes et exempts de saisie, si la puissance 
belligerante dont ils dependent leur a donne une commission officielle 
et en a notifie les noms a la puissance adverse a l'ouverture ou au 
cours des hostilites, en tout cas avant toute mise en usage. 

Ces navires doivent etre porteurs d'un document de l'autorite com- 
petente declarant qu'ils ont ete sounds a son controle pendant leur arme- 
ment et a leur depart final. 

Les batiments dont il s'agit seront distingu£s par une peinture ex- 
terieure blanche avec une bande horizontale rouge d'un metre et demi 
de largeur environ. 

Ils sont soumis aux regies etablies pour les batiments-hopitaux 
militaires par l'article 41. 

Article 43. Dans le cas d'un combat a bord d'un vaisseau de guerre, 
les infirmerie8 et leur materiel seront respectes et menages autant 
que faire se pourra. Tout en demeurant soumis aux lois de la guerre, 
ils ne pourront etre detournes de leur emploi, tant qu'ils seront neces- 
eaires aux blesses et malades. Le commandant qui les a en son pouvoir 
a cependant la faculte d'en disposer, en cas de necessite militaire im- 
portante, en assurant le sort des blesses et malades qui s'y trouvent. 

Article 44. La protection due aux batiments hospitaliers et aux 
infirmeries des vaisseaux cesse si Ton en use pour commettre des actes 
nuisibles a l'ennemi. N'est pas considere comme etant de nature a 
justifier le retrait de la protection, le fait que le personnel de ces bati- 
ments et de ces infirmeries est arme* pour le maintien de l'ordre et pour 
la defense des blesses ou malades, ainsi que le fait de la presence a 
bord d'une installation radio-telegraphique. 

Article 45. Navires de cartel. — Ne puevent etre saisis, pendant 
qu'ils remplissent leur mission, les navires dits de cartel, qui font 
office de parlementaires, meme s'ils appartiennent a la marine militaire. 

Est considere comme navire de cartel, le navire autorise par l'un 
des belligerants a enter en pourparlers avec l'autre et se presentant 
avec un pavilion blanc. 

Le chef auquel un navire de cartel est expedie n'est pas oblige de le 
recevoir en toutes circonstances. II peut prendre toutes les mesures 



ZONE OF OPERATIONS. 149 

necessaires afin d'empecher le navire de cartel de profiter de sa mission 
pour se renseigner. II a le droit, en cas d'abus, de retenir temporaire- 
ment le navire de cartel. 

Le navire de cartel perd ses droits d'inviolabilit£, s'il est prouve", 
d'une maniere positive et irrecusable, que le commandant a profite de 
la position privilegiee de ce navire pour provoquer ou commettre un 
acte de trahison. 

Article 46. Navires charges de missions. — Sont exempts de saisie les 
navires charges de missions religieuses, scientifiques ou philanthro- 
piques. 

Article 47. Bateaux affectes a la peche cotiere et a la petite navigation 
locale. — Les bateaux exclusivement affectes a la peche cotiere, ou a 
des services de petite navigation locale, y compris ceux exclusivement 
affectes au pilotage ou au service des phares, comme aussi les navires 
destines a naviguer principalement sur les fleuves, canaux et lacs, sont 
exempts de saisie, ainsi que leurs engins, agres, apparaux et charge- 
ments. 

II est interdit de profiter du caractere inoffensif des dits bateaux pour 
les employer dans un but militaire en leur conservant leur apparence 
pacifique. 

Article 48. Navires munis d'un sauf-conduit ou d'une licence. — Sont 
exempts de capture les navires ennemis pourvus d'un sauf-conduit ou 
d'une licence. 

Article 49. Cessation des immunites. — Les exceptions visees dans 
les articles 41, 42, 45, 46, 47 et 48 cessent d'etre applicables si les 
navires qui en font l'objet participent d'une facon quelconque aux 
hostilites ou commettent d'autres actes qui sont interdits aux neutres 
comme assistance hostile. 

II en est de meme si, sommes de s'arreter pour etre soumis a la visite, 
ils essayent de s'y soustraire par la force ou par la fuite. 

Article 50. Droits du belligerant dans la zone de ses operations. — 
Alors qu'il n'aurait pas le droit de les saisir ou de les capturer, un 
belligerant peut, meme en haute mer, defendre aux navires de l'ennemi 
d'entrer dans la zone correspondant a la sphere d'action actuelle de 
ses operations. 

II peut aussi leur interdire dans cette zone certains actes susceptibles 
de nuire a son action, notamment certains actes de communication, 
comme par exemple la telegraphie sans fil. 

La simple infraction a. ces interdictions entrainera le refoulement, 
mdme par la force, du navire hors de la zone interdite et le sequestre des 
appareils. Le navire, s'il est etabli qu'il a communique avec l'ennemi 
pour lui fournir des renseignements sur la conduite des hostilites, pourra 
§tre considere comme s'etant mis a son service et sera par suite passible 
de capture ainsi que ses appareils. 

Article 51. — Du caractere ennemi. — Le caractere ennemi ou neutre 
d'un navire est determine par le pavilion qu'il a le droit de porter. 

Le caractere ou neutre des marchandises trouvees a bord d'un navire 
ennemi est determine par le caractere ennemi ou neutre de leur pro- 
prietaire. 



150 APPENDIX. 

Chaque Etat doit declarer, au plus tard des le debut des hostility, si 
le caractere ennemi ou neutre du proprietaire des marchandises est 
determine" par le domicile ou par la nationality de ce proprietaire. 

Le caractere ennemi de la marchandise trouvee a bord d'un navire 
ennemi subsiste jusqu'a l'arriv£e a destination, nonobstant un transfert 
intervenu pendant le cours de l'expedition, apres l'ouverture des hos- 
tility. 

Toutefois, si, anterieurement a la capture, un precedent proprietaire 
neutre exerce, en cas de faillite du proprietaire ennemi actuel, un droit 
de revendication legale sur la marchandise, celle-ci reprend le caractere 
neutre. 

Article 52. Du transfert du pavilion. — Le transfert sous pavilion 
neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectue avant l'ouverture des hostility, 
est valable, a moins qu'il soit etabli que ce transfert a ete" effectue en 
vue d'eUuder les consequences qu'entraine le caractere de navire 
ennemi. II y a neanmoins presomption de nullite" si l'acte de transfert 
ne se trouve pas a bord, alors que le navire a perdu la nationality bel- 
ligerante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouventure des hostilites; la 
preuve contraire est admise. 

II y a presomption absolue de validity d'un transfert effectue" plus de 
trente jours avant l'ouverture des hostilites, s'il est absolu, complet, 
conforme a la legislation des pays interesses, et s'il a cet effet que le 
controle du navire et le benefice de son emploi ne restent pas entre lea 
memes mains qu'avant le transfert. Toutefois, si le navire a perdu la 
nationalite belligerante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des 
hostilites, et si l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas a bord, la saisie du 
navire ne pourra donner lieu a des dommages et interets. 

Le transfert sous pavilion neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectue apres 
l'ouverture des hostilites, est nul, a moins qu'il soit etabli que ce trans- 
fert n'a pas ete effectue en vue d'£luder les consequences qu'entraine 
le caractere de navire ennemi. 

Toutefois, il y a presomption absolue de nullite : 1° si le transfert a 
^te effectue pendant que le navire est en voyage ou dans un port bloqu6; 
2° s'il y a faculte de remere ou de retour; 3 e si les conditions auxquelles 
est soumis le droit de pavilion d'apres la legislation du pavilion 
arbore, n'ont pas ete" observees. 

Article 53. B. Correspondance postale. — La correspondance postale, 
quelque soit son caractere officiel ou prive, trouvee en mer sur un 
batiment ennemi, est inviolable, a moins qu'elle ne soit en destina- 
tion ou en provenance d'un port bloque. 

L'inviolabilite de la correspondance postale ne soustrait pas les 
paquebots-poste aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur mer concernant 
les navires en general. Toutefois la visite n'en doit etre effectuee 
qu'en cas de necessite avec tous les managements et toute la celerite 
possibles. 

S'il y a saisie du navire sur lequel la poste est embarquee, la cor- 
respondance est expediee avec le moins de retard possible par le 
capteur. 



SUBMARINE CABLES. 151 

Article 54. C. Cdbles sous-marins. — Les Etats belligerants ne sont 
autorises a saisir et a detruire, dans les conditions determinees ci- 
dessous, que les cables sous-marins reliant leurs territoires ou deux 
points de ces territoires, et les cables reliant le territoire d'un des pays 
en guerre a un territoire neutre. 

Le cable les territoires des deux belligerants ou deux parties du 
territoire d'un des belligerants peut &tre saisi ou detruit partout, ex- 
cepte dans les eaux d'un Etat neutre. 

Le cable reliant un territoire neutre au territoire d'un des belligerants 
ne peut, en aucun cas, §tre saisi ou detruit dans les eaux dependant 
d'un territoire neutre. En haute mer, ce cable ne peut etre saisi ou 
detruit que s'il y a blocus effectif et dans les limites de la ligne de 
blocus, sauf retablissement du cable dans le plus bref delai possible. 
Ce cable peut toujours etre saisi ou detruit sur le territoire et dans la 
mer territoriale dependant d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'a une 
distance de trois milles mar ins de la laisse de basse maree. La saisie 
ou la destruction ne peut jamais avoir lieu que dans le cas de necessite 
absolue. 

En ce qui concerne l'application des regies precedentes, il n'y a pas 
de difference a 6tablir entre les cables, selon qu'ils sont des cables 
d'Etat ou qu'ils appartiennent a des particuliers; il n'y a pas non plus 
a teuir compte de la nationality de leurs proprietaires. 

Les cables sous-marins reliant un territoire belligerant a un territoire 
neutre, qui auront ete saisis ou detruits, devront etre restitues et les 
indemnitee seront reglees a la paix. 

Section V. — Des droits et devoirs du belligerant en ce qui 

CONCERNE LES PERSONNES. 

Article 55. A. Personnel des navires — Bdtiments de guerre. — En cas 
de prise par l'ennemi d'un batiment de guerre, les combattants et les 
non-combattants faisant partie de la force armee des belligerants ont 
droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre. 

Article 56. Navires publics ou prives. — Lorsqu'un navire ennemi 
public ou prive est saisi par un belligerant, les hommes de son equipage, 
nationaux d'un Etat neutre, ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre. II 
en est de meme du capitaine et desofficiers, egalement nationaux d'un 
Etat neutre, s'ils promettent formellement par ecrit de ne prendre, 
pendant la duree des hostilites, aucun service ayant rapport avec les 
operations de la guerre. Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de 
l'equipage, nationaux de l'Etat ennemi, ne sont pas faits prisonniers 
de guerre, a condition qu'ils s'engagent, sous la foi d'une promesse 
formelle ecrite, a ne prendre, pendant la duree des hostilites, aucun 
service ayant rapport avec les operations de la guerre. 

Article 57. Les noms des individus laisses libres sous la condition 
de la promesse prevue par l'article precedent sont notifies par le bel- 
ligerant capteur a l'autre belligerant. II est interdit a ce dernier 
d' employer sciemment les dits individus. 



152 APPENDIX. 

Article 58. Toute personne faisant partie de F6quipage d'un navire 
public ou prive ennemi est, sauf preuve contraire, presumee de natio- 
nality ennemie. 

Article 59. Ne peuvent etre retenus comme tels les membres du 
personnel d'un navire ennemi qui, a raison de son caractere particulier, 
est lui-meme exempt de saisie. 

Article 60. Sous la condition de la promesse prevue par Varticle 
precedent. — Lorsqu'un navire public ou prive a directement ou indi- 
rectement pris part aux hostilites, l'ennemi peut retenir comme pri- 
sonniers de guerre tous les membres du personnel du navire, sans 
prejudice des penalites qui peuvent etre encourues d 'autre part. 

Article 61. Les membres du personnel d'un navire public ou d'un 
navire prive, qui se rendent personnellement coupables d'un acte 
hostile envers l'ennemi, peuvent etre retenus par lui comme prison- 
niers de guerre, sans prejudice des penalites qui peuvent etre encourues 
d'autre part. 

Article 62. B. Passagers. — Les individus qui suivent une force 
navale sans en faire partie, tels que les fournisseurs, correspondants de 
journaux, etc., lorsqu'ils tombent au pouvoir de l'ennemi, et lorsque 
celui-ci juge utile de les retenir, ne peuvent etre detenus qu'aussi 
longtemps que les necessites militaires l'exigent. lis ont droit au 
traitement des prisonniers de guerre. 

Article 63. Les passagers qui, sans faire partie de 1' equipage, se 
trouvent a bord d'un navire ennemi, ne peuvent etre retenus comme 
prisonniers de guerre par l'ennemi, a moins qu'ils ne se soient rendus 
coupables d'un acte hostile. 

Tout passager incorpore dans la force armee de l'ennemi peut etre 
fait prisonnier de guerre, meme si le navire n'est pas susceptible de 
saisie. 

Article 64. C. Personnel religieux, medical et hospitaller. — Le per- 
sonnel religieux, medical et hospitalier de tout batiment pris ou saisi 
est inviolable et ne peut etre fait prisonnier de guerre. II emporte, en 
quittant le navire, les objets et les instruments de chirurgie qui sont sa 
propriete particuliere. 

Ce personnel continuera a remplir ses fonctions tant que cela sera 
necessaire et il pourra ensuite se retirer, lorsque le commandant en 
chef le jugera possible. 

Les belligerants doivent assurer a ce personnel tombe entre leurs 
mains les memes allocations et la meme solde qu'au personnel des 
raemes grades de leur propre marine. 

Jouit de la protection dont beneficie le personnel sanitaire, le com- 
missaire mis par le belligerant a bord du batiment hospitalier de son 
adversaire, conformement a Palinea 10 de l'article 41. 

Le personnel religieux, medical et hospitalier perd ses droits a 
Pinviolabilite, s'il s'immisce dans les hostilites, si, par exemple, il 
fait usage de ses armes autrement que comme moyen de defense. 

Article 65. D. Parlementaires. — Le personnel des navires de cartel 
est inviolable. 



SPIES, GUIDES, ETC. 153 

II perd ses droits a l'inviolabilite s'il est prouve - d'une maniere 
positive et irrecusable qu'il a profite de sa position privilegiee pour 
provoquer ou commettre un acte de trahison. 

Article 66. E. Espions. — L'espion, meme pris sur le fait, ne peut 
dtre puni sans jugement prealable. 

Article 67. On ne doit considerer comme espion que l'individu 
qui, agissant clandestinement ou sous de faux pretextes, et dissimulant 
ainsi ses operations, recueille ou cherche a recueillir des informations 
dans la zone d'operations d'un belligerant avec l'intention de les com- 
muniquer a la partie adverse. 

Ne peuvent, des lors, etre reputes espions et sont soumis au traite- 
ment des prisonniers de guerre, s'ils sont captures, les militaires non 
deguises qui ont penetre dans la zone d'operations de la flotte ennemie 
a l'effet de recueillir des informations. De meme, ne sont pas regarded 
comme espions les militaires et les non militaires accomplissant ouver- 
tement leur mission, qui sont charges de transmettre des depeches, ou 
qui se livrent a la transmission et a la reception de depeches par tele- 
graphie sans fil. A cette categorie appartiennent egalement les indi- 
vidus envoyes en aeronefs ou en hydroaeroplanes pour faire un service 
d' exploration dans la zone d'operations de la flotte ennemie ou pour 
entretenir des communications. 

Article 68. L'espion qui reussit a sortir de la zone correspondant 
a la sphere d'action actuelle des operations de l'ennemi, ou qui a rejoint 
la force armee a laquelle il appartient, n'encourt, s'il tombe plus tard 
au pouvoir de l'ennemi, aucune responsabilite pour ses actes anterieurs. 

Article 69. F. Requisition des nationaux de VEtat ennemi: Guides, 
pilotes et otages. Le belligerant n'a pas le droit de forcer les individus 
qui tombent en son pouvoir, et d'une maniere generale les nationaux 
de la partie adverse, a prendre part aux operations de guerre dirigees 
contre leur pays, meme dans le cas ou ils auraient ete a son service 
avant le commencement de la guerre, ainsi que de les contraindre a 
donner des renseignements sur leur propre Etat, ses forces, sa position 
militaire ou ses moyens de defense 

II ne pourra les obliger a lui servir de guides ou de pilotes. 

II pourra toutefois punir ceux qui sciemment et volontairement se 
seront offerts pour l'induire en erreur. 

II n'est pas permis de forcer les nationaux d'un belligerant a preter 
serment a la puissance ennemie. 

II est interdit de prendre des otages. 

Article 70. G. Prisonniers de guerre. — Les prisonniers de guerre 
sont au pouvoir du gouvernement ennemi, mais non des individus 
ou des corps qui les ont captures. 

Ils doivent etre traites avec humanite. 

Tout ce qui leur appartient personnellement reste leur propriete, 
excepte les armes, les chevaux, les papiers militaires, et en general 
tous objets specialement adaptes a un but militaire, 

Article 71. Les prisonniers de guerre ne peuvent etre assujettis a 
l'internement sur un navire qu'en cas de necessite et temporairement. 



154 APPENDIX. 

Article 72. Le gouvernement au pouvoir duquel se trouvent lea 
prisonniers de guerre est charge de leur eutretien. 

Article 73. Tous les prisonniers de guerre seront, aussi longtemps 
qu'ils se trouvent a bord d'un navire, soumis aux lois, reglements et 
ordres en vigueur dans la flotte de l'Etat au pouvoir duquel ils se 
trouvent. 

Article 74. Les prisonniers evades qui seraient repris avant 
d'avoir pu r6ussir a sortir de la sphere d'action actuelle de l'ennemi, 
ou avant d'avoir pu rejoindre la force armee a laquelle ils appartien- 
nent, sont passibles de peines disciplinaires. 

Les prisonniers qui, apres avoir reussi a s'evader, sont de nouveau 
faits prisonniers, ne sont passibles d'aucune peine pour la fuite ant6- 
rieure. 

Article 75. Chaque prisonnier de guerre est tenu de declarer, s'il 
est interroge a ce sujet, ses veritables nom et grade, et, dans le cas 
oil il enfreindrait cette regie, il s'exposerait a une restriction des 
a vantages accord es aux prisonniers de guerre de sa categoric 

Article 76. Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent etre mis en liberte 
sur parole, si les lois de leur pays les y autorisent, et, en pareil cas, ils 
sont obliges, sous la garantie de leur honneur personnel, de remplir 
scrupuleusement, tant vis-a-vis de leur propre gouvernement que 
vis-a-vis de celui qui les a faits prisonniers, les engagements qu'ils 
auraient contractus. 

Dans le meme cas, leur propre gouvernement est tenu de n'exlger 
ni accepter d'eux aucun service contraire a la parole donnee. 

Article 77. tin prisonnier de guerre ne peut etre contraint d'ac- 
cepter sa liberte sur parole; de meme le gouvernement ennemi n'est 
pas oblige d'acceder a la demande du prisonnier reclamant sa mise 
en liberte sur parole. 

Article 78. Tout prisonnier de guerre, lib ere sur parole et repris 
portant les armes contre le gouvernement envers lequel il s'etait engage" 
d'honneur, ou contre les allies de celui-ci, perd le droit au traitement 
des prisonniers de guerre et peut etre traduit devant les tribunaux, a 
moins que, posterieurement a sa liberation, il n'ait ete compris dans 
un cartel d'echange sans conditions. 

Article 79. Les prisonniers de la guerre maritime debarques sur 
le territoire continental sont soumis aux regies etablies pour les prison- 
niers de la guerre terrestre. 

Les memes regies doivent etre appliquees, dans la mesure du possible, 
aux prisonniers de guerre internes sur un navire. 

Les regies qui precedent, dans la mesure ou il est possible de les 
appliquer, doivent etre suivies vis a vis des prisonniers de guerre des 
le moment de leur capture, alors qu'ils sont sur le navire qui les conduit 
au lieu de leur internement. 

Article 80. Apres la conclusion de la paix, le repatriement des 
prisonniers de guerre s'effectuera dans le plus bref delai possible. 

Article 81. H. Blesses, malades, naufrages et morts. — Les bati- 
ments employes au service hospitalier porteront secours et assistance 
aux blesses, malades et naufrages des bellige>ants sans distinction de 
nationality. 



OCCUPATION. 155 

Article 82. Dans le cas de prise ou de saisie d'un navire ennemi 
ou d'un batiment hospitaller qui a manque a ses obligations, les marins 
et les militaires embarques et les autres personnes officiellement at- 
tachees aux marines ou aux armees, blesses, malades ou naufrages, a 
quelque nation qu'ils appartiennent, seront respectes et soignes par les 
capteurs. 

Article 83. Tout batiment de guerre d'une partie belligerante 
peut reclamer la remise des blesses, malades ou naufrages, qui sont a 
bord de batiments-hdpitaux militaires, de batiments hospitaliers de 
eocietes de secours ou de particuliers, de navires de commerce, yachts 
et embarcations quelle que soit la nationalite de ces batiments. 

Article 84. Sont prisonniers de guerre les naufrages, blesses ou 
malades d'un belligerant qui tombent au pouvoir de l'autre. II 
appartient a celui-ci de decider suivant les circonstances, s'il convient 
de les garder, de les diriger sur un port de sa nation, sur un port neutre 
ou meme sur un port de son adversaire. Dans ce dernier cas, les prison- 
niers ainsi rendus a leur pays ne pourront servir pendant la duree de la 
guerre. 

Article 85. Apres chaque combat, les deux parties belligerant es, 
en tant que les interets militaires le comportent, prendront des 
mesures pour rechercher les naufrages, les blesses et les malades, et 
pour les faire proteger, ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les 
mauvais traltements. 

Elles veilleront a ceque l'inhumation, l'immersion ou l'incineration 
des morts soit precedee d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres. 

Article 86. Chaque belligerant enverra, des qu'il sera possible, 
aux autorites de leur pays, de leur marine ou de leur armee, les marques 
ou pieces militaires d'identite trouvees sur les morts et l'etat nomi- 
natif des blesses ou malades recueillis par lui. 

Les belligerants se tiendront reciproquement au courant des interne- 
ments et des mutations, ainsi que des entrees dans les hdpitaux et des 
deces survenus parmi les blesses et malades en leur pouvoir. lis 
recueilleront, pour les faire transmettre aux interesses par les autorites 
de leur pays, tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc., 
qui seront trouves dans les navires pris ou saisis, ou qui seront delais- 
s6s par les blesses ou malades decedes dans les hdpitaux. 

Article 87. En cas d'operations de guerre entre les forces de terre 
et de mer des belligerants, les dispositions du present reglement sur 
Tassistance hospitaliere ne seront applicables qu'aux forces embar- 
quees. 

Section VI. — Des droits et des devoirs du belligerant en 

territoire occupe. 

Article 88. Occupation: etendue et effets. — I/occupation d'un 
territoire maritime, c'est-a-dire des golfes, baies, rades, ports et eaux 
territoriales, n'existe que dans les cas ou il y a en me>me temps occupa- 
tion du territoire continental, soit par une force navale, soit par une 
force militaire. L'occupation est, ence cas, soumise auxlois et usages 
de la guerre terrestre. 



156 APPENDIX. 

Section VII. — Des conventions entre belligerants. 

Article 89. Regies generates. — Le commandant de toute force 
naval e belligerante peut conclure des conventions de nature purement 
tnilitaire concernant les forces sous ses ordres. 

II ne peut, sans autorisation de son gouvernement, conclure aucune 
convention ayant un caractere politique, telle qu'un armistice general. 

Article 90. Toutes conventions entre belligerants doivent tenir 
compte des regies de l'honneur militaire et, une fois fixees, doivent 
§tre scrupuleusement observees par les deux parties. 

Article 91. Capitulation. — Apres avoir conclu une capitulation, 
le commandant ne peutendommager nidetruire lesnavires, objets ou 
approvisionnements en sa possession qu'il doit livrer, a moins que le 
droit d'agir ainsi ne lui ait ete expressement reserve dans la capitu- 
lation. 

Article 92. Armistice. — L'armistice suspend les operations de la 
guerre. 

Les blocus etablis au moment de l'armistice ne sont pas leves, a 
moins d'une stipulation sp£ciale dans la convention. 

Le droit de visite continue a pouvoir etre exerce. Le droit de capture 
cesse hormis les cas oil ce droit existerait a l'egard des navires neutres. 

Article 93. L'armistice peut etre general ou partiel. Le premier 
suspend partout les operations de guerre des Etats belligerants; le 
second seulement entre certaines fractions des forces belligerantes et 
dans un rayon determine. 

Article 94. La convention qui stipule un armistice doit indiquer 
avec precision le moment ou il commence et celui ou il doit finir. 

L'armistice doit etre notifie officiellement et en temps utile par 
chaque belligerant aux autorites competentes ainsi qu'aux forces 
interessees. 

Article 95. Les hostilites sont suspendues au terme fixe par la 
convention, ou, si un terme ira pas ete etabli, immediatement apres la 
notification de l'armistice. 

Si la duree de l'armistice n'a pas ete determinee, les parties bellige- 
rantes peuvent reprendre en tout temps les operations, pourvu toutefois 
que l'ennemi soit averti en temps utile. 

Article 96. Les clauses de l'armistice naval fixeront, au cas oil 
elles admettraient l'acces des batiments de guerre des belligerants a 
certains points du littoral ennemi, les conditions de cet acces et les 
rapports de ces batiments soit avec les autorites locales, soit avec les 
populations. 

Article 97. Toute violation grave de l'armistice par l'une des 
parties donne a l'autrele droit deledenonceret meme,encasd'urgence, 
de reprendre immediatement les hostilites. 

Article 98. La violation des clauses de l'armistice par des par- 
ticuliers isoles, agissant de leur propre initiative, donne droit seule- 
ment a reclamer la punition des coupables et, s'il y a lieu, une indem- 
nity pour les pertes eprouvees. 



PRIZE. 157 

Article 99. Suspension d'armes. — La suspension d'armes doit, 
comme l'armistice, fixer avec precision le point de depart de l'arret 
des hostilites et le moment ou doit cesser son effet. 

S'il n'y a pas de delai fixe pour la reprise des hostilites, le belligerant 
qui se propose de continuer la lutte doit en prevenir l'ennemi en temps 
utile. 

La rupture d'une suspension d'armes par l'un des belligerants ou 
par des particuliers isoles entraine les consequences visees aux articles 
97 et 98. 

Section VIII. — Des formalites de la saisie et du jugement des 

prises. 

Article 100. Formalites de la saisie. — Lorsque, apres la visite qui 
en aura ete faite, un navire est reconnu susceptible de capture, l'orricier 
qui en opere la saisie doit: 

1° mettre sous scelles, apres les avoir inventories, tous les papiers de 
bord du navire; 

2° dresser un proces-verbal de la saisie, ainsi qu'un inventaire 
sommaire du batiment constatant son etat; 

3° constater l'etat de la cargaison dont il sera dresse un inventaire, 
puis faire fermer les ecoutilles de la cale, les coffres et les soutes et y 
apposer les scelles autant que le permettent les circonstances; 

4° dresser la liste des personnes trouvees a bord; 

5° mettre a bord du navire saisi un equipage suffisant pour s'assurer 
du navire et y maintenir Pordre et le conduire dans tel port qu'il 
appartiendra. 

S'il le juge a propos, le capitaine peut, au lieu de detacher un equi- 
page a bord du navire, se borner a l'escorter. 

Article 101. En dehors des personnes susceptibles d'etre con- 
siderees comme prisonniers de guerre ou d'etre punies, le belligerant ne 
peut retenir, sur le navire saisi, que pendant un delai raisonnable, 
celles qu'il est necessaire d 'entendre comme temoins pour la cons- 
tatation des faits: a moins d'empechement absolu il doit les remettre 
en liberte apres que proces-verbal de leurs depositions a ete dresse. 

Si des circonstances speciales le commandent, le capitaine, les 
ofnciers et une partie de 1' equipage du navire saisi peuvent etre pris a 
bord du capteur. 

Le capteur pourvoira a l'entretien des personnes retenues et leur 
donnera, en tout cas, ainsi qu'aux personnes de l'equipage, lors de leur 
mise en liberte, les moyens provisoirement necessaires pour leur 
entretien ulterieur. 

Article 102. Le navire saisi doit etre conduit dans un port de l'Etat 
capteur ou dans celui d'une puissance belligerante alliee, aussi proche 
que possible, susceptible d'offrir un abri sur et ayant des communica- 
tions faciles avec le tribunal des prises charge de statuer sur la capture. 

Pendant le voyage, la prise naviguera avec le pavilion et la flamme, 
insigne des navires militaires de l'Etat. 



158 APPENDIX. 

Article 103. Le navire saisi et la cargaison seront, autant que 
possible, raaintenus intacts durant leur voyage au port. 

Si la cargaison comprend des choses susceptibles de se deteriorer 
facilement. le capteur, autant que possible d 'accord avec le capitaine 
du navire saisi et en sa presence, prendra les mesures les plus conve- 
nables pour la conservation de ces choses. 

Article 104. Destruction des navires et des marchandises confiscables. — 
II n'est permifl aux belligerants de detruire les navires ennemis saisis 
qu'en tant qu'ils sont sujets a confiscation et en presence d'une 
necessity oxceptionnelle, c'est-a-dire lorsque P exigent la securite du 
navire capteur ou le succes des operations de guerre dans lesquelles 
celui-ci est actuellement engage. 

Avant la destruction, les personnes qui se trouvent a bord devront 
etre mises en siirete. et tons les papiers de bord et autres pieces que les 
interesses estimeront utiles pour le jugement sur la validite de la 
capture, devront etre transbordes sur le navire capteur. II en sera de 
meme. dans la mesure du possible, pour les marchandises. 

II sera dresse proces-verbal de la destruction du navire capture 1 et 
des motifs qui l'ont amenee. 

Article 105. Le capteur a la faculte d'exiger la remise ou de 
proceder a la destruction des marchandises confiscables trouvees a- bord 
d'un navire qui lui-meme n'est pas sujet a confiscation, lorsque les 
circonstances sont telles que, d'apres Particle precedent, elles justi- 
fieraient la destruction dun navire passible de confiscation. II 
mentionne les objets livres ou detruits sur le livre de bord du navire 
arrete et se fait remettre par le capitaine copie certifiee conforme de 
tous papiers utiles. Lorsque la remise ou la destruction a ete effectuee 
et que les formalites ont ete remplies, le capitaine doit etre autorise a 
continuer sa route. 

Article 108. Emploi des navires saisis. — Si le navire saisi ou sa 
cargaison est necessaire au capteur pour un usage public immediat, il 
peut les employer a cet usage. Dans ce cas il sera fait du navire et de 
la cargaison, par des personnes impartiales, une estimation et un 
inventaire soigneux qui, joints au dossier de la saisie, seront transmis 
au tribunal des pri>< 

Article 107. Perte des prises par fortune de mer. — Si une prise est 
perdue par fortune de mer, on doit constater le fait avec soin. Aucune 
indemnite n'est due, dans ce cas, ni pour le navire, ni pour le charge- 
ment, pourvu que, si la prise est annulee ulterieurement, le capteur 
puisse prouver que la perte aurait eu lieu meme en Pabsence du 
capture. 

Article 108. Rescousse. — Lorsqu'un navire pris, puis repris, vient 
a etre enleve au recapteur, le dernier capteur a seul des droits sur lui. 

Article 109. Jugement des prises. — Le navire saisi et son charge- 
ment, une fois entres dans un port de PEtat capteur ou dans celui d'une 
puissance alliee, sont remis a Pautorite competente, avec tous les docu- 
ments necessaires. 

Article 110. La legalite et la regularite de la capture des navires 
ennemis et de la saisie des marchandises doivent etre etablies devant 
la juridiction des prises. 



TERMINATION OF WAR. 159 

Article 111. Toute reprise doit egalement etre jugee par la juridic- 
tion des prises. 

Article 112. Un Etat belligerant n'acquerra la propriete du navire 
ou des marchandises qu'il a saisis durant la guerre qu'au moment ou, 
par une decision devenue definitive, la juridiction des prises aura pro- 
nonce a son profit la confiscation de ce navire ou de ces marchandises. 

Article 113. Si la saisie du navire ou des marchandises n'est pas 
validee par la juridiction des prises, ou si, sans qu'il y ait eu de mise 
en jugement, la saisie n'est pas maintenue, les interesses ont droit a des 
dommages et interets, a moins qu'il y ait eu des motifs suffisants de 
saisir le navire ou les marchandises. 

Article 114. Dans le cas de destruction d'un navire, le capteur sera 
tenu d'indemniser les interesses, s'il n'est pas justifie par lui de la neces- 
site exceptionnelle de la destruction, ou si, la destruction ayant ete 
justifiee, la capture est ensuite declaree nulle. 

La meme regie est applicable dans Phypothese prevue a 1' article 105. 

Si des marchandises qui n'etaient pas susceptibles de confiscation 
ont ete detruites, le proprietaire de ces marchandises a droit a une 
indemnite. 

Au cas ou le capteur a fait emploi du navire ou de la cargaison apres 
la saisie, LI devra, si celle-ci est reconnue illegitime, payer aux interes- 
ses une equitable indemnite, d' apres les documents dresses au moment 
de P emploi. 

Article 115. A la difference des navires publics non militaires et 
des navires prives ennemis, les batiments de la marine militaire d'un 
belligerant pris par son Padversaire, deviennent, ainsi que leur mate- 
riel, la propriete de celui-ci, des qu'ils sont tombes en sa possession, 
sans que doive intervenir une decision de la juridiction des prises. 

Section IX. — De la fin des hostllites. 

Article 116. Paix. — Les actes d'hostilite doivent cesser par la sig- 
nature de la paix. 

L'avis de la fin de la guerre doit etre notifie dans le plus bref delai 
par chaque gouvernement au commandant de ses forces navales. 

Lorsque des actes hostiles ont ete accomplis apres la signature de la 
paix, on doit, autant que possible, remettre les choses en Petat. 

Lorsqu'ils ont ete accomplis apres connaissance de l'avis officiel du 
traite de paix, ils donneront lieu a une indemnite et a la punition des 
coupables. 

Article additionnel. 

Conformement a Particle 3 de la Convention de La Haye du 18 
octobre 1907, concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, la 
partie belligerante qui violerait les dispositions du present reglement 
sera tenue a une indemnite, s'il y a lieu; elle sera responsable de tous 
actes commis par les personnes faisant partie de sa force armee navale. 



INDEX. 



A. Page. 

Adjudication of prize 158 

Agreements between belligerents 156 

Aircraft, use of in foreign jurisdiction 46, 47 

Anchorage of vessels of war 44 

Area (see Mines) : 

Limitations of mined 119, 127, 128 

Armistice 156 

Armed forces of belligerents 142 

Arms, carrying on foreign territory 48 

Aube, Admiral, on bombardment 70-72, 83 

B. 

Baltic Sea, regulations • 44 

Belligerents: 

Rights and duties concerning enemy property 145 

Rights and duties concerning persons 151 

Rights and duties in occupied territory 155 

Rights in zones of operations 154 

Bellona, case of the 29 

Blockade, use of mines in 121, 145 

Bombardment by land forces 78, 93 

Brussels rules, No. 74 74 

Hague convention, 1899 73 

Hague convention, 1907 74 

Bombardment by naval forces 68-99, 144 

Admiral Aube on, 1882 70-72, 83 

Conclusion on 69, 98 

Convention concerning, 1907 68-72 

Conclusion as to 98 

Ratifications of 78 

Report on 85 

Vote on 78 

Defense, as cause of 75 

Dupuis, opinion of 79 

Hague, discussion, 1899 73 

Hague, discussion, 1907 74 

Holland on 73 

Institute of International Law 79, 93, 96, 144 

Material of war, because of 84, 85 

Military necessity, because of 87, 88, 89, 92 

71396—15 11* 161 



162 INDEX. 

Bombardment by naval forces — Continued. Page. 

M ines, because of 77 

Provisions, because of 94 

Report on 85 

Requisitions, because of 95 

Resume, 1882-1907 83 

Supplies, because of 93 

Turno-Italian War, 1911-12 91 

Vessels, because of 86 

Brazil, neutrality regulations, 1898, 1904 15 

British : 

Instructions to delegates concerning automatic contact 

mines 108 

Opinion on bombardment because of mines 77, 78 

C. 

Cables, submarine 151 

Canals: 

Interparliamentary Union on 50 

Panama Canal 50 

Suez Canal 50 

Use of 49, 50 

Capitulation 156 

Capture defined 141, 146 

Capture, formalities of 157 

Cartel ships 20, 31, 34, 148 

Classification of public vessels. (See Vessels, classification of 
public.) 

Closure of a port 37 

Condemnation 158 

Confiscation defined 141 

Conversion of merchant ships 87, 142 

Cuba, lighthouses, 1898 24, 25 

Customs inspection 46 

D. 

Decret, 26 Mai, 1913, French 52 

Defense, what constitutes 75, 76 

Denmark, neutrality regulations, 1898 16 

Departure of vessels of war, foreign regulations in regard to 43 

Destruction of vessels, Institute rules 158 

Dupuis: 

On bombardment 79 

On mines Ill 

E. 

Enemy character 149 

Entrance of vessels: 

Authorization 38 

German regulation 38 



INDEX. 163 

Entrance of vessels — -Continued. Page. 

French regulation 39, 46, 52, 53, 54 

In time of peace 37, 40 

In time of war 51-66 

Italian rules 60 

Restrictions in United States 39 

Vessels of war • 37 

Exploration, vessels engaged in 22, 31 

F. 

Ferguson on lighthouses 23 

Flag, transfer of 150 

France, regulation of entrance of foreign ships of war into ports of 39, 

46, 52, 53, 54 
Fishing vessels, coast 31, 149 

G. 

Germany : 

Regulation of entrance of foreign ships of war into ports of. . 38 

Position on laying of mines 119, 123 

Guides 1 53 

H. 

Hague Peace Conference on — 

Bombardment 73, 74, 75, 81 

Hospital ships 18, 19, 20, 31 

Material of war 84, 85 

Military necessity and bombardment, discussion, 1907 . . 89, 90, 91 

Mines 102-106, 108, 109, 110, 118, 123, 134-136 

Ships of war, definition of 10, 11-14 

Torpedoes 100, 101, 114, 122, 136, 137, 145 

Hague convention: 

Bombardment by naval forces, 1907 68-72 

Laying mines 118, 136, 137, 144 

Preamble on mines 106 

Submarines 137 

Hatsuse, destruction of 101 

Holland, Prof., on bombardment 72, 73 

Hospital ships 18, 19, 20, 31, 34, 147 

Hostages 153 

Hostilities: 

Conclusion of 159 

Places where they can be committed 141 

I. 

Immunities, loss of by vessels 149 

Institute of International Law, on: 

Boats in local trade '. 31 

Bombardment 79, 81, 93 

Coast fishing 31 



164 INDEX. 

Institute of International Law, on — Continued. Page. 

Laws of maritime warfare (Oxford, 1913) 96. 139-159 

Lighthouse vessels 31 

Mines 122 

Pilot vessels 31 

" Zone of operations" 149 

Italy: 

1905, neutrality regulations 16 

Regulation of admission of vessels to ports 60-63 

J. 
Japan: 

1894, regulations regarding hospital ships and lighthouse 

boats 24 

1898, neutrality regulations 16 

L. 

Laws of maritime warfare. Institute of International Law, 1913. 139-159 

Lighthouses 23 

Cuba, 1898 24, 25 

Far East 23, 28 

For defense 25 

Regulations 23 

San Juan, P. R., 1898 25,26 

Service in China 23 

Tenders to 23, 27, 33 

Light vessels 27, 28 

Lights: 

Cuban, in Spanish War 24 

Extinction of 27 

Maintenance of 27 

Loss of prize 158 

U. 

Mail 150 

Maritime war, changes in method and changes in law of regula- 
tion 10 

Means of injuring enemy (see also Mines) 143 

Military necessity: 

Bombardment and 69 

Doctrines of 87 

Hague discussion. 1907 88, 89 

L'nited States rules 88 

Von Moltke on 88 

Mines, submarine: 

American delegates on 103, 113, 125, 126 

Anchored contact, danger of 107, 129-132 

Area 100, 116, 118, 127 

Blockaded 117 

German delegation on 119, 123 



INDEX 165 

Mines, submarine — Continued. 

Area — Continued. Page. 

Netherlands delegation on 118, 119 

Strategic 57, 117 

Spanish delegation on 119 

Automatic contact 100 

Austrian delegation on 134 

Before "military ports " 121 

Blockade, use for 121 

Bombardment, because of 68, 77 

Brazil, proposition of 103, 132 

British delegation on 108, 109, 124 

British opinion on bombardment because of 77, 78 

Circumstances of use 120 

Chinese vessels and 102 

Colombian project 120 

Commerce, use against 121 

Conclusion 100, 138 

Controlled 107 

Dupuis on 79, 111 

German — 

Position 103, 110, 123 

Suggestion 119 

Hague convention, 1907, character of 106 

Hague propositions, 1907 102, 104, 123 

Hatsuse, destruction of the 101 

High seas 128 

Italy, proposition of 103 

Institute of International Law on 123, 144 

Japan, proposition of 103 

Laying of 101,117,118 

High sea 128 

National waters 128 

Neutral waters 132, 134 

Russo-Japanese War 101, 111, 118 

Life of 48, 1 29 

Marginal waters 123 

Naval War College, discussion, 1913 121, 122 

Netherlands, proposition of 103 

Amendment 118, 119 

Neutral use 132-134 

Brazilian delegate on 132 

Laying of, vote 134 

Netherlands delegate on 132 

Summary 133 

Notice of laying 100 

Petropavlovsk, destruction of the 102 

Precautions 102, 114, 129-132 

Propositions before Hague conference 119, 134 



166 INDEX. 

Mines, submarine — Continued. Page. 

Pursuit, use for 112 

Removal 128 

Russia on 104, 129 

Russo-Japanese War 101, 102 

Spain on 103, 118 

Torpedoes 100, 101, 112, 114, 122, 136, 137, 144 

Transformation, limit of time 136 

Types 106 

Anchored 108, 129-132 

Controlled 108 

Torpedo 100, 101, 112, 114, 122 

Unanchored, contact 100, 110, 112, 115 

Life- 

One-half hour 116 

One hour 113, 114, 115 

Precautions 114-117 

Pursuit 113 

Russian delegation 129 

Russo-Japanese War Ill 

Use in pursuit 112 

United States, attitude at The Hague, 1907, regarding. . 113 

Warning of use 100 

Westlake on 118 

N. 

Naval War College, discussion on mines, 1913 121, 122 

Netherlands: 

Amendment to proposition on mines 119 

Attitude on mines 103 

Regulations on departure 46 

Regulations of admission of foreign ships of war 51-67 

Neutrality proclamations and treatment of ships of war 15 

Neutrals, use of mines by 132-134 

O. 

Occupation by naval forces 155 

Operations, area of 149 

P. 

Panama Canal, use of 50 

Philanthropic work, vessels in 21, 22, 31 

Pilots 153 

Port regulations, and foreign vessels of war 44, 46 

Pradier-Fode>6, admission of foreign vessels of war into ports. . . 37 

Prisoners of war 153 

Sick, shipwrecked, wounded 154 

Prize, defined 141 

Public officials, exemption from regulation of vessels with 49 

Public vessels, classification of. (See Vessels, classification of 
public.) 



INDEX. 167 

Q- Page. 

Quarantine 45 

R. 

Reay, Lord, definition of ships of war 11 

Recapture of vessels 158 

Requisitions 95, 153 

Revenue Service 29 

Cooperation with Navy 28 

In 1790 28 

Jurisdiction for revenue purposes 28 

Personnel "of vessels in 29 

Service of United States 28 

Vessels 33 

Russia, regulation of admission of vessels to ports 63-66 

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05 — use of mines during 101-102 

S. 

Safe conduct 149 

Scientific work, vessels engaged in 21, 22, 31 

Seizure 157 

Defined and explained 141 

Ships of war. (See Vessels of war.) 

Sojourn of vessels of war, foreign regulations as to 42 

Soundings 46, 47 

Spain, position on laying of mines 119 

Sperry, Admiral: 

On status of auxiliary vessels 13 

On mines 125 

Spies 153 

Straits, mining of 118 

Submarine cables 151 

Submarine mines. (See Mines, submarine.) 

Submarines, operations in foreign waters 47 

Suez Canal, use of 50 

Suspension of arms 157 

T. 

Target practice 46, 47 

Termination of war 159 

Torpedoes (see also Mines) 136, 144 

Comparison with mines 122, 144 

Life of 114, 136 

Regulations as to 100, 101, 138, 144 

Russian delegation on 136 

Transfer of flag 150 

Transformation of vessels 142 

Treatment of public vessels. (See Vessels, treatment of public.) 



168 INDEX. 

U. 
United States: Page. 

Restrictions as to use of certain harbors 39 

Regulations relating to foreign vessels of war in territorial 

waters 66 

V. 

Vessels, classification of public 9, 34 

Auxiliary vessels 11,13 

Cartel ships 20, 31, 152 

Conclusion 9, 34 

Definitions 11-18 

. Exploration 22, 31 

Ferguson on lighthouse sen-ice 23 

Hospital ships 18, 19, 20, 31, 147 

Lighthouse service 23, 28, 33 

Neutrality proclamations 15 

Philanthropic work 31, 148 

Religious work 31, 148 

Revenue service 28, 29, 33 

Scientific service 22, 31, 148 

Sperry, Admiral, on auxiliary vessels 13 

War vessels 11-18 

Vessels, enemy character 149 

Vessels, treatment of public 9. 30, 31, 34 

Cartel ships 20, 31, 34, 148 

Conclusions 9, 34 

Exploration service 31 

Hospital ships 18, 31, 147 

Lighthouse service 28, 31, 33 

Passengers 152 

Personnel 151, 152 

Pilot service 31 

Quasi-public vessels 34 

Revenue service 28 

Vessels of war, regulations as to foreign, in waters under United 

States jurisdiction 35, 36. 51, 66 

Aircraft on 46, 47 

Anchorage 44 

Armed personnel 48 

Canals, vessels in 49, 50 

Closure of port 37 

Conclusion 35, 66 

Customs duties 46 

Definition 35, 142 

Departure 40, 42 

Belgian rule 43 

French rule 43 

German rule 43 

Italian rule 43 



INDEX. 169 

Vessels of war, etc. — Continued. Page. 

Entrance 37, 51 

Authorization 38 

Day, during 37, 55 

German rules 38 

Fog 56 

French rules 39, 52 

Italian rules 60-63 

Netherlands rules 57-60 

Night 56 

Permission 56 

Russian rules 63-66 

Storm 56 

United States 39 

French regulations 39, 46, 52 

German regulations 38 

Navy Regulations, United States, 1913 46 

Netherlands regulations 46, 57 

Number 40 

Officials on board 49 

Permission to enter 56 

Port regulations 44, 46 

Quarantine regulations 45 

Restrictions, notice of 38 

Sojourn 41, 42 

Sovereigns and public officials 49 

Soundings 46, 47 

Submarines, use of 46, 47 

Target practice 46, 47 

Violations of rules 48 

Vis major 49 

Zone of operations 58, 149 

Vessels, public: 

Classification 9, 34 

Treatment 9, 34 

Vis major 50 

Visit and search 145 

Von Moltke on doctrines of military necessity 91 

W. 

Westlake, Prof. , on laying mines 118 

Wheaton, admission of foreign vessels of war into ports 37 

Y. 
Yenissei, destruction of the 102 

Z. 
1 ' Zone of operations " 149 

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